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The United States Supreme Court has struggled with the Constitutional
rights of corporations since shortly after the adoption of the Constitution.
At various times in the nineteenth century, the Court described a corporation
as "[t]hat invisible, intangible, and artificial being, that mere legal entity"; i
"an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation
of law"; 2 "an artificial body of men, composed of diverse constituent
members"; 3 and an "artificial person[] created by the legislature, and
possessing only the attributes which the legislature has prescribed." 4 Yet,
these descriptions of the ontological status of the corporation failed to assist
the Court in developing a consistent theory for determining the constitution-
al rights of corporations.
During the nineteenth century the Court held that corporations were
"Citizens" of a state for the purpose of determining federal diversity
jurisdiction,' but not "Citizens" protected by the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV.6 This confusion continued into the twentieth century.
I. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809).
2. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636
(1819).
3. Louisville, C. & C.R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 552 (1844).
4. Paul v. Virginia, 80 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1868).
5. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. I ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, . . . between Citizens of Different States .... "). In Deveaux, the Court
held that corporations were citizens in order to determine whether they met the requirements
for federal jurisdiction. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 87-88. The Court stated:
[A corporate] name, indeed, cannot be an alien or a citizen; but the persons whom it
represents may be the one or the other; and the controversy is, in fact and in law,
between those persons suing in their corporate character, by their corporate name, for
a corporate right, and the individual against whom the suit may be instituted.
Substantially and essentially, the parties in such a case, where the members of the
corporation are aliens, or citizens of a different state from the opposite party, come
within the spirit and terms of the jurisdiction conferred by the constitution [sic] on the
national tribunals.
ld.
6. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."). In 1839, the Court held that
a corporation created in one state may not claim the same protection as a natural person when
it enters another state. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586-87 (1839). In
Paul v. Virginia, 80 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868), which affirmed the holding in Earle after the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court stated:
But in no case which has come under our observation, either in the State or Federal
courts, has a corporation been considered a citizen within the meaning of that provision
of the Constitution, which declares that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states.
Id. at 178.
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Rather than deny 7 constitutional rights to this artificial being based on its
status as only a legal entity, the Court has followed a seemingly ad hoc
approach to the question of which constitutional rights a corporation can
assert. 8 In 1906, the Supreme Court held in Hale v. Henkel9 that a
corporation does not have a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination because the right applies to natural persons and not corpora-
tions.'" At the same time, the Court permitted the corporation to challenge
the government's seizure of corporate records on Fourth Amendment
grounds." The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" shall not be
violated, 12 while the Fifth Amendment grants certain rights to any "per-
son." 3  Therefore, no textual basis explains Hale v. Henkel's discordant
treatment of the corporation in criminal proceedings.' 4
The Court's determination that a corporation can assert the Fourth
Amendment to prevent the government from searching or seizing records
but not a Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse compelled production of the
same records may strike one at first blush as inconsistent. But the line
7. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). In Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific
Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886), the Court summarily stated that it did "not wish to hear
argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does." Id.
at 396; see infra notes 25-54 and accompanying text (discussing the nineteenth century
development of the constitutional status of corporations).
8. See Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of
Rights, 41 Hastings L.J. 577, 662 (1990) ("The lack of a consistent basis for according
corporations constitutional guarantees is all the more puzzling as the demand for corporate
protection increases."); Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business
Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1441, 1467 (1987) (stating that the legal
status of the corporation "proved to be one of the most confusing jurisprudential problems
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries"); Note, Constitutional Rights of the
Corporate Person, 91 YALE L.J. 1641, 1644-45 (1982) ("There is no way to bring unity to
these many decisions [on corporate constitutional rights], for they rest on radically different
conceptions of the person whose rights and duties receive judicial definition.").
9. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
10. Id. at 75-76; see Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1988)
(explaining that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply to "collective entities").
II. Id. at76.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14. Cf Michael D. Rivard, Comment, Toward a General Theory of Constitutional
Personhood: A Theory of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39
UCLA L. REv. 1425, 1465 (1992) (arguing that conflicting treatment of corporation's Fourth




drawn by the Court in Hale v. Henkel makes sense in light of the purposes
of the two constitutional protections and their relation to the government's
need to prosecute economic crimes by corporate, as opposed to individual,
actors. A corporate right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination
could completely frustrate the criminal prosecution of corporate wrongdoing,
a justification identified by the Court in Hale v. Henkel for refusing to
extend the Fifth Amendment privilege to a corporation. 5  Because the
Fourth Amendment, on the other hand, protects against unreasonable
government intrusions, allowing corporations to assert that right would not
insulate a corporation from enforcement of the criminal law. 1
6
A closely related issue the Court had to consider m the wake of Hale
v. Henkel was the scope of the corporation's potential .criminal liability for
the acts of corporate agents. In New York Central & Hudson River Railroad
Co. v. United States, 7 the Supreme Court adopted the respondeat superior
theory of liability for corporations, imposing criminal liability "by imputing
[the agent's] act to his employer and imposing penalties upon the corpora-
tion for which he is acting in the premises. ' ' 18 The recognition of corpo-
rate criminal liability in New York Central was not an isolated event, much
less an aberration. It was a vital part of the Supreme Court's consideration
of the applicability of the Constitution's criminal protections to business
organizations that rejected anthropomorphizing the corporation. The
respondeat superior theory of liability was consistent with Hale v. Henkel's
treatment of corporate criminal rights because that theory gave the Court
flexibility to determine the scope of protection for corporate defendants
under the Constitution without simply equating corporations to individuals.
Hale v. Henkel's analysis and New York Central's adoption of broad
corporate criminal liability provided the basis for developing a coherent
framework for appraising the constitutional rights of corporate defendants.
15. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. at 74. The Court justified its decision to reject the
corporation's assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination on the ground that
permitting a corporate officer to invoke the privilege to refuse the production of business
records "would result in the failure of a large number of cases where the illegal combination
was determinable only upon the examination of such papers." Id. Compare Joseph M.
Proskauer, Corporate Privilege Against Self Incrimination, II COLUM. L. REV. 445, 450
(1911) (asserting contemporaneously with Hale v. Henkelthat "[i]t is impossible to frame a
logical theory consistent with these precedents that shall exclude [corporations] from the
connotation of 'person' in the Fifth Amendment") with Henry T. Terry, Constitutional
Provisions Against Forcing Self-Incrimination, 15 YALE L.J. 127, 129 (1906) (pre-Hale v.
Henkel law review article advocating restricting the privilege against self-incrimination
because it "cripples the administration of the criminal law, and makes it an almost useless
weapon against the evils and abuse of combination").
16. See infra text accompanying notes 124-30 (discussing rationale of providing
corporations with Fourth Amendment rights).
17. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
18. Id. at 494.
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Yet, the Court frequently failed to follow the thrust of Hale v. Henkel. often
neglecting to consider the initial question of whether a corporation can
invoke the protection of a constitutional provision before deciding the scope
of the provision. 9 Outside of the Fourth Amendment, the Court does not
19. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), the Supreme
Court considered a First Amendment claim by a national bank concerning restrictions on
corporate contributions to political campaigns. Id. at 770. The Court, in a footnote, stated
that the distinguishing characteristic in the corporate constitutional rights cases was whether
the right involves "[c]ertain 'purely personal' guarantees, such as the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, [that] are unavailable to corporations and other organizations
because the 'historic function' of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection
of individuals." Id. at 779 n. 14. Describing the analysis as focusing on whether a right is
"purely personal" is meaningless because every constitutional right is "personal," in that any
individual can claim protection. Under this simplistic approach, any corporate organization
should also be able to claim every right because a corporation is recognized as a legal actor
capable of being a "citizen" and "person" for constitutional purposes. There is no obvious
means of determining how a right rises to the level of being "purely" personal, or only
qualifying as somewhat personal, short of the Court announcing a test for what constitutes
an individual, non-corporate right. That, however, is the very point of calling a right "purely
personal." See also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. California Pub. Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. I.
23 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the first amendment right not to be forced
to speak should not extend to corporations because "[tio ascribe to such artificial entities an
'intellect' or 'mind' for freedom of conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with
reality.").
The Court's decision in Hale v. Henkel belies the facile statement in Bellotti that there
is a simple test to determine a corporation's constitutional rights. The Fourth Amendment
is generally considered to be the principal means of protecting the individual right to privacy,
and it is hard to conceive how a business organization, especially one that has a large number
of employees, can have much if any privacy compared to the individual. Yet. the Court in
Hale v. Henkelreadily acknowledged the corporation's rights under the Fourth Amendment.
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. at 76. That unquestioning acceptance of the constitutional
protection raises a difficult question: Why can a corporate entity be forced to incriminate
itself? If a corporation can assert a right of privacy, how much more difficult is it to
conceive that it should have the "purely personal" right to prohibit the government from
making the corporation convict itself by use of its own words? Hale v. Henkel certainly did
not rest on the vacuous ground that the Fifth Amendment right is purely personal while
Fourth Amendment protection is not.
The "purely personal" test described in Bellotti cannot explain why the Double Jeopardy
Clause should apply to a corporation when one of the Clause's principal rationales was to
protect a defendant from "embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in
a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity." Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88
(1957). Nevertheless, in United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977), the
Court rejected on double jeopardy grounds the government's appeal of a judgment of
acquittal entered on behalf of a corporation after the jury deadlocked. Id. at 575. The Court
did not explain how a corporation could feel the "anxiety and insecurity" of a possible second
trial and qualify for a Fifth Amendment right that appears to be as "purely personal" as the
privilege against self-incrimination denied to corporations in the same amendment. See infra
[Vol. 63:793
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acknowledge explicitly that corporations have only abbreviated constitutional
protection as compared to individuals. By refi-aining from asking the
foundational question about the corporation's right to constitutional
protection in a criminal prosecution, the Court appears to operate on the
blind assumption that constitutional protections apply to corporate defen-
dants to the same extent that they apply to individual defendants.
20
If the Court were to address the question of corporate criminal
constitutional rights directly, it would first have to consider whether a
corporation has any right to claim the protection of a constitutional
provision, and then decide whether the protection is coextensive with the
right afforded to the individual. The Court's analysis of the rights of
businesses under the Fourth Amendment reflects such a weighing of the
scope of protection because the Court acknowledges that the breadth of the
organization's right is not as great as that recognized for individuals. This
Article proposes that such an explicit analysis be done for other criminal
text accompanying notes 223-321 (analyzing corporate double jeopardy right).
20. For example, in United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977),
the Court prohibited on double jeopardy grounds the government's appeal of a judgment of
acquittal entered on behalf of two corporations and an individual defendant. Id. at 575. It
did not address, however, why the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause applies to a
corporation when the Self-Incrimination Clause does not, despite the fact that they are
grouped together in the same constitutional amendment that applies to "any person."
Similarly, the Court's earlier per curiam decision in Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141
(1962), did not address the question of whether a corporation could claim the protection of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Instead, the brief opinion merely asserted that the "constitution-
al provision is at the very root of the present case" without stating why a corporation should
receive a protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 143.
The apparently inconsistent treatment of the Fifth Amendment continued in the Ninth
Circuit's conclusion that the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not apply to
a corporate defendant because it could not be convicted of an "infamous crime." See United
States v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 637 F.2d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Regulatory crimes,
such as those charged in this case, are not inherently infamous."); United States v. Armored
Transp.. Inc., 629 F.2d 1313, 1319 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The potential punishment must be
infamous, and a fine, levied against either an individual or a corporation, simply does not fit
within the meaning of that word, as interpreted by the Supreme Court.").
The Supreme Court recently recognized in United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct.
2552 (1994), a union's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury in a criminal contempt
proceeding. Id. at 2562. Similar to Martin Linen Supply, the Court never confronted
whether an organization can claim the jury trial right. Instead, it just assumed the right's
applicability to a legal entity in deciding the constitutional question. Despite Bagwell's
recognition of the jury trial right for an organization, there is a serious question whether a
corporation can receive any protection under the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 389 (1979) (holding that the right to
appointed counsel only applies when the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment).
1996]
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constitutional rights, consistent with the approach adopted in Hale v.
Henkel.2
21. The analysis proposed here accepts, and even argues in favor of, the respondeat
superior theory of corporate criminal liability as consistent with the proper determination of
corporate criminal constitutional rights. This theory has been severely criticized as being in
conflict with the basic principles of criminal law, and scholars have advanced a number of
proposals for reforming the theoretical concept of corporate criminal liability. Perhaps the
most far-reaching theory for reshaping corporate criminal liability has been offered by
Professor Pamela Bucy, who argues for a "Corporate Ethos" paradigm. Pamela H. Bucy,
Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MiNN. L. REV.
1095, 1103 (1991) [hereinafter Bucy, Corporate Ethos]. Her analysis would identify
corporate intent by requiring the government to prove that the business entity has a distinct
and identifiable personality that "encouraged agents of the corporation to commit the criminal
act." Id. at 1103. Other proposed methods for proving corporate intent involve establishing
an "objective standard of reasonableness" based on evidence of primary action and intention
by the corporation, William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J.
647, 677 (1994); determining a corporation's liability based on its reaction to the criminal
act of its agent, Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence.
Retribution, Fault. and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1141, 1183 (1983). and ascertaining
intent through a corporation's failure to make reasonable efforts to implement policies and
procedures to prevent criminal acts by its agents. Developments in the Law-Corporate
Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV.
1227, 1257 (1979). One proposal would eliminate all corporate criminal liability in favor of
civil enforcement actions. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does
It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1533 (1996).
A shortcoming with focusing on the acts of the corporate entity to a particular inens rea
separate from the individual agent's is that by treating the corporation as a completely
separate actor, the government will have to amass a large body of evidence that may be
wholly unrelated to the charged criminal act to demonstrate the elusive intent of an
incorporeal entity. In order to establish that intent element beyond a reasonable doubt, these
theories seek to mimic, to the extent possible, what must be established in a criminal
prosecution against a natural person. The theories apparently assume that the corporation is
a "person" that should be treated identically to an individual defendant. See, e.g., Laufer,
supra, at 683 (arguing for a "reasonable man" standard for judging the acts of the corporation
to determine whether there is evidence of its intent); Bucy, Corporate Ethos, supra, at 1099
("In a sense, this corporate ethos standard takes its cue from notions of intent developed in
the context of individual liability .... If the individual committed the act purposely, we
consider it to be a crime, while if the individual committed the act accidentally, we do not.
Similarly, the standard proposed herein imposes criminal liability on a corporation only if the
corporation encouraged the criminal conduct at issue.").
These proposals for corporate criminal liability either overlook or take for granted the
answer to the concomitant question of what rights the corporate defendant is entitled to under
the Constitution. By aligning the position of the corporation as closely as possible with
natural persons, the implicit response may be that the corporation could assert all the
constitutional rights that an individual could. Simply ascribing the rights of individual
defendants wholesale to corporations could make the prosecution of corporate wrongdoing
virtually impossible under the new theories of corporate intent. See id. at I 172-75 (noting
[Vol. 63:793
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The initial determination of whether a constitutional right should apply
to a corporate criminal defendant should be based on the fundamental
premise that the corporation's sole interest is protection from abuse of the
government's power to investigate, prosecute, and sanction illegal conduct.
Arguably, corporations do not have the human dignity interests that
constitutional rights can also preserve.22 The Court first should compare
the possibility of abuse with the effect of permitting a corporation to assert
the right and the government's ability to enforce the law effectively. It then
should determine whether there is a substantial likelihood that, absent the
constitutional protection, the government will abuse a power that might lead
to a questionable conviction of a corporate defendant. Only through this
weighing of the effects of such an abuse of power can the Court determine
the degree of protection a corporation merits under the Constitution in a
criminal prosecution. This approach acknowledges that a corporation has
no a priori claim to a specific constitutional right, and its interests can be
outweighed by the necessity of preserving the government's capability to
support a productive law enforcement program when the potential for abuse
is not significant. 3
The proposed approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis
of corporate rights first undertaken in Hale v. Henkel. Since that decision,
the Court has rejected corporate claims to the privilege against self-
incrimination. This has been mainly because permitting the assertion of the
right would have a deleterious effect on the enforcement of regulatory
provisions, which were designed to curb corporate misconduct. Neverthe-
potential Confrontation Clause problems with the Corporate Ethos standard of criminal
liability). Yet, the proposals requiring proof of a separate corporate intent appear to assume
that the corporation cannot assert any constitutional protection to shield information from the
government, despite the fact that they are being treated as separate from their individual
agents. See, e.g., Laufer, supra, at 709-10 ("Evidence that supports a determination of
constructive fault is easier to gather than the circumstantial and direct evidence submitted in
cases of vicarious fault."). While the respondeat superior theory of liability is open to
criticism, that analysis must be understood as part of a broader approach to the constitutional
rights of corporations. See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text (noting the close
relationship between Hale v. Henkel and New York Central).
22. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.6(g)
(2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter LAFAVE & ISRAEL] (stating that in the context of the criminal
justice system, "[t]he concept of human dignity . . . is far from precise, but it may be
described roughly as encompassing the basic needs of the human personality, including
privacy, autonomy, and freedom from humiliation and abuse"). For example, the Supreme
Court has explained that the policy supporting the Double Jeopardy Clause is to protect
individuals from having to live in a "continuing state of anxiety and insecurity" if they had
to face a second prosecution for the same misconduct. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184,
187 (1957).
23. The proposed analysis does not incorporate any aspect of proportionality, that
larger corporations should receive less protection than smaller corporations.
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less, the Court does not permit the government to make full use of the act
of producing corporate documents against the individual custodian.24
Under the Fourth Amendment, the Court acknowledges a limited corporate
right that is not coextensive with the protection afforded to the individual.
Yet, it still recognizes that denying corporations all protection from
unreasonable searches and seizures would give the government carte
blanche to abuse its power.
Part I of this Article reviews the Supreme Court's development of the
constitutional status of the corporation, and Part II analyzes the related trend
in the federal courts of government prosecution of criminal actions against
corporate entities. Part III reviews the seminal decision in Hale v. Henkel,
with careful attention to the historical and economic contexts in which the
Court granted limited constitutional protections to corporations in criminal
cases. Part IV discusses the development of corporate rights under the Self-
Incrimination Clause and the Fourth Amendment to demonstrate that the
balancing of interests adopted in Hale v. Henkel continues in the Court's
analysis of those provisions. Part V reviews the Double Jeopardy and
Indictment Clauses of the Fifth Amendment, and analyzes conflicting
treatment of the corporation's rights in the same amendment. Part VI
studies the three principal rights granted by the Sixth Amendment, the right
to a jury trial, confrontation of witnesses, and assistance of counsel, to
determine the degree of protection a corporation should be afforded under
those rights in a criminal prosecution.
I. THE SUPREME COURT AND CORPORATIONS: PERSONS AND
CITIZENS IN FEDERAL COURTS
A. Corporations as "Citizens "
The American economy at the time of the adoption of the Constitution
was predominantly agrarian, with most industrial production conducted in
individual enterprises or small partnerships, rather than complex business
organizations.25 The state and federal governments chartered a limited
number of corporations, granting narrow powers to conduct specific
businesses; most involved quasi-public franchises, such as utilities or
transportation-related activities. 6 The accepted theory of the corporation
24. See infra text accompanying notes 151-55 (discussing limitation imposed on use
of custodian's production of business records in Braswell v. United States).
25. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1483 (1989) ("Economic units tended
to be individual rather than collective. Individuals produced goods for sale in the market.").
26. See JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGITIMAcY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN
THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, 7-8 (1970); Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate
Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 393, 405
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at that time was that it existed only as an artificial entity through the
concession granted by the sovereign. 27  This "concession theory" of
corporate existence meant that the government retained extensive power over
the continued operation of the enterprise.
As merely an artificial being existing only with the acquiescence of the
state, one would expect that analysis of a corporation's constitutional status
would be straightforward because Constitutional protection extends only to
"Persons" and "Citizens." In Bank of the United States v. Deveaux,2
however, the Supreme Court stated that "corporations have been included
within terms of descripfion appropriated to real persons., 29 Based on this
finding, the Court held that corporations qualify as "Citizens" 3 for the
purpose of invoking the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. 3' The
Court acknowledged the artificial status of the corporate entity "as a mere
creature of the law, invisible, intangible, and incorporeal. 3 2  Yet, it
justified the decision by noting that "the term citizen ought to be understood
as it is used in the Constitution, and as it is used in other laws. That is, to
describe the real persons who come into court, in this case, under their
corporate name., 33  Thus, the Court looked beyond the organizational
structure to find natural persons, the owners of the entity, who met the
condition of being citizens empowered by the Constitution to invoke federal
judicial authority.34
(1982) ("The more typical colonial corporation was quasi-public in character and was
established to improve public transportation facilities.").
27. See Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation,
21 FLA. ST. U. L. Rev. 1061, 1064 (1994); Mark, supra note 8, at 1447; Bratton, supra note
25, at 1484; Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate
Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REv. 173, 184 (1985).
28. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
29. Id. at 88.
30. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. I ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases...
between Citizens of Different States.").
31. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 91-92.
32. Id. at 88.
33. Id. at 91.
34. The Supreme Court's assertion in Deveauxthat the citizenship of the shareholders
was sufficient to meet the requirement for diversity jurisdiction did not pass unchallenged.
In Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844),
the Court held that a corporation chartered by a state was deemed a citizen of that state for
the purpose of suing and being sued.
A corporation created by a state to perform its functions under the authority of that state,
and only suable there, though it may have members out of the state, seems to us to be
a person, though an artificial one, inhabiting and belonging to the state, and therefore
entitled, for the purpose of suing and being sued, to be deemed a citizen of that state.
ld. at 555. In Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853),
the Court shifted the conceptual basis of corporate diversity jurisdiction back to the analysis
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Along with the right to sue in federal court, the Court early on permitted
a corporation to assert directly that a state action could violate its own
constitutional rights, as opposed to the rights of its owners. In Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward," the Court held that the Contracts
Clause36 prohibited a state from enacting a statute that interfered with a
corporation's charter by changing the governance structure for an education-
al institution.37 The Court explained that the corporate character of the
party asserting the constitutional violation was immaterial because "the body
corporate, as possessing the whole legal and, equitable interest, and
completely representing the donors, for the purpose of executing the trust,
has rights which are protected by the constitution. ' 8
B. "Citizens " and "Persons "Before the Court
While in the nineteenth century the Court had no trouble concluding that
a corporation could rely on the citizenship of its shareholders for diversity
jurisdiction and could sue for alleged violations of its own constitutional
rights, it also held that a corporation was not a "Citizen" protected by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. 9 In Bank of Augusta v. Earle,4" the
Supreme Court rejected an expansion of Deveaux by denying protection
from state regulation to corporations operating in a state other than that
adopted in Deveaux by creating a conclusive presumption that all of a corporation's
shareholders were citizens of the state which granted the charter.
If the declaration sets forth facts from which the citizenship of the parties may be
presumed or legally inferred, it is sufficient. The presumption arising from the habitat
of a corporation in the place of its creation being conclusive as to the residence or
citizenship of those who use the corporate name and exercise the faculties conferred by
it ... is a sufficient averment that the real defendants are citizens of that State.
Id. at 329. Marshall's conclusive presumption has been called the "purest fiction."
CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 165 (5th ed. 1994). Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c) (1994), a corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation and the state of its
principal place of business. The statute, of course, simply adopts the initial assumption of
Deveaux that a corporation is a "Citizen" under Article'lII.
35. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I ("No State shall ... pass any... Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts.").
37. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 652. New Hampshire sought to take control
of Dartmouth College through a statute that amended the college's charter to increase the
number of trustees who could be appointed by the governor. Id. The Court stated: "The will
of the state is substituted for the will of the donors, in every essential operation of the
college. This is not an immaterial change." Id.
38. Id. at 654.
39. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
40. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
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which chartered them.4' And, approximately thirty years later, in Paul v.
Virginia,42 the Court unanimously reaffirmed that position. In Paul, the
Court held that states "may exclude the foreign corporation entirely; they
may restrict its business to particular localities, or they may exact such
security for the performance of its contracts with their citizens as in their
judgment will best promote the public interest. The whole matter rests in
their discretion."'3  The Court justified this holding by analogizing the
grant of a corporate charter to a special privilege that need not be recog-
nized outside the borders of the granting state."
Justice Field, who wrote the opinion in Paul, found that "[t]he term
citizens... applies only to natural persons, members of the body politic,
owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created by the
Legislature, and possessing only the attributes which the legislature has
prescribed." '  Yet, three years later in The Railroad Tax Cases,4 in
which he sat as a Circuit Justice, Justice Field invalidated a state tax claim,
agreeing with a railroad corporation's assertion that the state's tax assess-
ments discriminated against corporations in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Whatever acts may be imputed justly or unjustly to the corporations, they
are entitled when they enter the tribunals of the nation to have the same
justice meted out to them which is meted out to the humblest citizen.
There cannot be one law for them and another law for others.47
41. Id. at 587. The Court stated:
Whenever a corporation makes a contract, it is the contract of the legal entity; of the
artificial being created by the charter: and not the contract of the individual members.
The only rights it can claim are the rights which are given to it in that character, and
not the rights which belong to its members as citizens of a state [sic] ....
Id.
42. 80 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
43. Id. at 18 1. The Court rejected the challenge of out-of-state insurers to a Virginia
statute requiring them to obtain a license and deposit a bond with the state treasurer before
writing insurance policies. Id.
44. Id. at 180.
45. Id. at 177. With regard to the application of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
to the rights of foreign corporations, Professor Tribe argues:
The plainly manipulable and at times anachronistically metaphysical character of these
doctrines and the dubious consistency of their complex exceptions suggest that the
Supreme Court has preserved them with an eye to their discretionary application in order
to prevent what appear to be instances of intolerable local or state interference with
interstate markets.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-14 (2d ed. 1988).
46. 13 F. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
47. Id. at 730.
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In Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad,48 the Supreme
Court affirmed The Railroad Tax Cases in a terse statement authored by
Chief Justice Waite. The Court did not wish to hear argument on the
applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to corporations because "[w]e
are all of the opinion that it does [apply]." '49 Thus, without the slightest
effort to explain its inconsistent treatment of the corporation's status as a
"Citizen" or "Person" under the Constitution, the Court announced a
position granting corporations broad protection under one provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment while in other cases ostensibly adhering to a theory
that views the corporation as an entity with only limited powers subject to
the control of the sovereign.
The status of corporations in the economic and legal landscape changed
dramatically during the nineteenth century. By the end of the century, states
moved away from granting limited corporate charters toward permitting
businesses to incorporate freely and to operate for any legal purpose. 50
The concept of the corporation also began to shift away from the "artificial
entity" theory expounded in the earlier cases. 5' A new understanding of
the corporation began to emerge, that the business organization was a "real
entity" apart from its particular incorporators or owners, with distinct rights
and obligations.52
When the Supreme Court held in Santa Clara County that the Equal
Protection Clause applied to corporations, there was no dominant theory of
corporate existence to explain why that portion of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment reached a corporate entity but the Privileges and Immunities Clauses
of Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment did not.53 The Court's
48. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
49. Id.; see Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S.
181, 189 (1888) ("Under the designation of person there is no doubt that a private
corporation is included.").
50. See Mark, supra note 8, at 1455 ("The transformation of the private law of
corporations from 1819 to the 1920s is best described as a move from a circumstance in
which a corporation could do only those things specifically allowed by its charter to one in
which a corporation could do anything not specifically prohibited to it.").
51. See Bratton. supra note 25, at 1489 (stating that theorists on corporations
"rejected the earlier doctrinal notions of the corporation as 'legal fiction' and 'artificial
entity"'), Mark, supra note 8, at 1457 ("in the 1880s it appeared that the time was ripe for
a new approach to the corporation. The collapse of the fictive conception of the corporation
was evident.").
52. For excellent reviews of the development of the philosophical theories of the
corporation, see Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational
"Real Entity" Theory, 50 U. PIT. L. REv. 575 (1989); Mark, supra note 8; Horwitz, supra
note 27.
53. See Horwitz, supra note 27, at 178 (explaining that the "real entity" theory that




approach to corporations in the nineteenth century showed an amazing
flexibility that permitted it to interpret the same term, "Citizens," to both
include and exclude corporate entities. As corporations assumed greater
economic importance, their demands for legal protection could only
increase. The Court did not embrace a mode of analyzing corporate
constitutional rights that required adherence to one philosophical conception
of corporate existence. In fact, the Court has never adopted a single test for
applying constitutional rights to corporations, at least in part because it has
never agreed upon a single understanding of what a corporation is for
constitutional purposes. 4
The Court's nineteenth century decisions dealt exclusively with civil
actions, and the constitutional provisions at issue involved government
regulation or protection of private rights. By the early twentieth century, the
Court faced a new challenge as the federal government began to regulate
businesses through criminal sanctions. Corporations sought to extend the
rationale of constitutional protection from the context of private relationships
and civil causes of action to criminal prosecutions, arguing that the
protections granted by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments applied to
corporate as well as individual defendants.
II. THE ORIGINS OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS OF
CORPORATIONS: ARTIFICIAL EXISTENCE AS A
SHIELD TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY
As corporations assumed a greater role in the national economy in the
late nineteenth century," the federal government responded to alleged
corporate excesses by enacting laws designed to curb some of the greatest
abuses perceived to arise from these large economic combinations.56 The
two most important provisions from this era that imposed criminal liability
on corporations for economic crimes were the Interstate Commerce Act and
54. Compare First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) ("[w]e
need not survey the outer boundaries of the [First] Amendment's protection of corporate
speech, or address the abstract question whether corporations have the full measure of rights
that individuals enjoy under the First Amendment.") with id. at 823-24 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("Since it cannot be disputed that the mere creation of a corporation does not
invest it with all the liberties enjoyed by natural persons, our inquiry must seek to determine
which constitutional protections are 'incidental to its very existence."') (citation omitted)
(quoting Trustee of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)).
55. See Bratton, supra note 25, at 1487 ("Management corporations appeared around
1890 ... [as] large corporations performing multiple tasks of production andmarketing. The
new corporations produced an array of goods cheaply and in quantity.").
56. See Mayer, supra note 8, at 585 ("The federal government did intercede in the
economy during this period, but almost always in a sporadic manner for economic (as
opposed to environmental or social) purposes.").
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its progeny,57 and the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.58 Corporations
promptly challenged the government's power to regulate business practices
through the criminal laws by arguing first that they were not amenable to
the criminal law, and then by turning to the Constitution as a potential
source of protection. 9
The classic view of the corporation's potential criminal liability, as
expressed by Blackstone, was that a corporation could not be held liable for
a crime, although individual members could be punished for corporate
acts.60 But by the mid-nineteenth century, civil law principles of corporate
57. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887); Act of Mar. 2, 1889. ch.
382, 25 Stat. 855 (1889); Elkins Act, ch. 708. 32 Stat. 847 (1903): Hepburn Act, ch. 3591,
34 Stat. 584 (1906). The original Interstate Commerce Act did not have criminal provisions;
these were added in the later acts. The various acts prohibited shippers and carriers from
paying or receiving any "rebate, concession, or discrimination" at less than a published rate.
49 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1964) (repealed 1978). In New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad
Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U.S. 361 (1906), the Supreme Court stated:
It cannot be challenged that the great purpose of the act to regulate commerce, whilst
seeking to prevent unjust and unreasonable rates, was to secure equality of rates as to
all and to destroy favoritism, these last being accomplished by requiring the publication
of tariffs and by prohibiting secret departures from such tariffs, and forbidding rebates,
preferences and all other forms of undue discrimination. To this extent and for these
purposes the statute was remedial and is, therefore, entitled to receive that interpretation
which reaonably accomplishes the great public purpose which it was enacted to
subserve.
Id. at 391. Ironically, the recent trend toward diminishing federal regulation has claimed the
ICC as one of its casualties, and the agency ceased to exist as of January 1, 1996. See David
E. Sanger, A U.S. Agency, Once Powerful, Is Dead at 108, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 1, 1996, at AI
("[W]ith the arrival of the new year, something happens to the country's oldest regulatory
agency that almost never happens in Washington. It dies at the age of 108.").
58. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1994)). In Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), the
Supreme Court considered the scope of Congress's power to reach combinations that restrain
trade:
If a State may strike down combinations that restrain its domestic commerce by
destroying free competition among those engaged in such commerce, what power, except
that of Congress, is competent to protect the freedom of interstate and international
commerce when assailed by a combination that restrains such commerce by stifling
competition among those engaged in it?
Now, the court is asked to adjudge that, if held to embrace the case before us, the
Anti-Trust Act is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. In this view we
are unable to concur.
Id. at 342.
59. See, e.g., Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56 (1908) (attacking
the constitutionality of the Elkins Act's jurisdiction on Sixth Amendment grounds); Northern
Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (attacking the application of the Sherman
Act to international commerce).
60. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 476 (1765); Michael B. Metzger,
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liability seeped into criminal prosecutions as state courts started to allow
prosecutors to charge business organizations with crimes for acts performed
by their agents on behalf of the company. 6' The important question was
whether the corporation could be criminally liable for the acts of an agent
whose conduct went beyond the principal's grant of authority.
One late-nineteenth century author professed a narrower regard for
corporate criminal liability, arguing that "to render a corporation criminally
liable, it must appear that the act was one authorized by the company and
not the mere unauthorized act of the officer or agent. 1 2 Bishop's Com-
mentaries on the Criminal Law, one of the leading treatises at the time, took
the broader view that "in principle, the limits of the liability to indictment
depend chiefly on the nature and duties of the particular corporation, and the
extent of its powers in the special matter. 6 3 In developing the answer to
this question, the federal courts took the lead in defining the parameters of
corporate criminal liability. Although corporations could sue in federal
courts by invoking diversity jurisdiction, they sought to avoid criminal
prosecutions by arguing that their status as an artificial entity precluded
them from being punished for crimes that require proof of the defendant's
mens rea.
Corporate Criminal Liability for Defective Products: Policies, Problems, and Prospects, 73
GEO. L.J. 1, 47 (1984) ("The common law early rejected any notion that corporations could
be held criminally responsible.").
61. See, e.g., State v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360 (1852) (indicting railroad
for nuisance for building on a public highway and obstructing passage on the highway); see
also Eliezer Lederman, Criminal Law, Perpetrator and Corporation: Rethinkinga Complex
Triangle, 76 J. CRIM. L. &CRIMINOLOGY 285, 288 (1985) ("[T]he penetration of civil law
doctrines into the criminal arena has contributed greatly to the advancement of the principles
of corporate criminal liability."); Metzger, supra note 60, at 48 (explaining the development
of corporate criminal liability facilitated by growth of "public welfare offenses" that impose
liability regardless of the actor's intent). Although the early prosecutions were for crimes
involving a corporation's failure to act, i.e. nonfeasance, Professor Brickey points out that
the distinction between offenses involving nonfeasance and misfeasance was short-lived in
the United States. Brickey, supra note 26, at 407.
62. 1 EMLIN MCCLAIN, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 184 (1897) (emphasis
added). McClain goes on to assert:
If a statute imposes a penalty for knowingly and wilfully doing an act which the statute
declares wrongful, as, for instance, wilfully converting the property of another or
knowingly employing children under a certain age in manufacturing establishments, it
is not to be deemed directed against corporations, but against their officers or agents,
who alone can knowingly and wilfully do the prohibited act.
Id. This approach would limit a corporation's criminal liability to those acts that the
company authorizes the agent to perform, and would deny that a corporation can act with the
requisite mens rea to wilfully violate a statute because its agents are never authorized to act
wrongfully.
63. 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 423 (9th ed. 1923).
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The first reported federal case to consider the criminal liability of a
corporation for the acts of its agents was United States v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad Co. ,' in which a railroad was indicted for violating a revenue act
by not having the proper tax stamps on shipping documents.65  Chief
Justice Chase, sitting as a Circuit Justice, was "inclined" to reject the
defendant's argument that the company agent's intent "could not be imputed
to a corporation having no sentient or visible tangible being, and existing
only in contemplation of law., 66 The opinion, however, did not state the
reason for this inclination, and "[u]pon this intimation of opinion ... the
cases were settled by counsel." 7
In United States v. John Kelso Co.,68 a federal district court held that
a corporation could be liable for a crime whose mens rea element required
proof that the defendant intended to commit the alleged act. 69  The
government charged a corporation with violating an eight-hour workday
statute, and the defendant argued that a corporation was incapable of
forming any intent.7" The company's argument sought to use its corporate
existence as a shield from liability by asserting that while a corporation's
actions might violate the law, the organization itself could not intend for
there to be a violation, and therefore it could not be prosecuted.7' In
rejecting the company's claim, the court explained that, if it were to accept
the argument, then it would exempt corporations from punishment for any
violation of the statute and they "would be given a privilege denied to a
natural person."" The decision in John Kelso Co. showed that federal
regulatory statutes, such as the one setting an eight-hour workday, would be
hamstrung if the court accepted a defense based on the status of the
corporation as an artificial entity.73
64. 24 F. Cas. 972 (C.C.D. W. Va. 1868)(No. 14,509).
65. Id. at 972-73.
66. Id. at 972-73.
67. Id. at 973.
68. 86 F. 304 (N.D. Cal. 1898).
69. Id. at 306.
70. Id. at 304-05. The statute made it a misdemeanor for any contractor to
"intentionally violate any provision of this act." Act of Aug. 1, 1892, ch. 352, 27 Stat. 340
(1892).
71. Id. at 305.
72. John Kelso Co., 86 F. at 307.
73. The district court also explained that there were limits to corporate criminal
liability, stating that "there are certain crimes of which a corporation cannot be guilty; as, for
instance, bigamy, perjury, rape, murder and other offenses, which will readily suggest
themselves to the mind." Id. at 306. The court cites no support for this position, but it
appears to be a quotation from Regina v. Great North of England Railway, 9 Q.B. 315, 326
(I 846). Although this statement in John Kelso Co. is dicta, it sets forth the general
understanding of the period concerning a possible boundary for corporate criminal liability.
See, e.g., BISHoP, supra note 63, § 422 ("So it is said, that a corporation cannot be guilty of
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The court in John Kelso Co. recognized a possible limitation on a
corporation's potential criminal liability; namely, that the statute at issue
must have a punishment "that can be inflicted upon a corporation-as, for
instance, a fine. 7 4 In United States v. Van Schaick,75 however, another
federal district court rejected the requirement that the statute must provide
a punishment amenable to a corporate defendant.76 Van Schaick concerned
a ferry disaster in New York harbor involving the death of over 900
passengers because the operator failed to provide life-preservers, as required
by law.77 The statute under which the corporate owner and members of
the crew were charged provided a sentence of up to ten years at hard labor,
but no fine or other penalty short of incarceration.78 The corporation
argued that it could not be convicted of the crime because there was no
sentence that could be imposed on it upon conviction.79 The district court
rejected this claim, finding that Congress's failure to include a penalty that
could be imposed on a corporate defendant was "inadvertent" and that the
legislature could not have "intended to give the owner impunity simply
because it happened to be a corporation. 80
While Van Schaick may have expounded a broader view of corporate
criminal liability than John Kelso Co., the crimes in both cases required
proof of the lowest level of mens rea: the defendant intended to do the act
prohibited without evidence of any higher mental state. In United States v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 81 a federal district court extended corporate
criminal liability to prosecutions requiring proof of a higher level of mens
rea.82 In that case, three corporations and their individual officers were
an assault, or riot, or other crime involving personal violence, or any felony."); MCCLAIN,
supra note 62, § 184 ("[I]t is evident there is a large class of crimes, including perhaps all
the common law felonies, that cannot be committed by a corporation because criminality is
dependent upon the intent with which the criminal act is done.").
74. John Kelso Co., 86 F. at 306.
75. 134 F. 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1904).
76. Id. at 602.
77. id. at 594. These cases were named the "Slocum Cases" after a disaster involving
the vessel General Slocum. The district court noted: "On June 15, 1904, while navigating
the East river, a fire occurred, and was so uncontrolled that many persons were compelled
to jump into the water, and some 900 were drowned." Id.
78. U.S. COMP. STAT. 3629, tit. 70, § 5344 (West 1901).
79. Van Schaick, 134 F. at 602.
80. Id. In United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50 (1909), a decision handed
down shortly after New York Central's recognition of corporate criminal liability, the
Supreme Court upheld the indictment of a corporation for violating a statutory provision that
imposed a fine and imprisonment on the grounds that "when a statute prescribes two
independent penalties . . . it means to inflict them so far as it can, and that if one of them
is impossible, it does not mean on that account to let the defendant escape." Id. at 55.




charged with conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act through a monopoly in
licorice paste, a substance used in the manufacture of tobacco.83 The
district court rejected the argument that a corporation could not form the
specific intent to agree to conspire to violate the law, characterizing that
position as "the remnant of a theory always fanciful and in process of
abandonment." 4 Yet, the court did not cite any supporting authority for
its holding, asserting only that "[i]t seems to me as easy and logical to
ascribe to a corporation an evil mind as it is to impute to it a sense of
contractual obligation. 85
The federal courts had primary responsibility to define the government's
power to prosecute corporations because, by the turn of the century,
Congress was well on its way toward enacting substantial economic
regulatory statutes. The government prosecuted corporations for the first
time for crimes, such as conspiracy, that simply never would have been
considered appropriate in a period when most business organizations were
modest enterprises whose owners were usually well known members of the
community and the corporate body operated with limited legal authority
under restrictive charters. As a guide to developing this new area of law,
the federal courts looked to well-developed principles of tort law that
routinely dealt with corporate liability for the acts of agents.86
83. Id. at 825.
84. Id. at 835. The court noted the development of the law up to that point had
permitted the prosecution of corporations where the mens rea involved the intent to do the
act which violated the statute. Id.
85. Id. at 836; cf Cohen v. United States, 157 F. 651, 654 (2d Cir. 1907) (In a
bankruptcy fraud prosecution in which the bankrupt corporation was the only party that could
be directly prosecuted under the statute, the circuit court stated, "It is immaterial that the
corporation was not indicted for conspiracy, or whether it could be indicted. Failure to
prosecute all conspirators does not prevent the prosecution of a part of them.").
Shortly after deciding MacAndrews & Forbes Co., the same district court judge
concluded that a vehicle for imputing the necessary knowledge to the business organization
was the board of directors of the corporation. United States v. New York Herald Co., 159
F. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1907). In New York Herald, the court held that a corporation could have
the necessary intent to "knowingly" send certain unmailable matter when the "directors in
their official capacity were aware of the insertion in the newspaper of matter obnoxious...
to the statute." Id. at 297. The court concluded that to attribute knowledge from the
individual directors to the corporate body "requires no other or different kind of legal
inference than has long been used to justify punitive damages in cases of tort against an
incorporated defendant." Id.
86. It would have been surprising if the federal courts tried to formulate a new
analysis for this rapidly developing system of economic regulation on a theoretical basis
distinct from the approach taken by civil tort law and already adopted by courts in more
rudimentary criminal prosecutions. In United States v. Alaska Packers' Ass'n, I Alaska 217
(1901), the territorial court stated:
[S]ince a corporation acts by its officers and agents, their purposes, motives, and intent
are just as much those of the corporation as are the things done. If, for example, the
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III. DEVELOPING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CORPORATE
DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
The. first line of defense to government prosecutions of corporations was
the argument that the intent element necessary for a criminal conviction
could not be proven against an incorporeal entity that existed only under a
charter to conduct lawful business. That position became less tenable,
however, as the theoretical concept of the corporation began shifting away
from the earlier "artificial entity" conception. In the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, writings regarding the nature of the corporate
entity poured into the body of legal literature, and theorists began to argue
that the corporation was a real being with an existence separate from its
agents.87 Although the judicial analysis of corporate criminal liability did
not exhibit any substantial concern with this changing conception of the
corporation, attempts by corporations to rely on their intangible nature as a
shield against government regulation certainly cut against the grain of then-
current thinking.88 Therefore, it was unlikely that a court would accept an
argument that exempted business organizations from prosecutions solely
because they could not intend to commit a crime due to their "artificial"
nature.
If a corporation was a real entity, with an existence similar in some
ways to that of natural persons, then it was logical to assert that the same
protection afforded to individuals in criminal prosecutions should be granted
to the corporate defendant. With the growing acceptance of corporate
invisible, intangible essence of air which we term a corporation can level mountains, fill
up valleys, lay down iron tracks, and run railroad cars on them, it can also intend to do
those acts, and can act therein as well viciously as virtuously. The ordinary crimes,
wherein only general evil, or the mere purpose to do the forbidden thing, suffices for
the intent, are plainly within this doctrine.
Id. at 220. The earliest state cases holding corporations criminally liable recognized the
connection between tort law principles and the intent element for criminal liability. See
Commonwealth v. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 339, 346 (1854);
State v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360, 367 (1852).
87. See Horwitz, supra note 27, at 179 ("There was a flood of writing on the subject
of 'corporate personality' in Germany, France, England, and America near the turn of the
century."). The most influential European scholars in this area were Otto Gierke and
Frederick Maitland, who translated Gierke's works into English, and Ernst Freund was the
leading American writer on the subject. See Mark, supra note 8, at 1465-66. For an
extended review of the development of the real entity theory of the corporation, see Mark,
supra note 8, at 1464-78; Hager, supra note 52; Horwitz, supra note 27.
88. SeeHERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 283
(1991) (discussing shift in late nineteenth century away from classical economic theory under
which Sherman Anti-Trust Act "federalize[d] the perceived common law, [and] it also
changed the status of contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade from
merely unenforceable to affirmatively illegal").
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criminal liability, corporations shifted their defense to raising constitutional
challenges to Congress's power to regulate the economy and to asserting the
rights of individual defendants against the government.
In an earlier era, when business organizations were primarily concerned
with protecting their private economic rights through federal judicial power,
the constitutional issues turned on whether a corporation was a "Citizen" or
could seek protection from governmental interference in its organization and
business dealings. The development of corporate criminal liability shifted
the focus to a new area that involved different concerns about the balance
between the government's power to regulate businesses and the specter of
prosecutorial overreaching that interfered with the right to operate free from
oppression. Indeed, the questions raised by challenges to government's
power to investigate and prosecute corporations continue to confront courts
to this day.
A. The Power to Regulate Business
The increased regulation of large business organizations by the federal
government led to a number of high-profile civil and criminal actions
against well-known corporations and concomitant challenges to the
government's power to reach economic activity. 9 In Northern Securities
Co. v. United States,90 a closely-watched antitrust case, a holding company
that dominated interstate railroad transportation challenged the application
of the Sherman Act to a business that had been properly incorporated and
authorized by the state of incorporation to engage in any type of busi-
ness. 9' The company argued that under the Tenth Amendment,92 any
federal regulation invaded the state's power to charter corporations and
therefore fell beyond the area of permissible congressional regulation. 3
89. See Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447,486 (1894) (holding
that the ICC did not have the power to compel witnesses to testify); United States v. E. C.
Knight & Co., 156 U.S. 1,9, 16 (1895) (adopting a narrow interpretation of "combinations
in restraint of trade" under the Sherman Act); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n,
166 U.S. 290, 312-13 (1897) (upholding antitrust prosecution of railroads); Interstate
Commerce Comm'n v. Alabama Midland R.R., 168 U.S. 144, 175 (1897) (permitting
judicial review of ICC findings of fact); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175
U.S. 211, 246-47 (1899) (upholding antitrust conviction for market-allocation plan).
90. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
91. Id. at 342.
92. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people."). Essentially, the corporation argued that it came within the term "people" to
whom powers were reserved under the Constitution. Northern Secs., 193 U.S. at 342.
93. Id. at 344-45. Northern Securities Company was incorporated in New Jersey,
which had at that time the nation's most liberal incorporation law. Id.
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The Court's opinion was a caustic rejection of the challenge to the federal
government's power to control interstate commerce:
[T]he court has steadily held to the doctrine, vital to the United States as
well as to the States, that a state enactment, even if passed in the exercise
of its acknowledged powers, must yield, in case of conflict, to the
supremacy of the Constitution of the United States and the acts of
Congress enacted in pursuance of its provisions.94
In Armour Packing Co. v. United States,95 corporations argued that
their prosecutions under the Elkins Act for receiving unlawful concessions
from railroad shippers violated the constitutional venue provisions for
criminal actions.96 The Elkins Act permitted-the government to prosecute
a shipper in the district where the crime was committed "or through which
the transportation may have been conducted."'97 The companies argued that
this authorization for prosecutions in a district other than where the crime
took place was impermissible because Congress sought to extend federal
power beyond the parameters of the constitutional venue limitation.9" The
Supreme Court rejected this argument and upheld the broad venue provision
because an Elkins Act violation was a continuing offense committed in each
district in which an item was shipped.99
Although the Court rejected the arguments advanced by the corporations
in Northern Securities and Armour Packing, it never questioned a corporati-
on's power to assert a claim that a statute violated its constitutional
rights.' ° The constitutional arguments advanced in Northern Securities
and Armour Packing involved challenges to Congress's power to criminalize
a particular act or to enact a broad jurisdictional provision. Neither case
94. Id. at 347. In rejecting the corporation's argument, the Court stated, "We cannot
conceive how it is possible for any one to seriously contend for such a proposition." Id. at
345.
95. 209 U.S. 56 (1908).
96. Id. at 73; see U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The trial of all Crimes ... shall
be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed."); U.S. CONST. amend.
VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law.").
97. Id. at 73 (quoting Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903) (codified as amended
at 49 U.S.C. § 11903(d) (1994)).
98. Id. at 76-77.
99, Id. at 77. The Court noted that "[t]o say that this construction may work serious
hardship in permitting prosecutions in places distant from the home and remote from the
vicinage of the accused is to state an objection to the policy of the law, not to the power of
Congress to pass it." Id.
100. The Court's analysis of the substantive challenges to Congressional enactments
was consistent with its Contracts Clause approach in Trustee of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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involved the assertion by a corporation of a constitutional right that would
prevent the government from pursuing a particular method of investigation
or from using evidence to prosecute a crime.
Facial challenges to the validity of a statute, as opposed to a particular
application, go to the very heart of whether the government has exerted its
authority impermissibly to bring the defendant before the court. In that
context, therefore, the status of the party subject to the statute, whether it
was a corporation or individual, was irrelevant to the threshold issue of the
congressional power under the Constitution to adopt the provision.
B. Hale v. Henkel: Ascertaining the Limits of Constitutional
Protection for Corporations
With the growth of federal regulation of economic activity through
criminal statutes in the late nineteenth century, the contours of the
government's power to prosecute business organizations demanded the
Court's attention. 10 ' Prosecutions involving statutes that regulate econom-
ic relations and the conduct of business activities are usually the result of
extended investigations that involve gathering a large number of documents
to prove how the conduct of an ostensibly legal transaction constitutes a
violation of the law. °2 The best, and often only, source of information
is the target of the investigation, who will have the records necessary to
trace the questionable transactions. Without access to those documents, the
government's ability to prosecute economic crimes would be severely
impaired. 1
3
The development of the federal criminal law regarding corporations
through the district court decision in MacAndrews & Forbes Co. is helpful
to understanding the context in which the Supreme Court decided Hale v.
Henkel. Hale v. Henkel grew out of the same investigation of price fixing
in the tobacco industry that led to the Sherman Act conspiracy prosecution
in MacAndrews & Forbes Co. In Hale v. Henkel, the Supreme Court
considered Fourth and Fifth Amendment challenges by the custodian of
101. Cf Lederman, supra note 61, at 288 ("The evolutionary process of the
[respondeat superior] theory was not . . . altogether wild and accidental, nor did it lack
internal legal reasoning and legal direction.").
102. See Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White
Collar Crime: How Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 405,
408 (1993) [hereinafter Henning, White Collar Crime] (stating that corporate crime usually
consists "of a number of events spread over an extended period of time, with the 'real'
evidence frequently buried in reams of business and corporate records relating to numerous
transactions").
103. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 115 (1988) (permitting collective
entities to assert Fifth Amendment privilege "would have a detrimental impact on the
Government's efforts to prosecute 'white-collar crime,' one of the most serious problems
confronting law enforcement authorities").
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records for the MacAndrews & Forbes Company to a subpoena duces tecum
calling for the corporation to produce a broad array of records in connection
with a criminal antitrust investigation of the tobacco industry." 4  At the
outset, the Court framed the problem:
If, whenever an officer or employe' [sic] of a corporation were
summoned before a grand jury as a witness he could refuse to produce the
books and documents of such corporation, upon the ground that they would
incriminate the corporation itself, it would result in the failure of a large
number of cases where the illegal combination was determinable only upon
the examination of such papers.'0 5
Although the Court was clearly reluctant to accept this failure, it had to
confront the broad language in its earlier decision in Boyd v. United
States 10 6 restricting the government's power to compel the production of
incriminating documents. In Boyd, the Court held that the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments prohibited "any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's
own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict
him of [a] crime or to forfeit his goods."'0 7 Boyd involved an attempt by
the government to obtain invoices for imported glass from a partnership to
show that the importer had not paid the proper duties on the items.' The
Court prohibited the government from obtaining the documents, based on
reading the Fourth and Fifth Amendments together to forbid "the invasion
of [the] indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property, where that right has never been forfeited by ... conviction for
some public offense."' 0 9
Boyd seemed to grant every recipient of a demand for documents the
constitutional right to forestall the government from compelling the person
to produce incriminating papers, even if the documents related to ordinary
business transactions."' If the Fourth and Fifth Amendments together
104. 201 U.S. 43, 60 (1906).
105. Id. at 74.
106. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
107. Id. at 630.
108. Id. at 618.
109. Id. at 630. Boyd has often been cited for its broad statement of the right to
privacy. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(stating that Boyd "will be remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the United States").
However, Boyd no longer remains good law for either its Fourth or Fifth Amendment
holdings. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (the "precise claim sustained
in Boyd would now be rejected").
110. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633-34. In United States v. National Lead Co., 75 F. 94
(C.C.D.N.J. 1896), decided after Boyd, a lower court refused to require a corporation to
produce its records prior to trial in a civil suit brought by the government seeking to recover
on an allegedly false claim by the company. Id. at 97. The statutory basis for the production
sought was the same as that in Boyd, and the court rejected the government's request for
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protected all documents held by private parties, then the prosecution of
corporations for economic crimes would have to proceed without access to
any of the company's documents, save those turned over voluntarily or
provided by third parties."'
The Supreme Court in Hale v. Henkel faced the question of how to
balance Boyd's broad protection for individuals from being compelled to
produce incriminating documents with the developing trend that corporations
could be held criminally liable for their acts. A holding that permitted
corporations to invoke the full protection of the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments would thwart the government's enforcement effort by making
investigation of a corporation's crimes virtually impossible. On the other
hand, simply refusing to extend the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to
corporate defendants might be too extreme because the Court had frequently
recognized that corporations were persons or citizens under other provisions
of the Constitution.12 Thus, the Court chose the Solomonic approach in
Hale v. Henkel, denying protection under the Fifth Amendment while
recognizing some measure of protection under the Fourth Amendment." 1
3
Hale v. Henkel held that a corporation has no Fifth Amendment right to
refuse to produce records pursuant to a subpoena because the privilege
against self-incrimination "is purely a personal privilege of the witness" that
cannot be exercised by the corporation."' The Fifth Amendment only
applied when the person may incriminate "himself"; the testimony sought
by the government from MacAndrews & Forbes Company could only have
been provided by the custodian of records testifying in a representative
capacity. Therefore, the witness has no basis to claim the privilege on
behalf of a third party.
Under this analysis, the corporation existed apart from its agents, and
because the corporation itself did not testify, it could not exercise any claim
of the privilege. This analysis permitted the Court to avoid deciding
whether a corporation was a "person" protected by the Self-Incrimination
Clause because the company itself was not asserting the Fifth Amendment
production of records before trial because "discovery will never be decreed when it might
tend to convict the party of a crime or work a forfeiture of his property." Id. The circuit
court cited to Boyd for support, and noted that the production of the records might
incriminate both the individual officers and agents of the company and the corporation itself.
Id. at 96.
Ill. Presumably, even under this broad reading of Boyd, the government could compel
production of correspondence from the recipient, assuming that party was not under
investigation for conspiring with the author of the correspondence.
112. See, e.g., PembinaConsol., 125 U.S. at 189; Santa Clara Co., 118 U.S. at 394;
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 88.
113. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. at 74-76.
114. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. at 69-70.
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protection: "The question whether a corporation is a 'person' within the
meaning of this Amendment really does not arise. ' is
While the Court claimed it need not reach the question of whether a
corporation can ever assert the privilege, the end result of the decision was
that a corporation is incapable of ever insisting on the Fifth Amendment
right because it could not speak except through its agents. These agents,
however, were not equated with the corporation for Fifth Amendment
purposes, so that while individuals retain their personal privilege not to
incriminate themselves, they cannot assert the privilege on the corporation's
behalf. As a consequence of this approach, the Court avoided considering
the theoretical status of the corporation as a "real" versus "artificial"
entity." 6  An equally important effect of the Court's judgment was that
the opinion circumvented the issue of whether the Fifth Amendment's other
protections apply to corporate defendants.
In Hale v. Henkel, the Court was unwilling to allow the assertion of the
Fifth Amendment to nullify congressional enactments regulating broad areas
of the economy by the criminal authorities." 17 At the same time, the Court
did not intend to strip all constitutional protection away from corporations:
"In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional
immunities appropriate to such body."'" 8 The key issue is what the Court
meant by "appropriate" protection for corporations.
Although the Court found that a corporation had no right to refuse
production of documents under the Self-Incrimination Clause, it provided
corporations with some measure of protection by recognizing a Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures." 9
In the context of the subpoena duces tecum at issue, the Court found that it
115. Id.
116. Professor Horwitz argues that Hale v. Henkelis the first "natural entity" opinion,
but then notes that "the Court's continuing reluctance to entirely personify the corporation
is underlined by its decision in the same case refusing to extend fifth amendment protection
against self-incrimination to corporations." Horwitz, supra note 27, at 182. Hale v. Henkel
consciously avoided any particular theory of the corporation by adopting a functional analysis
of the effect on the government's economic enforcement program if the constitutional
protection were extended to corporations. Rather than endorsing a theory, the Court used the
corporation's status as a vehicle to sanction a flexible approach to the application of
constitutional rights.
117. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. at 70 ("As the combination or conspiracies provided
against by the Sherman antitrust act [sic] can ordinarily be proved only by the testimony of
parties thereto, in the person of their agents or employees, the privilege claimed would
practically nullify the whole act of Congress."); see William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception,
and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REv. 1903, 1941 (1993) (statingthat "where theprivilege
does not apply, its application would impose a substantial evidentiary cost on the government
and hence benefit guilty defendants and harm innocent ones").
118. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. at 76.
119. Id.
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would have "denuded" the MacAndrews & Forbes Company of vital records
necessary to conduct its business. 2° This finding led to the holding that
the subpoena was "far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as reason-
able."02
1
The Court's opinion failed to explain why corporations should be treated
differently under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Justice Harlan, in a
concurring opinion, argued that a corporation was not included within the
terms "persons" or "people" under the Fourth Amendment, so he could not
see any basis for treating the Fifth Amendment differently from the
protection against unreasonable searches. 22 The majority opinion in Hale
v. Henkel ignored Justice Harlan's point and did not justify the disparate
treatment under the Amendments, nor did it explain why a corporation could
assert only a Fourth Amendment right that the Court in Boyd said was
intimately related to the Fifth Amendment.123
One possible reason for the Court's willingness to extend the Fourth
Amendment protection to corporations was that the rationale for the
prohibition on unreasonable searches described in Boyd is "for the security
of person[s] and property.1 24 Corporations can hold property and sue for
deprivations without just compensation, 25 so constitutional protection of
property rights extends beyond that held only by individuals. The weakness
with this explanation of Hale v. Henkel's Fourth Amendment analysis is that
the government sought MacAndrews & Forbes Company records of business
120. Id. at 77.
121. Id. at 76. The Court analogized the subpoena to a search warrant and did not
consider it meaningful that "many, if not all, of these documents may ultimately be required."
Id. at 77. The Court stated: "A general subpoena of this description is equally indefensible
as a search warrant would be if couched in similar terms." Id.
122. Id. at 78-79 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice McKenna concurred on the same
ground as Justice Harlan, asserting that "it would seem a strong, if not inevitable conclusion,
[sic] that, if corporations have not such immunity, they can no more claim the protection of
the Fourth Amendment than they can of the Fifth." Id. at 83 (McKenna, J., concurring).
Justice Brewer dissented, arguing that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments should be interpreted
consistently and the corporation should be granted rights under both provisions: "[l]f the
word 'person' in [the Fourteenth] [A]mendment includes corporations, it also includes
corporations when used in the 4th and 5th Amendments." Id. at 85 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
123. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633 ("We have already noticed the intimate relation between
the two Amendments. They throw great light on each other."); see Stephen A. Saltzburg,
The Required Records Doctrine. Its Lessons for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 53
U. CHI. L. REv. 6, 37 (1986) (the Court's reasoning for denying Fifth Amendment protection
"could have been used to deny corporations fourth amendment protection, or the protection
of almost any amendment, [so] the Court begged the question of why the privilege against
self-incrimination should be denied to corporations that were not denied other rights.").
124. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635 (emphasis added).
125. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. at 76 (stating that a corporation's "property cannot
be taken without compensation").
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transactions, and there was no physical invasion of the corporation's
property, only the acts of the custodian of records complying with the
subpoena. 26 The Court's concern was with the unreasonable scope of the
subpoena, not corporate property rights.'27
In considering the Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues, Hale v. Henkel
endeavored to reconcile two competing concerns. Corporate assertions of
constitutional rights could negate the possibility of policing the actions of
business organizations through the criminal mechanism. Therefore, Hale v.
Henkel concluded that a corporation may be forced to give up evidence of
its guilt because it was a "creature of the State" with "certain special
privileges and franchises."' 28  The corporation did not automatically
qualify for protection under the Constitution solely because it was a
defendant in a criminal action. In light of Boyd's condemnation of
unfettered government power, however, the Court also recognized that there
must be some limit on the government's prerogative to investigate and
prosecute corporate criminal activity. In Hale v. Henkel, the Court bottomed
that limit on the Fourth Amendment protection against an unreasonable
search.
The Court's disparate application of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
to corporations did protect the rights of the individual, a significant concern
expressed in Boyd. 29  Hale v. Henkel's Fifth Amendment analysis
permitted a corporate agent called to testify pursuant to a subpoena to retain
the personal right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination. Once the
individual could assert a Fifth Amendment right to protect oneself from
harm, the need to shield the corporation was lessened. Therefore, even
though the corporation could not assert the privilege, there remained a
means for safeguarding the fundamental rights of individuals. For Fourth
Amendment purposes, however, only the corporation could assert the right
because it alone would be the subject of the unreasonable search. 30
126. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. at 825.
127. If taken to its full measure in a corporate criminal prosecution, the Fourth
Amendment could prove as disruptive to the government's enforcement program as the
assertion of the Fifth Amendment, because requests for documents showing criminal activity
in large-scale economic activities will by their very nature be "sweeping." Nevertheless,
Hale v. Henkelwas unwilling to simplyjettison the Fourth Amendment, instead asserting that
the Amendment provides some measure of protection to the corporation that is "appropriate."
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. at 88.
128. Id. at 74.
129. SeegenerallyBoyd, 116 U.S. at 630-31 (discussing the history of the amendments
to the Constitution and their emphasis on individual liberty).
130. See William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure,
93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1037 (1995) [hereinafter Stuntz, Privacy's Problem] ("This
difference in treatment is perhaps an effort to protect individuals against privacy intrusions
from the police without protecting institutions' interest in keeping regulation at bay.").
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C. The Expansive View of Corporate Criminal Liability
in New York Central
Although Hale v. Henkel had involved a grand jury subpoena, the Court
never paused to consider whether the MacAndrews & Forbes Company
could be held liable for the criminal antitrust violation under investiga-
tion.'3  The Court applied Hale v. Henkel's agency analysis of the scope
of the privilege against self-incrimination to reject a constitutional challenge
to a corporation's criminal liability in New York Central & Hudson River
Railroad Co. v. United States.'32 In New York Central, the government
indicted a railroad and two of its officers for granting unlawful discounts
under the Elkins Act. 33  The corporation argued that its conviction
violated the Due Process Clause because the court instructed the jury that
acts of the agents were sufficient to prove the corporation's criminal liability
without any separate proof of corporate intent. 134 Rejecting that argument,
the Court explained that the agents acted within the scope of their authority
in setting the illegal rates:
Applying the principle governing civil liability, we go only a step farther
in holding that the act of the agent, while exercising the authority delegated
to him to make rates for transportation, may be controlled, in the interest
of public policy, by imputing his act to his employer and imposing
penalties upon the corporation for which he is acting in the premises.'35
In ascribing the intent of the agents to a corporate principal, made up
of a number of different constituencies who were presumably innocent of
the charged offense, the Court adopted a fiction that the intent of the
Another positive aspect of the approach in Hale v. Henkel is that the Court retained
flexibility in determining the scope of protection while being attuned to the needs of
individuals who act on behalf of the corporation. Rather than embracing a theory of the
corporation that granted or withheld constitutional protection based on a vague determination
of the status of a business organization vis-a-vis the individual, courts could evaluate the
need to permit government enforcement while ensuring no misuse of authority. The primary
concern was to enforce fully the criminal laws against business organizations, but not in a
manner that could unreasonably allow the government to abuse its power to gather evidence
and inflict punishment not only on the corporation, but on individuals connected to the
organization as well.
13 1. See Mitchell L. Rothman, Life After Doe? Self-Incrimination and Business
Documents, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 387, 410 (1987) (stating that New York Central "extin-
guished any lingering doubt about corporate criminal liability").
132. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
133. Id. at 489-91.
134. Id. at 492.
135. Id. at 494. The Court stated that there were some crimes for which a corporation
could not be held liable, but did not enumerate which ones were beyond the corporation's
power to commit. Id. 494-95.
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collective entity was necessarily that of each of its constituents. 13 6
Instead, New York Central simply asserted that accepting the corporation's
argument would "give them immunity from all punishment because of the
old and exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a crime [which]
would virtually take away the only means of effectually controlling the
subject-matter and correcting the abuses aimed at.' 137
136. Early criticisms of corporate criminal liability based on respondeat superior
noted the incongruity of imputing the agent's intent to the corporate body. See Frederic P.
Lee, Corporate Criminal Liability, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 14 (1928) ("The greater part of
the more recent cases have in consequence either held that criminal intent was not an element
of the particular crime or else, with a verbal simplicity that hides the real difficulty, have
'imputed' to the mind of the entity a criminal intent."); George F. Canfield, Corporate
Responsibility for Crime, 14 COLuM. L. REv. 469, 477 (1914) ("It is, therefore, not only not
easy or logical to ascribe to a corporation an evil mind, but it is absolutely impossible to do
so, except, of course, by a purely arbitrary and irrational fiction."). Reliance on fictive
attributions for corporations was not, however, particularly novel for the Supreme Court,
given its treatment of corporate citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See supra
note 34 (discussing theory propounded in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. that
corporate citizenship was based on citizenship of shareholders, all of whom were conclusively
presumed to reside in the state of incorporation).
137. New York Central, 212 U.S. at 495-96. The Elkins Act in effect at the time of
New York Central specifically mentioned corporations as subject to its restrictions. See
Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903). But the opinion did not consider whether the
statutory language alone was sufficient to uphold the corporation's criminal liability.
The application of the respondeat superior theory to corporate criminal liability has
been criticized as relying on "simplistic notions of agency," Laufer, supra note 21, at 649,
and that it ignores the element of the intent of the corporation in assessingcriminal liability.
See Pamela H. Bucy, Organizational Sentencing Guidelines: The Cart Before the Horse, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 334 (1993); Bucy, Corporate Ethos, supra note 21, at 1103. One
scholar has even called corporate criminal liability a "weed," contending that "the law has
proceeded without rationale whatsoever." Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the
Corporation, 19 U. PITr. L. REv. 21, 23 (1957). Professor Mueller proposed the term "herba
responsibilitas corporationis M." for corporate criminal liability, asserting that "[n]obody
bred it, nobody cultivated it, nobody planted it. It just grew." Id. at 21.
The argument that the criminal liability of corporations was an accidental or thoughtless
development is erroneous. One basis for Professor Mueller's criticism of corporate criminal
liability based on the respondeat superior theory was that it was confined to the United
States. Id. at 28 ("Apart from a few temporary and partial exceptions the maxim that
societas delinquere non potest is still firmly rooted in the civil law."). The more recent
trend in Europe, however, has been to expand the liability of corporations for criminal
offenses, with the Dutch adopting the American theory of liability. See Guy Stessens,
Corporate Criminal Liability:A Comparative Perspective,43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 493, 507
(1994); L.H. Leigh, The Criminal Liability of Corporations and Other Groups: A
Comparative View, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1508, 1510 (1982). The argument that the criminal
liability of corporations was an aberration ignores the development of the law in the federal
courts culminating in the Supreme Court's decisions in Hale v. Henkeland New York Central.
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If the Supreme Court had adopted a theory of liability requiring proof
of a separate mens rea for the corporate defendant, then that would call into
question the Fifth Amendment agency analysis of Hale v. Henkel. Proof of
a distinct corporate intent would compel a court to recognize that the
corporation was capable of expressing intentions that were not necessarily
embodied through its agents. According a separate existence to the
corporation for proof of every element of a crime could raise the organiza-
tion to the level of a "person" under the Self-Incrimination Clause, thereby
foiling the careful balancing the Court undertook in Hale v. Henkel. The
respondeat superior theory was the only approach available in New York
Central to preserve corporate criminal liability in the face of the due process
challenge without completely foreclosing other constitutional protections to
corporate defendants.
The railroad company's constitutional argument was strikingly similar
to the MacAndrews & Forbes Company's assertion of a Fifth Amendment
right, in the sense that acceptance of either claim would make enforcement
of the criminal laws against corporate entities virtually impossible. New
York Central's attention to the functional consequences of its decision was
consistent with the method adopted in Hale v. Henkel to determine the scope
of a corporation's constitutional rights. Moreover, permitting prosecution
of a corporation on the respondeat superior theory involved very little threat
to the rights of individual corporate agents because any criminal action
against them would necessarily entail providing the individual defendants
with all of the constitutional rights guaranteed to non-corporate defendants.
The capacity to assert the protection of the Constitution to curb any misuse
of the government's power can be exercised fully by the individual
defendant, which can also inure to the benefit of the corporation if they are
indicted together, as they were in New York Central.
If the corporation alone is indicted, then there is no threat to individual
agents because they will not be punished for the acts committed on behalf
of the business organization. In that instance, the issue then becomes what
criminal constitutional rights can a corporate defendant assert that do not
undermine the government's law enforcement power to such an extent as to
make assertion of the right unacceptable. The respondeat superior theory
of corporate liability gives the government the power to prosecute corpora-
tions without expanding the scope of the criminal constitutional rights a
corporation can exercise when it is prosecuted by the government.
D. Conclusion
Hale v. Henkel's Fifth Amendment analysis hinges on the role of the
corporate agent-the person testifies on behalf of the organization as its only
means of communicating, yet the agent cannot assert the privilege against
self-incrimination if the testimony only incriminates a third party, the
corporation. By focusing on the agent's capacity as the sole party whose
rights were affected, the Court professed that it was not concerned with
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whether the corporation was a "person" for Fifth Amendment purposes. 138
The Court then applied that agency analysis in New York Central to support
its conclusion that due process permitted holding the corporation fully liable
for the acts of each of its agents by attributing the agent's mens rea to the
corporation. The Court premised its denial of constitutional protection to
the corporate defendant by balancing the need to protect the government's
ability to prosecute corporations for wrongdoing with the possibility that the
government will misuse its power against the corporation and, indirectly,
against the individual. 39 The degree of constitutional protection afforded
to corporations depended on that weighing of interests, so the corporation's
rights could not be coterminous with the rights of the individual criminal
defendant.
The balance struck by the Court in Hale v. Henkel provides a guide for
limiting a corporation's criminal constitutional rights to those protections
that are "appropriate."' 4 °  First, the applicability of a particular right
depends on considering the need for adequate enforcement of the law
against the possibility of governmental abuse of its power to gather evidence
to convict and punish a defendant. In considering the Fifth Amendment, the
Court concluded that the Self-Incrimination Clause could be used to
undermine the government's enforcement effort against corporate defendants
as the basis for denying the privilege to corporations.' 4 ' The Fourth
Amendment, on the other hand, only prohibits "unreasonable" searches,
138. In Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911), the Supreme Court took the
agency theory one step further in holding that a corporate agent could not assert the privilege
to resist production of business records even if the custodian of the records created the
documents and they were personally incriminating. Id. at 384-85. Wilson was president and
director of a corporation, and the government indicted him for mail fraud and conspiracy in
connection with transactions by the corporation. Id. at 367-68. Wilson took the corporate
account books, which he had created and maintained, and refused to produce them despite
being directed to do so by the company's board of directors. Id. at 371. The Court stated,
"If the corporation were guilty of misconduct, [Wilson] could not withhold its books to save
it; and if he were implicated in the violations of law, he could not withhold the books to
protect himself from the effect of their disclosures." Id. at 384. The corporate agent's
function as the embodiment of the organization meant that the acts on behalf of the
corporation were not personal, but only those of the corporation. The agent could not use
a personal privilege to prevent a corporation from fulfilling the requirement of the law.
Wilson's holding that the records of a corporation were not private papers subject to the
protection of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments further undermined Boyd's analysis limiting
the government's power to investigate corporate wrongdoing through the review of business
records. Id. at 380.
139. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. at 74-75.
140. See Saltzburg, supra note .123, at 37 ("In the end, the Court in Hale struck a
sensible compromise in its treatment of corporations.").
141. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. at 75.
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giving courts a flexible means to police government conduct without
effectively supplying corporations a complete shield from criminal liability.
IV. MAKING SENSE OUT OF CORPORATE RIGHTS UNDER THE SELF-
INCRIMINATION CLAUSE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The balancing act in Hale v. Henkel was a significant step in establish-
ing the scope of corporate constitutional rights in a criminal prosecution by
recognizing that the comparison of interests of the government and the
defendant could lead to different results from cases involving the rights of
individuals. Since that decision, the Court has consistently denied the
privilege against self-incrimination to corporations and has expanded the
prohibition to cover a broader array of business organizations, such as
partnerships and unions. The weighing of interests in Hale v. Henkel
produced a clear result, albeit one that granted no Fifth Amendment
privilege to the corporation.
The development of the rights of business entities under the Fourth
Amendment has been more haphazard because Hale v. Henkel did not set
forth a clear analytical model of the "appropriate" protection for a corpora-
tion.142 Yet, the decisions construing the extent of a corporation's right
to be free from unreasonable searches exhibit a measure of adherence to the
form of analysis adopted in Hale v. Henkel. The Court's efforts to define the
constitutional limits of searches of business property yield a much more
constricted corporate right than individuals enjoy. That should not be
surprising and is, in fact, consistent with the approach adopted in Hale v.
Henkel for defining corporate constitutional rights in the criminal context.
A. The Expanding Definition of a Collective Entity
After Hale v. Henkel, the scope of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion appeared clear with regard to state-chartered entities-the government
could require them to produce records so long as the subpoena was not
overbroad. Even if the corporation had dissolved, that did not change the
character of the documents or generate a Fifth Amendment right for a
corporate agent to refuse their production. 4 3 Incorporation is not, howev-
er, the only choice for organizing a business, and criminal activity is not
confined to entities operating under a state-granted charter.
142. Professor Stuntz concludes that "the law has followed the path Hale marked out:
abandon privacy where it might create difficulties outside ordinary criminal procedure. The
result is a body of Fourth and Fifth Amendment law filled with strange twists and turns."
Stuntz, Privacy's Problem, supra note 130, at 1055.
143. See Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 490 (1913).
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In United States v. White, 144 the Supreme Court upheld a subpoena to
a union for its records related to possible kickbacks on public works projects
over an assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination by the union's
custodian of records. 145 The Court stated that "the power to compel the
production of the records of any organization, whether it be incorporated or
not, arises out of the inherent and necessary power of the federal and state
governments to enforce their laws."' 46 The Court found, once again, that
the Fifth Amendment's protection only extended to "natural individuals
acting in their own private capacity,',' 47 not to an organization.
At the same time, White expressed concerns that the government not
seek to bypass the privilege simply because an individual acted as part of
an organization, and it remained wary of permitting the government to use
its power to harass the individual. 4 ' Therefore, the Court enunciated the
test to determine what constitutes an organization:
[W]hether one can fairly say under all the circumstances that a particular
type of organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its
membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the
purely private or personal interests of its constituents, but rather to embody
their common or group interests only. 149
If an organization meets this description, then the custodian of its records
cannot refuse to turn over organizational documents on the basis of an
assertion of the Fifth Amendment, regardless of whether the records are
personally incriminating.
150
144. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
145. Id. at 705.
146. Id. at 700-01 (emphasis added). Earlier decisions had made reference to the
government's visitorial power over a corporation that received its charter from the state as
a basis for denying the corporation the right to refuse to produce its records. White moved
away from that basis because the union was not necessarily subject to the government's
power because the organization was not chartered under a grant of authority by the state.
147. Id. at 700.
148. See Henning, White Collar Crime, supra note 102, at 418 (stating that "White
exemplifies the Court's hesitancy in making its rule too broad").
149. White, 322 U.S. at 701.
150. The Court further refined the definition of organizations barred from asserting the
privilege against self-incrimination in Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974), which
involved a subpoena to a three-person law firm. In upholding the subpoena, the Court
declared that groups cannot assert the privilege if they are "relatively well organized and
structured, and not merely a loose, informal association of individuals. It must maintain a
distinct set of organizational records, and recognize rights in its members of control and
access to them." Id. at 92-93. The Bellis test is highly malleable, and places few limits on
a court's authority to hold that an organization, no matter how small, cannot invoke the
protection of the Fifth Amendment to refuse to produce records.
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Most recently, the Court reaffirmed the strict Fifth Amendment analysis of
corporate rights in Braswell v. United States.'5' Braswell involved a subpoena
for the records of a closely-held corporation dominated by its principal
shareholder.152 The government's apparent reason for issuing a subpoena to
the corporation was to use the documents against the principal shareholder in an
individual prosecution. 53  The Court began its analysis by elucidating the
"lengthy and distinguished pedigree" of the collective entity rule.'54 It then
proceeded to hold that the principal shareholder's "act of production is not
deemed a personal act, but rather an act of the corporation" and therefore not
within the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination.'
The Court's rationale for adopting increasingly broad definitions of the types
of entities that may not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination could be
found in its expressed fear of undermining the government's law enforcement
effort if it construed the corporation's constitutional rights too expansively. Hale
v. Henkel recognized that granting a corporation the privilege would "close the
door of access to every available source of information on the subject" of the
criminal acts. 56 In White, the Court reiterated that rationale: "Were the cloak
of the privilege to be thrown around these impersonal records and documents,
effective enforcement of many federal and state laws would be impossible." '57
Finally, Braswell took up the charge against extending any Fifth Amendment
protection to a corporation when the Court explained that granting the privilege
to collective entities "would have a detrimental effect on the Government's
In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), the Court shifted the focus of the
analysis of the privilege against self-incrimination away from analyzing the structure of the
organization and toward whether the act-of-production was testimonial. Id. at 408. In United
States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), the Court held that the custodian of records of a sole
proprietorship could assert the privilege because his act-of-production was personally
incriminating. Id. at 608; see Henning, White Collar Crime, supra note 102, at 419-22
(reviewing Fisher and Doe).
151. 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
152. Id. at 100-01.
153. Id. at 101. The corporation's board of directors consisted of Braswell, his wife,
and his mother; and he acknowledged that he was responsible for the business operation. Id.
154. Id. at 104.
155. Id. at 110. The Court rejected the argument that Fisher and Doe altered the
analysis of the scope of the Fifth Amendment, stating, "[T]he lesson of Fisher is clear: A
custodian may not resist a subpoena for corporate records on Fifth Amendment grounds."
Id. at 113.
156. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906).
157. White, 322 U.S. at 700 (citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70, 74 (1906)). The
Court stated that the framers of the Constitution "cannot be said to have intended the
privilege to be available to protect economic or other interests of such organizations so as to
nullify appropriate governmental regulation." Id. This statement is interesting because the
framers never considered corporations in drafting the Constitution. The various protections
afforded to individuals can equally frustrate government law enforcement, yet one would
never use that as the basis for denying all constitutional protection.
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efforts to prosecute 'white-collar crime,' one of the most serious problems
confronting law enforcement authorities."'
' 58
Yet, Braswell also was attuned to the tension first identified in the constitu-
tional analysis of Hale v. Henkel, when the Court was unwilling to grant the
government unfettered power to investigate and prosecute crimes by negating a
corporation's Fourth Amendment rights because such unlimited authority could
seriously infringe on the liberty of individuals. Thus, Braswell prohibited the
government from making any evidentiary use of the individual custodian's act
on behalf of the corporation against that person in a later prosecution--"For
example, in a criminal prosecution against the custodian, the Government may
not introduce into evidence before the jury the fact that the subpoena was served
upon and the corporation's documents were delivered by one particular
individual, the custodian."'5 9
The Court has taken comfort in its stated conclusion that denying the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to corporations would not
seriously impair the rights of the individual, especially when compared with the
perceived effect that affording the privilege to corporations would have on the'
government's ability to prosecute white collar crime. Braswell recognized that'.
an individual producing business records incurs some risk when acting as the,
custodian for the collective entity, which could be a reason to permit the
custodian to invoke the privilege. Rather than risk undermining the law'
enforcement power by expanding the scope of the Fifth Amendment right,
Braswell created a quasi-constitutional immunity that prohibits the government
from making any direct evidentiary use of the act of production in prosecution,-
of the custodian individually. 6 ' By providing explicit protection to the
individual, the Court negated some of the effect of denying the privilege to.
corporations without having to reconsider the balance it struck in Hale v. Henkel
in barring a corporation from refusing to produce documents.
B. The Government's Power to Investigate Corporations
Under the Fourth Amendment
1. Outrageous Searches and the Overbroad Subpoena
Hale v. Henkel asserted that a corporation retains its right under the Fourth
Amendment to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, but the
protection of a corporation's rights is not co-extensive with the security afforded
the individual. After Hale v. Henkel, the Court was not solicitous of questionable
government law enforcement investigations that were clearly an affront to the
158. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 115 (footnote omitted).
159. Id. at 118. The Court did not explain the constitutional basis for this restriction
on the government. See Henning, White Collar Crime, supra note 102, at 424.
160. See Henning, White Collar Crime, supra note 102, at 424 (Braswell failed "to
explain either the constitutional basis for the evidentiary prohibition or what use the
government could make of the act of production.").
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rights of business owners. The Court's initial pronouncements on the Fourth
Amendment rights of corporations came in cases that involved a "fishing
expedition" with the broad net of the subpoena duces tecum, and question-
able government searches that called into question the fairness of the
investigation itself.
The first of these cases was Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States,'6' in which the government engaged in an unauthorized search of
a corporation's offices. 162 After a federal district court ordered the return
of the seized records, the government issued a subpoena for the same
documents.' 63  The Supreme Court flatly rejected the government's
argument that the subpoena was lawful, stating that "the rights of a
corporation- against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected even if
the same result might have been achieved in a lawful way.
164
Shortly thereafter, in Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco
Co., 165 the Supreme Court refused to enforce broad subpoenas that called
for the production of all correspondence sent and received by a group of
companies over the course of an entire year.' The Court termed the
requests, which were issued as part of a congressionally-inspired antitrust
investigation, "fishing expeditions into private papers on the possibility that
they may disclose evidence of crime" without any indication of the
documents' relevance. 67  The troubling issue for the Court was the
government's failure to identify any wrongdoing by the holders of the
documents, leading it to find: "It is contrary to the first principles of justice
to allow a search through all the respondents' records, relevant or irrelevant,
in the hope that something will turn up.'
68
The third corporate Fourth Amendment case to reach the Court in this
period involved a flagrant violation of the basic concept of honesty in law
enforcement. In Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,"69 a government
agent arrested two people and seized corporate documents by claiming
falsely that he had a warrant. 7 ' The company sought the exclusion of the
records under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 7' although it did not
161. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
162. Id. at 390.
163. Id. at 391.
164. Id. at 392. Justice Holmes, author of the majority opinion, attacked the perceived
duplicity of the prosecutors by stating that: "The Government now, while in form repudiating
and condemning the illegal seizure, seeks to maintain its right to avail itself of the knowledge
obtained by that means which otherwise it would not have had." Id. at 391.
165. 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
166. Id. at 304-05.
167. Id. at 306.
168. Id.
169. 282 U.S. 344 (1931).




explain how it could assert a right under the Fifth Amendment. The Court
excluded the evidence and denigrated the government's actions as "a lawless
invasion of the premises and a general exploratory search in the hope that
evidence of crime might be found."'72 Beyond its scathing review of the
government's misconduct the Court did not explain the constitutional basis
for its decision.
These early cases involving a corporation's assertion of its Fourth
Amendment right were easy to decide because the government malfeasance
was so blatant. If the violations had not been real, it would have been
almost comical. The overly broad document request in American Tobacco
is as questionable as the unauthorized searches in Silverthorne Lumber and
Go-Bart Importing because in each case the government overstepped the
bounds of fairness in the investigation, causing the Court to apply the Fourth
Amendment as a shield to prevent the misuse of the investigatory power.
The corporate nature of the victims of governmental impropriety appeared
to be immaterial to the Court's decisions, and indeed the Court never
alluded to the complainant's status in excluding the evidence or rejecting the
subpoena. None of the opinions, therefore, provided any concrete guidance
to determine what was unreasonable when a corporation was the target of
a search.
2. Subpoenas in a New Regulatory Environment
As the scope of government regulation of business expanded after the
New Deal and World War II, so too did the demands for information from
business organizations used to monitor their compliance with legislative and
administrative regulations. In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Wall-
ing, "' the Supreme Court enforced a broad subpoena duces tecum requir-
ing the production of records from newspaper publishers to determine
whether they were obeying the Fair Labor Standards Act. 174 The Court
noted that the subpoenas were designed "to discover and procure evidence,
not to prove a pending charge or complaint, but upon which to make one
if ... the facts thus discovered should justify doing so."'17 Unlike its
earlier aversion to "fishing expeditions" in American Tobacco, the Court
declared that when an order for production of documents was judicially
authorized, the only issue was the reasonableness of the subpoena.
176
172. Id. at 358. The agents were searching for evidence of the illegal manufacture and
distribution of liquor under the National Prohibition Act. Id. at 349.
173. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
174. Id. at 189.
175. Id. at 201.
176. Id. at 209 ("Beyond this requirement of reasonableness, including particularity in
'describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,' also literally
applicable to warrants, comes down to specification of the documents to be produced
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In considering a corporation's rights under the Fourth Amendment,
Oklahoma Press stated that "corporations are not entitled to all of the
constitutional protection which private individuals have in these and related
matters."' 77 The Court rejected the inference that could be drawn from its
earlier decisions in Silverthorne Lumber and American Tobacco that
apparently recognized a broad protection for corporations under the Fourth
Amendment. Instead, the opinion explained that:
[such] suggestions or implications may be explained as dicta: or by virtue
of the presence of an actual illegal search and seizure, the effects of which
the Government sought later to overcome by applying the more liberal
doctrine developed in relation to 'constructive search': or by the scope of
the subpoena in calling for documents so broadly or indefinitely that it was
thought to approach in this respect the character of a general warrant or
writ of assistance, odious in both English and American history.'
Oklahoma Press was the first case to recognize explicitly that the Fourth
Amendment's protection is not as extensive for corporations as for
individuals, and that the test of reasonableness involves weighing the effect
of granting protection on the efficacy of the government's investigatory
powers. That approach comported with the "basic compromise [that] has
been worked out in a manner to secure the public interest and at the same
time to guard the private ones affected against the only abuses from which
protection rightfully may be claimed."' 79  Moreover, the Court justified
this "basic compromise" on the same ground asserted in Hale v. Henkel that
denied corporations the right to assert the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion-a broad construction of corporate Fourth Amendment rights "would
stop much if not all of investigation in the public interest at the threshold
of inquiry."'
8 0
In United States v. Morton Salt Co., the Supreme Court reiterated its
position that corporate rights are not coextensive with individual rights
under the Fourth Amendment."' Rejecting a corporation's argument that
a governmental demand for information concerning compliance with a
consent decree violated the Fourth Amendment, the Court stated that
"corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a
adequate, but not excessive, for the purposes of the relevant inquiry.").
177. Id. at 205.
178. Id. at 206-07 (footnotes omitted). The Court distinguished American Tobacco
as involving the "aggravating circumstance" of the government's claim of an unlimited right
of access to the business records, id. at 207 n.40, although it was not clear how the broad
subpoenas in Oklahoma Press differed from the document demand in American Tobacco in
any meaningful way.
179. Id. at 213.
180. Id.
181. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
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right to privacy."' 82 So long as the investigation was within the power of
the government, then the only limits the Fourth Amendment imposed were
that the documents be described with sufficient particularity in the demand
and the information sought be reasonably relevant to the inquiry.'83
Insofar as earlier cases may be read to impose any significant limits on
the government's investigatory power vis-a-vis corporations, Oklahoma
Press and Morton Salt laid to rest the argument under the Fourth Amend-
ment that a corporation could resist a demand to produce its business
records. The question the Court did not confront until much later was
whether the Fourth Amendment imposed any constraint on the government's
power to search the premises of a business without first securing a warrant.
3. Regulatory Regimes as the Premise for the Right
to Search Business Property
In See v. City of Seattle,'8 4 the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement applied to government searches of business
property.'85 The Court explained that a "businessman, like the occupant of
a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from
unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property."l86
Shortly thereafter, in Katz v. United States,8 7 the Supreme Court reorient-
ed the constitutional analysis of searches when it stated that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places."' 88 The Fourth Amendment was
concerned with protecting privacy, not simply property interests, and a
reasonable expectation of privacy extends to persons "in a business office,
in a friend's apartment, or in a taxicab."' 89  Although See v. City of
Seattle apparently equated the "businessman" with the organization for the
purpose of determining the validity of the government's search, it was
unclear, as an initial matter, whether Katz's focus on the privacy right of
"people, not places" would prohibit a corporation from invoking the Fourth
Amendment to challenge a search conducted on its property.
182. Id. at 652.
183. Id.
184. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
185. Id. at 545.
186. Id. at 543. The search in See v. City of Seattle involved a business owner who
was convicted for refusing to permit a search of a locked commercial warehouse by the fire
department as part of a routine canvass of businesses to determine their compliance with the
fire code. Id. at 541. The Court held that the inspections could only take place after a
warrant had been obtained. Id.
187. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
188. Id. at 351.
189. Id. at 352 (footnotes omitted).
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a. Development of the Administrative Search Exception
The seemingly unremarkable proposition advanced in See v. City of
Seattle, that the government cannot enter onto a corporation's property to
conduct a search without a warrant, was quickly undermined in a series of
cases establishing an exception to the Warrant Clause for administrative
searches. The initial step away from Katz's seemingly broad protection
involved businesses operating in closely regulated industries, such as retail
liquor sales and gun dealers.
In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 9' the Court announced
that a governmental inspection of a locked liquor storeroom without a
warrant was permissible because "the liquor industry [has] long [been]
subject to close supervision and inspection. As respects that industry...
Congress has broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for
searches and seizures."' 9' In United States v. Biswell,'92 the Court up-
held the inspection of a pawn shop owner's locked gun storeroom on the
grounds that the dealer had no reasonable expectation of privacy because
when one "chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to
accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business
records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspec-
tion.' 93  The Court noted that while regulation of firearms is not as
deeply rooted in history as that of liquor, the supervision of which dates
back to colonial times, mere temporal longevity alone did not determine
whether the pervasiveness of regulation was sufficient to permit warrantless
searches. 194 The Court considered the degree of regulation together with
the need to permit unannounced inspections, when violations could be easily
hidden or quickly corrected absent an unannounced search, as the critical
factors for determining whether the government must first seek a war-
rant. 95
190. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
191. Id. at 77. In California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), the Court
held that currency reporting regulations imposed on banks to provide information about
customer transactions were "sufficiently described and limited in nature, and sufficiently
related to a tenable congressional determination as to improper use of transactions of that type
in interstate commerce, so as to withstand the Fourth amendment challenge made by the bank
plaintiffs." Id. at 67. The Court relied on Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt in upholding
the currency reporting requirements. id.
192. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
193. Id. at 316. The right to enter a closely regulated business without a warrant was
not unconditional because the inspection system must be "carefully limited in time, place and
scope" so that the constitutionality of the search is not based on the owner's consent but on
the validity of the statute. Id. at 315.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 316. Biswell's reference to some form of implied consent to enter a highly
regulated businesswithout a warrant has been roundly criticized as fictitious, especially when
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Although the Court was unmoved in Biswell by the pawn shop owner's
claim for Fourth Amendment protection, in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,'96
it found that businesses had some expectation of privacy that prohibited
warrantless searches related to workplace safety.' 97 The Court rejected the
argument that a business voluntarily consents to inspections under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) because it chose to engage in
a business that affects interstate commerce, noting that this was "the most
fictional sense of voluntary consent."' 98  In fact, due to the breadth of
OSHA's regulatory scheme, such a finding would subject virtually every
operation to warrantless inspections for health and safety violations.
Therefore, the Court held that the government must secure a warrant before
it could conduct a search pursuant to OSHA.' 99
But the Court was unwilling to apply the same standard for obtaining
a warrant to enter a business's premises as apply to government efforts to
search a private individual's home. Instead, the Court in Barlow's held that
a warrant could issue on a showing that the search will be conducted in
accord with reasonable legislative or administrative standards. 20 0  The
Court relaxed the burden on the government to provide the particularized
information required to demonstrate probable cause when a corporate entity
is the target of the search.20 '
one could join an industry that later becomes sufficiently regulated to allow a court to uphold
warrantless administrative searches. See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.03(b) (3d ed. 1993) (stating that "[C]ontrary to the
Court's insinuation in Biswell, one does not 'consent' to surprise searches merely because
one enters a 'closely regulated industry"'); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 10.02(b) (2d ed. 1987) ("Hopefully, the Biswellcase will mark the end of resort to artificial
concepts of voluntariness as a means of avoiding more fundamental questions about the
legality of various inspection schemes."). The Court rejected the warrantless seizure of
property to satisfy a tax lien in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977),
stating that the government could not "effect a warrantless seizure of property, even that
owned by a corporation, situated on private premises to which access is not otherwise
available for the seizing officer." Id. at 354. The Court acknowledged, however, that "a
business, by its special nature and voluntary existence, may open itself to intrusions that
would not be permissible in a purely private context." Id. at 353.
196. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
197. Id. at 315.
198. Id. at 314.
199. Id. at 325.
200. Id. at 320.
201. The Court first limited the probable cause requirement in Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), when it held that housing inspections could be based on warrants
that were issued pursuant to a neutral plan of investigation that did not target a particular
business. Id. at 536. The Court stated that "[]f a valid public interest justifies the intrusion
contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant." Id.
at 539. This relaxation of the probable cause requirement has been strongly criticized as
permitting general warrants, which were the very type of governmental action that led to the
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In Donovan v. Dewey, °2 the Court took a somewhat different ap-
proach to justifying warrantless administrative inspections, stating that "it is
the pervasiveness and regularity of the federal regulation that ultimately
determines whether a warrant is necessary to render an inspection program
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."20 3  The Court abandoned the
notion of voluntary consent first enunciated in Biswell, instead relying on
congressional determinations of the necessity for the inspection based on
reasonable standards incorporated into the program to ensure compliance
with the Fourth Amendment.0 4 This approach comports with the Court's
conclusion "that the expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial
property enjoys in such property differs significantly from the sanctity
accorded an individual's home.,
205
b. Dow Chemical and Burger: Businesses Just Aren't People
The Supreme Court's acknowledgement in Dewey of the lesser
protection under the Fourth Amendment for corporations and other
businesses comported with the approach to corporate rights in Hale v.
Henkel, The key question for warrantless inspections of commercial
property is whether a line of business is of a type that the Court can label
as a pervasively regulated industry. If so, then the need to preserve the
government's enforcement effort justifies the warrantless entry. The degree
of protection the Court afforded to business premises after Barlow's and
Dewey appeared to be that the government could not invade commercial
property to any greater degree than it could search an individual's property,
absent the presence of a fairly narrow statutory scheme authorizing
warrantless inspections. Yet, even that reduced measure of protection did
not survive for long in the wake of the Court's more recent decisions in
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States206 and New York v. Burger.
20 7
In Dow Chemical, the Court rejected a corporation's Fourth Amendment
challenge to the EPA's use of aerial surveillance photographs to monitor
adoption of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis M. Seidman,
The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory. 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 26 (1988) (administrative
search exception is a "stunning reversal" of the theory of the Fourth Amendment that permits
general warrants that "demonstrate the absence of particularity and probable cause").
202. 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
203. Id. at 606.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 598-99. The Court upheld warrantless searches under the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act, based on the substantial federal interest in regulating the mining
industry and stating that the mining industry "is among the most hazardous in the country and
that the poor health and safety record of this industry has significant deleterious effects on
interstate commerce." Id. at 602.
206. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
207. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
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compliance with emission standards at a chemical manufacturing plant.2 °8
It found that the industrial complex "is more comparable to an open field
and as such it is open to the view and observation of persons in aircraft
lawfully in public airspace"2 °9 The property did not qualify for the same
Fourth Amendment protection as the curtilage area immediately surrounding
an individual's house, an area in which the occupant usually maintains a
legitimate expectation of privacy if the allegedly illegal activity was not
conducted in the plain view of outsiders.2 10  Despite Dow Chemical's
extensive efforts to shield its facility from outsiders, the Court permitted
government surveillance by adopting a narrower definition for corporations
of the space within which a business has a privacy interest than that
accorded to an individual's residence.2 '
In Burger, the Court upheld a warrantless inspection by police officers
of an automobile junkyard's books and records because the operation fell
within the category of pervasively regulated businesses.2 2  The Court
explained that a statutory scheme permitting warrantless inspections of
commercial property must meet three criteria: (1) there is a substantial
governmental interest; (2) warrantless entry is necessary to avoid alerting
owners who will hide violations; and (3) the inspection program is
208. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 239.
209. Id.; see Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (establishing open fields
exception to the warrant requirement).
210. Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 235; see California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207
(1986); Oliver,466 U.S. at 179. The Court stated in Dow Chemicalthat "[tjhe area at issue
here can perhaps be seen as falling somewhere between 'open fields' and curtilage, but
lacking some of the critical characteristics of both." Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 236.
The majority opinion justified that position because the areas for which the company sought
protection as curtilage "cover the equivalent of a half dozen family farms." Id. at 236 n.3.
Although, the Court did not explain why an industrial facility's size should remove it from
the protection of the Constitution.
211. In United States v. Hall, 47 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 1995), the Eleventh Circuit
stated:
The fact that the test of the legitimacy of an expectation of privacy is the same in
both the residential and commercial sphere does not mean, however, that the facts which
tend to be of probative value in resolving the [business curtilage] inquiry when the
governmental intrusion involves a residence, are to be accorded the same weight when
the inquiry is directed at the legitimacy of a privacy expectation in commercial property.
The Supreme Court's treatment of the expectation of privacy that the owner of
commercial property enjoys in such property has differed significantly from the
protection accorded an individual's home.
Id. at 1095. See Lesser v. Espy, 34 F.3d 1301, 1305 (7th Cir. 1994) ("An owner or operator
of a business thus has a reasonable expectation of privacy in commercial property. This
expectation, however, is different from, and indeed somewhat less than, the privacy
expectation in one's home.").
212. Burger, 482 U.S. at 704-05.
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reasonable as to time, place, and scope.213 If the program meets these
criteria, then the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement has been
fulfilled to permit the inspection because the business owner has sufficient
notice that an inspection will take place within the confines of the regulatory
214regime.
Interestingly, the Court's rationale for finding that automobile junkyards
are pervasively regulated, and the concomitant state interest in closely
monitoring the area, was that these businesses frequently deal with stolen
cars. 2 5 The Court took a forgiving approach to the question of pervasive-
ness, noting that while automobile junkyards are a recent phenomenon, they
are similar to secondhand shops and general junkyards, more "traditional"
enterprises that have been subject to close regulation. 1 6  Moreover,
Burger worked a subtle change on the law of administrative inspections by
permitting the police, rather than civil administrative authorities, to conduct
the search. The inspection program appears to be devoted primarily to
supporting the police function, i.e., stopping the traffic in stolen automobile
parts, rather than ensuring compliance with complex administrative
regulations entrusted to a regulatory body with expertise in overseeing the
industry.
4. Consistency Among the Shifting Forms of Analysis
of the Corporation's Right to Privacy
The corporate search cases show the Court struggling to reconcile the
corporation's limited right under the Fourth Amendment with the broader
protection afforded to individuals. 2 7 The shifting rationales demonstrate
213. Id. at 702-03.
214. Id. at 711. The dissent vigorously disputed the claim that the statute gave
sufficient guidance as to the time, place, and scope of inspections, arguing that "[n]either the
statute, nor any regulations, nor any regulatory body, provide limits or guidance on the
selection of vehicle dismantlers for inspection. In fact the State could not explain why
Burger's operation was selected for inspection." Id. at 723.
215. See id. at 710 ("Because stolen cars often pass quickly through an automobile
junkyard, 'frequent' and 'unannounced' inspections are necessary in order to detect them.
In sum, surprise is crucial if the regulatory scheme aimed at remedying this major social
problem is to function at all.").
216. Id. at 706; see Stuntz, Privacy's Problem, supra note 130, at 1058-59 (The
Court's approach in Burger is criticized because it treats "the junkyard owner's privacy
interest as of no account. Once again, the law sets a boundary line, protects privacy on one
side of the line, and ignores it on the other. The result is to limit criminal procedure's
substantive effect.").
217. See Lynn S. Searle, Note, The "Administrative" Search from Dewey to Burger:
Dismantling the Fourth Amendment, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 261, 267 (1989) ("In its
struggle to find authority and articulate rationales for warrantless searches, the Court has been
unsuccessful in developing and defining consistent criteria. Its decisions, neither comprehen-
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that there is no simple basis to explain how much less protection a
corporation should receive, only that it is not as great as the individual's
sphere of privacy. The Court's hesitancy to give corporations too much
protection leads instead to rules that severely limit corporate Fourth
Amendment rights, such as the result in Dow Chemical, in which the Court
granted less protection to a corporation's property than an individual's
without any cogent explanation.1 s  Similarly, Burger expanded the
administrative search exception to the warrant requirement by allowing the
police to search for evidence of wrongdoing in the guise of enforcing a
regulatory scheme to monitor a line of business that employs questionable
acquisition practices.
The Fourth Amendment cases establish the corporation's claim to
protection from unreasonable searches, but reflective of Hale v. Henkel's
initial recognition of corporate rights under the Fourth Amendment, the
Court fails to supply consistent or clearly discernible rules for recognizing
the scope of the constitutional protection. Simply acknowledging that a
corporation has a degree of protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures does not provide a framework for distinguishing the extent of
corporate rights from that accorded to the individual. The Court's failure
to adopt a consistent form of analysis effectively gives the government
broad leeway to search for evidence at a business despite language in earlier
cases that seemingly equates the corporation's right with the individual's.
When viewed in light of Hale v. Henkel's weighing of the need to
permit effective enforcement of the criminal law against corporations with
the danger of misuse of the government's power, the Fourth Amendment
decisions take on a degree of clarity. The early decisions granting
corporations protection, Silverthorne Lumber, American Tobacco, and Go-
Bart Importing, involved obvious overreaching by the government. The
factual bases of the claims alone permitted the Court to restrain the
government without having to explain the limits of the Fourth Amendment's
protection for corporations. In Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt, the
government used a less intrusive means of gathering information, and
upholding the corporate claims of protection would have undermined the
government's enforcement efforts just as surely as permitting a corporation
to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. Absent evidence of
governmental misuse of its investigatory power, the Court will give only
minimal protection to corporations seeking to resist efforts to gather
information that do not involve an actual entry on to a business's premises.
sive nor far-seeing, have dealt with cases on an ad hoc basis.").
218. See, e.g., Hall, 47 F.3d at 1095 (government agent's removal of shredded
documents from a dumpster located on commercial property did not violate Fourth
Amendment because business must show it took "the additional precaution of affirmatively
barring the public from the area" while an individual need only show actions were not in
plain view of others).
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The administrative search cases considered an even greater invasion of
corporate privacy to gather evidence that can be used in an administrative
or criminal proceeding against the organization. Nevertheless, the Court
provided a substantially lower degree of protection under the Fourth
Amendment, ostensibly because of the diminished expectation of privacy in
commercial property. A better understanding of the conclusions in the
search decisions results when one notes that the Court imposed the warrant
requirement when there was only a minimal danger that a business entity
could undermine the government's enforcement effort. The greater the
possibility that regulatory or statutory violations can be shielded from the
government, the more likely the Court will find that a warrantless search is
permissible.
The very concept of a pervasively regulated industry as the basis for
permitting a warrantless inspection demonstrates that the Court uses the need
for close regulation to determine that there is no expectation of privacy
sufficient to merit protection of the business premises under the Fourth
Amendment. 2'9  The reasonableness requirement described in Burger,
mandating some objective framework for the time, place, and scope of the
invasion of the business, is a means to ensure that the government does not
misuse its power. Similarly, Barlow's represents the Court's effort to
impose an outer limit on the government's power to conduct warrantless
searches of corporation's by holding that not every regulatory scheme can
form the basis for permitting the search of commercial property without a
220warrant. Without an opinion like Barlow's, the exception would truly
swallow the rule and create too great a possibility that the government can
abuse its power. Even when the Court imposes a warrant requirement, the
factual basis for its issuance is diminished because Barlow 's adopts a lower
threshold that does not require the government to provide specific facts to
show probable cause to search. Finally, what constitutes a search of an
individual's house is not a search, for Fourth Amendment purposes after
Dow Chemical, when the target is a corporation.
The Court adheres to its mantra that corporations are protected by the
Fourth Amendment, 22 1 yet that recitation is largely irrelevant. Instead, the
219. See, e.g., Lesser, 34 F.3d at 1307 (The court held that rabbitries were a closely
regulated industry based on finding that "[wihile one may debate why the regulation of
rabbitries is a federal matter ... [Airguably by taking measures to assure that the animals
are accorded the basic creature comforts, the federal government may be of some benefit to
[medical] research.").
220. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 324-25 (stating that OSHA regulations do not warrant
inspection without a warrant).
221. See, e.g., Burger, 482 U.S. at 699 ("An owner or operator of a business thus has
an expectation of privacy in commercial property, which society is prepared to consider to
be reasonable."); Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 315 ("What [employees] observe in their daily
functions is undoubtedly beyond the employer's reasonable expectation of privacy. The
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corporation has only an abbreviated constitutional protection compared to
the individual. While the Court uses the phrase "reasonable expectation of
privacy" in relation to the corporation, there is no realistic basis for
concluding that a corporate entity has any privacy because that is a term
applicable to individuals, not organizations. The Fourth Amendment
protects the corporation from the government to the extent that the
government may not abuse its power over the corporation, but it does not
create an area protected from the scrutiny of the sovereign. Unlike the
individual, there is no zone of privacy that a corporation a priori may lay
claim to under the Fourth Amendment.
V. How MANY FIFTH AMENDMENTS ARE THERE FOR CORPORATIONS?
The Supreme Court consistently denied corporations the right to assert
the privilege against self-incrimination on the ground that the Fifth
Amendment protects the liberty of the individual, not a corporate entity.22
2
The Court's analysis, however, begs the question of whether the other Fifth
Amendment protections afforded to individuals in criminal prosecutions
should also be denied to the corporate defendants. Hale v. Henkel finessed
the question by asserting that a corporation's rights under the Self-Incrimi-
nation Clause are not even implicated because the corporation is not the
witness compelled to testify, so there is no constitutional question for the
Court to decide.
The Fifth Amendment provides two other specific protections for
criminal defendants in addition to the privilege against self-incrimination-
the prohibition against placing a person twice in jeopardy for the same
offense and the right to indictment by a grand jury.223 For the Double
Government inspector, however, is not an employee."); City ofSeattle,387 U.S. at 543 ("The
businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his
business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property."). The
Court's opinions do not attribute specifically to the corporation the right to privacy, probably
because it would be troublesome to ascribe a particularly human trait to ajuridical construct.
Instead, the Court often refers to the "owner" or "employer" as the possessor of the
expectation of privacy, using a verbal sleight-of-hand to avoid stating that a corporation has
an expectation of privacy, a potentially objectionable position.
222. See, e.g., Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43 (1906).
223. The Court has long held that corporations are entitled to the protections of the
due process clause under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Pembina Consol. Silver
Mining and Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181 (1888). That protection applies in
both civil and criminal proceedings, but it does not furnish any specific rights beyond the
requirement that the procedures comport with basic concepts of fundamental fairness. See,
e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) ("Due process of law, as a[] historic and
generative principle, precludes defining, and thereby confining, these standards of conduct
more precisely than to say that convictions cannot be brought about that offend 'a sense of
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Jeopardy Clause, the Court merely assumes that corporations can claim the
protection without considering whether the right should be afforded to
corporate defendants. 224  The test the Court has adopted for determining
the scope of the Indictment Clause, on the other hand, appears to exclude
corporations from the right completely. 25 The inconsistent treatment of
corporate rights under the Fifth Amendment is traceable to the Court's
failure to carry through the form of analysis adopted in Hale v. Henkel,
which affords constitutional protection to a corporate defendant only when
there is a substantial danger that the government will misuse its power and
recognition of the corporation's right will not impede the successful
enforcement of the criminal law.
A. Can a Corporation Survive in a "Continuing State
of Anxiety and Insecurity -?226
1. The Scope of Double Jeopardy
In North Carolina v. Pearce,227 the Supreme Court defined the limits
of the Double Jeopardy Clause to three situations: 1) protection against a
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, 2) protection against
a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and 3) protection
against multiple punishments for the same offense.2 8 A primary value of
the double jeopardy prohibition is preservation of the finality of a verdict,
which prevents the government from using its prosecutorial power to seek
added sanctions.229 The Court has recognized that "permitting the sover-
justice."').
224. See, e.g., United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977); Fong
Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962).
225. See, e.g., Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348 (1886); Ex parte Wilson, 114
U.S. 417 (1885).
226. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
227. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
228. Id. at 717.
229. See George C. Thomas 111, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL.
L. REv. 827, 850 (1988) (stating that "government can have no legitimate interest in
relitigating the fact finder's culpability determination"); Peter J. Henning, Precedents in a
Vacuum: The Supreme Court Continues to Tinker with Double Jeopardy, 31 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 1, 7-8 (1993) [hereinafter Henning, Double Jeopardy] (reviewing theories of double
jeopardy protection); see generally Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150 (1977)
(stating that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple prosecutions for the same
offense); Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 796 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(stating that government can not later accuse a defendant on a broader offense when the
defendant has been already acquitted of a lesser included offense).
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eign freely to subject the citizen to a second trial for the same offense would
arm Government with a potent instrument of oppression.""23
The double jeopardy protections reflect two related rationales. It
prevents the government from misusing its prosecutorial power through
repeated trials and excessive punishments, while providing a defendant with
a measure of personal repose from the government's legitimate use of its
power once the case has concluded. 3' The institutional rationale is to
prevent "prosecutorial overreaching," '232 while the Court has summarized
the personal rationale of the constitutional protection as preventing repeated
trials for the same misconduct that will expose "him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compel[] him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty.
2 33
Although the Court speaks of the Double Jeopardy Clause as barring the
government from subjecting a person to repeated trials, it has not credited
the Fifth Amendment with a reach quite that broad.234 As early as 1824,
in United States v. Pere, 235 the Court stated that a retrial can take place
after the judge declared a mistrial when there was a "manifest necessity" for
the mistrial, "or the end[] of public justice would otherwise be defeat-
ed., 236 A problem with the jury, such as deadlock or a biased or prejudi-
cially influenced panel, is normally the basis for finding manifest necessi-
ty.23  The government can also reprosecute after a successful appeal of
230. Martin Linen Supply, 430 U.S. at 569.
231. See Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive
and Excessive Penalties, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 101, 130-46 (1995) (reviewing limited scope
of double jeopardy in preventing retrials and imposition of additional punishments).
232. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 501 (1984).
233. Green, 355 U.S. at 187-88; see Note, The ApplicabilityofDouble JeopardyRights
to Corporations, 1977 DUKE L.J. 726, 742 (1977) ("The government is checked from
misusing its prosecutorial power to harass those it may perceive as potential or actual
adversaries.").
234. See Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on
Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1001, 1009 (1980) ("If the
defendant's feelings and desires were controlling, the latter rulings should confer the same
kind of immunity from reprosecution that erroneous acquittals do. Yet they do not.").
Jeopardy attaches when the "jury is impaneled and sworn," Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 29
(1978), or when the court hears evidence in a bench trial. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S.
377, 388 (1975). See generally Project, Twenty-Fourth Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1993-1994, 83 GEO. L.J.
665, 1040-50 (1995) [hereinafter 24th Criminal Procedure Project].
235. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
236. Id. at 580.
237. See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 324 (permitting retrial after
mistrial due to deadlocked jury); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 515-16 (1978)
(manifest necessity when defense opening statement may have biased jurors). The
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the dismissal of an indictment when the trial court's order is unrelated to the
defendant's guilt or innocence.238 Moreover, a defendant whose appeal
results in reversal of the conviction cannot assert double jeopardy to bar a
retrial. 9  Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, a defendant may be
prosecuted for misconduct that violates both federal and state laws in
separate actions, and acquittal in one jurisdiction does not bar conviction in
the other. 240 Thus, despite the soaring rhetoric of limiting the government
to a single attempt to convict the defendant,24' the Double Jeopardy Clause
provides less comfort to the defendant than the Court's language suggests.
Hale v. Henkel's interpretation of the Self-Incrimination Clause as a
"purely personal" protection appears consistent with the language the
Supreme Court has used in later cases to describe one rationale -for double
jeopardy, that it protects the individual from a "continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity ' 242 about repeated prosecutions when each trial will entail
a "heavy personal strain. 243  Whatever "anxiety" a trial engenders in a
corporation, one can argue that it is not sufficient to allow corporate
assertion of the prior determination as a bar to a subsequent trial for the
same misconduct.244  The second rationale of preventing misuse of
government power will be raised if the government seeks to retry the
defendant for the same violation.
The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the issue of the
Double Jeopardy Clause's applicability to corporations. Rather, the Court
assumed initially that a corporation must be protected by the constitutional
prohibition when it considered the scope of the Clause's protection in cases
brought against corporate defendants. The Court has failed to distinguish
between the personal and institutional rationales for the Double Jeopardy
Clause by granting corporations the same double jeopardy protection as
individuals.
government may also try the defendant again when the defense has moved for a mistrial,
unless the prosecution acted in bad faith to induce the defendant into seeking the termination
of the trial. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 674-75 (1982).
238. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98-99 (1978).
239. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896).
240. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985).
241. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (stating that "society's
awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual
defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the Government to a single criminal
proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws").
242. Green, 355 U.S. at 187.
243. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 108 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
244. See Sally A. Schreiber, Double Jeopardy and Corporations: "Lurking in the
Record" and "Ripe for Decision," 28 STAN. L. REv. 805, 814 (1978) ("The fact that
corporations lack both life and limb, the two elements expressly protected by the fifth
amendment, [sic] might lead to the conclusion that they are not 'persons' protected by the
double jeopardy clause.") (footnote omitted).
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2. Applying Double Jeopardy to Corporations Without Asking Why
In Rex Trailer Co. v. United States,245 the Supreme Court rejected a
corporation's argument that a civil penalty assessed for infractions of the
Surplus Property Act of 1944 violated the Double Jeopardy Clause when the
company earlier entered a plea of nolo contendere to criminal charges
arising from the same transactions.24 6 The Court never considered whether
a corporation can raise a double jeopardy claim. Instead, it simply reached
the substantive issue of whether the second action sought a criminal penalty,
holding that the penalty was not a criminal punishment and therefore the
civil action did not violate double jeopardy. 47 Similarly, in Puerto Rico
v. Shell Co. (P.R.),248 the Court in dicta stated that the earlier successful
prosecution of a corporation for violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Act barred
a second prosecution in a territorial court because the cases would arise
under the same sovereign.
2 49
The Court's first opportunity to consider directly the issue of a
corporation's right under the Double Jeopardy Clause in a criminal
prosecution came in Fong Foo v. United States, 2 0 but it chose to ignore
the question in its brief per curiam opinion. A corporation and two of its
employees were the defendants, and after only three witnesses testified, the
district judge ordered the jury to return verdicts of not guilty for all
defendants. 5 ' The lower court based this decision on the "supposed
improper conduct" of the prosecutor and "a supposed lack of credibility in
the testimony of the witnesses, ' '2 52 a reason that the court of appeals found
"egregiously erroneous.,,2 5' The Supreme Court did not distinguish among
the defendants in concluding that a final judgment of acquittal, no matter
how groundless or mistaken, cannot be set aside.254
245. 350 U.S. 148 (1956).
246. Id. at 149-50. The government sought a $2,000 civil penalty for each violation.
Id. The Court held that the recovery sought by the government was "civil in nature," id. at
151, and therefore double jeopardy did not prohibit the second action. Id. at 152.
247. Id. at 153. The Court reached a similar conclusion in a False Claims Act case.
See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 550 (1943). Thus, the failure to
consider the corporate status of the defendant may be explained by the fact that clear
precedents controlled the outcome.
248. 302 U.S. 253 (1937).
249. Id. at 264 ("The risk of double jeopardy does not exist. Both the territorial and
federal laws and the courts, whether exercising federal or local jurisdiction, are creatures
emanating from the same sovereignty.").
250. 369 U.S. 142 (1962).
251. Id. at 142.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 142-43.
254. Id. at 143 (stating that the Double Jeopardy Clause "is at the very root of the
present case, and we cannot but conclude that the guaranty was violated when the Court of
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Legal analysis in Fong Foo is wanting, although if the corporate
defendant had been absent, the failure to discuss any. constitutional
principles would have been understandable. If only individual defendants
were prosecuted, the entry of a verdict of acquittal is the very event that
ought to permit a person to invoke the double jeopardy protection.2 55 The
Court, however, did not hint that it considered whether the Double Jeopardy
Clause applied to a corporate defendant. Rather, it assumed that the Fifth
Amendment protected a corporation from successive prosecutions after entry
of a verdict of acquittal to the same extent as an individual defendant.
That conclusion granting full constitutional protection appears to conflict
with the Court's analysis in Hale v. Henkel that resulted in denying a
corporation the right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination in a
criminal proceeding. Yet, the Court never acknowledged that its earlier
decision on one Fifth Amendment protection led to a completely different
result based on the defendant's corporate status. Even if there is a clear
rationale for equating the corporation's double jeopardy right with that of
the individual, a doubtful proposition given the scope of corporate protection
discussed above under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the Court made
no attempt at providing one in Fong Foo.
Lower courts have taken the same approach as Fong Foo, uncritically
accepting that a corporation's double jeopardy protection is identical to the
individual's. In United States v. Armco Steel Corp.,256 the government
sought to reprosecute corporations on a charge that had been dismissed in
an earlier prosecution, an attempt that the federal district court rejected on
double jeopardy grounds.257 The court explained that the earlier dismissal
was in effect an acquittal, and, without citing any authority, went on to fimd
that "it seems beyond doubt to me that the constitutional jeopardy extended
to 'persons' includes corporations, which each of the four remaining
defendants is.' 25 8
In two district court cases involving American Honda Motor Company,
the government sought to prosecute the corporation in different districts for
Appeals set aside thejudgment of acquittal and directed that the petitioners be tried again for
the same offense").
255. See Thomas, supra note 229, at 853 (stating that the principle of verdict finality
places all verdicts of acquittal beyond the reach of the government).
256. 252 F. Supp. 364 (C.D. Cal. 1966).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 368. The district court stated that it could not find authority either way on
the question of the application of double jeopardy to corporations, which is unsurprising
based on Fong Foo's failure to address the issue. Id. The district court's rationale for
extending the constitutional protection was that "either directly or indirectly persons own all
corporations and thus 'persons' must ultimately suffer whatever penalties are imposed upon
the corporations." Id. This analysis is reminiscent of the Supreme Court's fictive approach
to finding that corporations are "Citizens" of a state for the purposes of determining diversity
jurisdiction. See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 (Cranch) 61, 91-92 (1809).
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antitrust violations arising out of a nationwide price-fixing scheme to which
the corporation had already pleaded guilty in a third district.25 9 Both
courts refused to permit the renewed prosecutions on double jeopardy
grounds, again without citing any authority.2 60 The -decisions held that
once a defendant has been prosecuted for a single conspiracy, the govern-
ment could not bring subsequent prosecutions for that same misconduct.26'
In the American Honda cases, the government apparently sought a greater
punishment than that imposed in the original. proceeding by bringing
successive prosecutions against defendants who had already been found
either innocent or guilty. The district courts, relying on the Double
Jeopardy Clause's protection against subsequent prosecutions after a guilty
verdict, rejected the government's attempts to circumvent the earlier
adjudication by bringing what arguably were distinct prosecutions in
different judicial districts.262
In addition to prohibiting successive prosecutions, lower courts have
barred the government from challenging errors made in the trial court when
the corporate defendant has been acquitted. In United States v. Southern
Railway Co.,263 the district court had previously dismissed an indictment
charging an Elkins Act violation on the ground that the evidence did not
show any criminal conduct.264 In the appeal by the government, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that the district
court's decision amounted to an acquittal, and therefore double jeopardy
prohibited any further proceedings. 265 The circuit court cited Fong Foo
and Armeco Steel Corp. for the proposition "that the double jeopardy clause
of the Fifth Amendment has been applied to corporations as well as to
natural persons. 26 6
259. United States v. American Honda Motor Co., 273 F. Supp. 810, 811-12 (N.D. Ill.
1967); United States v. American Honda Motor Co., 271 F. Supp. 979, 980-81 (N.D. Cal.
1967).
260. American Honda, 273 F. Supp. at 819; American Honda, 271 F. Supp. at 986.
261. American Honda, 273 F. Supp. at 819 ("The prohibition of the Fifth Amendment
against double jeopardy cannot be evaded by fragmentation."); American Honda, 271 F.
Supp. at 986 (stating that "such conspiracy should not and cannot be so fragmented that
defendant American Honda, having once been prosecuted, convicted and penalized for its
conspiratorial activity, cannot be again so prosecuted ... such would be contrary to the
double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment"); seealso United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 404 F. Supp. 619, 622-23 (D.D.C. 1975) (dismissing on double jeopardy
grounds, without considering whether corporation protected by Double Jeopardy Clause,
contempt charges against corporation for violating antitrust consent decree when corporation
already prosecuted for criminal violation involving same conduct as contempt charge).
262. American Honda, 273 F. Supp. at 819; American Honda, 271 F. Supp. at 988.
263. 485 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1973).
264. Id. at311.
265. Id. at 312.
266. Id. The Fourth Circuit refused to consider the propriety of the district court's
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit took the
same approach to a government appeal of the trial court's jury instructions
in United States v. Security National Bank.2 67 Rather than rely on Fong
Foo's assumption that corporations are protected by the Double Jeopardy
Clause, the Second Circuit defended the Supreme Court's lack of analysis
in that opinion by asserting that "[a]t most, there was a failure by the Court
to set forth the reasons why it adopted petitioner's position., 268  The
circuit court then took it upon itself to supply those missing reasons.
According to the Second Circuit, the double jeopardy protection should be
extended to corporations because many such entities have few or only one
shareholder, and "[t]he small entrepreneur is not spared the embarrassment,
expense, anxiety and insecurity resulting from repeated trials on criminal
charges, simply because he has incorporated his modest business. 269
Security National makes a viscerally appealing argument that the danger
of governmental misuse of its prosecutorial resources to overwhelm a small
business requires extending the double jeopardy protection to every
corporation.27° Yet, that analysis is equally compelling for the Self-
Incrimination Clause; when a corporation with a single shareholder is
subpoenaed by the government for its business records, the individual
shareholder is effectively required to incriminate himself "simply because
he has incorporated his modest business.' Braswell v. United
States272 settled the self-incrimination issue for closely-held corporations,
however, by holding that every corporation was prohibited from asserting
the privilege. 73 That rule applies regardless of the corporation's size or
the incriminating effect that providing information may have on the
individual shareholder. An emotional argument to protect the powerless
small businessperson does not assist in reconciling the denial to any
corporation the protection of the Self-Incrimination Clause with Fong Foo's
actions because it had determined that it had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal once the trial
court entered the judgment of acquittal. Id.
267. 546 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 950 (1977).
268. Id. at 493. The Second Circuit relied on the fact that the petitioner's brief in
Fong Foo raised the question of double jeopardy's applicability to corporations as the basis
for finding that the Supreme Court must have decided the issue. The fact that a party
advanced an argument which the Supreme Court did not address in its opinion hardly rises
to the level of deciding the scope of a constitutional right, especially when recognizing a
corporation's right could conflict with another decision, Hale v. Henkel, which denied a
constitutional protection under the same Amendment.
269. id. at 494.
270. See id. at 495 ("In this unequal contest, 'fundamental fairness' requires that the
Government, having had a full try at establishing criminal wrongdoing, shall not have
another.").
271. Id. at 494.
272. 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
273. See id. at 102-04, 110.
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assumption of complete protection for all corporate defendants under the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
The Supreme Court had a second opportunity to address the applicability
of the Double Jeopardy Clause to corporations in United States v. Martin
Linen Supply Co.274 The district court entered judgments of acquittal for
two defendant corporations after discharging the jury because it was
deadlocked,"'5 and the prosecution appealed the lower court's order.276
The government's authority to appeal in a criminal case lies in 18 U.S.C.§ 3731, which permits appeals in criminal cases except "where the double
jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecu-
tion. 277  Relying on Fong Foo for the proposition that any verdict of
acquittal is "dispositive" on the issue, the Court held that entry of the
judgment precluded the government from having the statutory authority to
appeal because any consideration of the merits of the appeal would violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause.278
Martin Linen Supply took for granted a corporation's double jeopardy
right without considering whether it was coextensive with the individual's.
The Court's automatic assumption that a verdict of acquittal prohibits a
reprosecution, no matter how flagrantly erroneous that verdict may be, gives
corporations greater protection than they should be entitled to in light of the
two rationales for the Double Jeopardy Clause and the need to protect
corporations from misuse of governmental power.
3. Limiting Corporate Double Jeopardy Rights:
The Power to Appeal Acquittals
The Double Jeopardy Clause can permit a potentially guilty defendant
to escape punishment when a jury misunderstands the court's instructions,
the court gives an erroneous instruction resulting in an acquittal, or the jury
decides to exercise its power to nullify the law by returning a verdict of
acquittal.279 Similarly, the trial court can dismiss a case after jeopardy has
274. 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
275. Id. at 565-66. For the procedure regarding motions of acquittal, see FED. R.
CiuM. P. 29(c) which states:
If thejury ... is discharged without having returned a verdict, a motion for judgment
of acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or within
such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period .... If no verdict is
returned the court may enter judgment of acquittal.
276. Martin Linen Supply, 430 U.S. at 567.
277. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1988).
278. 430 U.S. at 573 ("Since Rule 29 merely replaces the directed-verdict mechanism
employed in Fong Foo. . . no persuasive basis exists for construing the Rule as weakening
the trial court's binding authority for purposes of double jeopardy.").
279. See Westen, supra note 234, at 1012 (suggesting that jury nullification is a basis
for the double jeopardy protection).
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attached, and that decision cannot be appealed if the court based the
dismissal on the government's failure to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt."' 0 Preventing a retrial based on an erroneous legal or factual
conclusion can be justified when it results in the acquittal of an individual
defendant because the trial, and not just the punishment, is a severe
hardship. As the Court recognized in Green v. United States,28' the
government cannot use its power to subject a person "to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compel[] him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity." '282 Nevertheless, the Constitution does tolerate some
measure of extended exposure to prosecution by countenancing a retrial after
a mistrial, provided there is "manifest necessity, ' '183 or after a defendant
appeals a conviction successfully and the appellate court orders a retrial. 84
The first rationale of double jeopardy, to safeguard the defendant's state
of mind, does not apply when a corporation or other business organization
asserts the constitutional protection because those entities cannot feel
embarrassment and do not experience anxiety and insecurity, except perhaps
metaphorically. The highly personal aspect of the Double Jeopardy Clause
makes it inappropriate as the basis for extending the provision's full
protection to corporations. The second rationale for the double jeopardy
safeguard is that the provision constrains the use of prosecutorial resources
to prevent harassment through repeated trials until a conviction can be
obtained. Unlike the first rationale, this concern is applicable to any
potential defendant, corporate or individual.
These two rationales of the Double Jeopardy Clause are not implicated
in every prosecution of a corporation, so it is possible for the Supreme
Court to distinguish between individuals and corporations in determining the
scope of protection. The Court's approach to double jeopardy should be
similar to its Fourth Amendment analysis of the privacy rights of businesses,
to the extent that the Court acknowledges the expectation of privacy for a
business is not coextensive with the individual's protection.
Although society may be willing to prohibit a second prosecution when
the specter of repeated trials takes too great a personal toll on the individual,
that is not necessarily the case when the corporation that is the subject of
the prosecution cannot experience the same hardship and oppression.285
280. See Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 29-30 (1977). In Lee the Supreme Court
held that the dismissal of an indictment after trial had begun, which is when jeopardy
attaches, does not prevent a retrial when the trial court's dismissal was not related to the guilt
or innocence of the defendant. Id. at 33-34. In that case, the dismissal is akin to a mistrial,
after which the government normally has the right to retry the defendant. Id. at 32-33.
281. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
282. Id. at 187.
283. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580.
284. Ball, 163 U.S. at 669.
285. See Westen, supra note 234, at 1009 ("Accordingly, regardless of how much
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At the same time, there remains the need to constrain misuse of governmen-
tal power, both in the search for evidence of crimes, which is governed by
the Fourth Amendment, and the prosecution of offenses, which invokes the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Having recognized sub silentio the corporation's
double jeopardy right in Martin Linen Supply, the Court should also
consider the circumstances in which the Fifth Amendment claim arises.
The initial inquiry in corporate double jeopardy cases should be to
determine whether invocation of the right will prevent the government from
misusing its power. That inquiry is appropriate for any defendant. The
second inquiry should be to determine whether the principal reason for
granting double jeopardy protection in a particular case rests on the
underlying policy of shielding the defendant's emotions from further harm
wrought by a criminal prosecution.26 To the extent that granting the right
only minimally affects prosecutions of corporations while lessening the
possibility of misuse of the government's power, then the corporation should
be able to assert the right.
The Court ought to recognize the constitutional protection for corpora-
tions in two types of double jeopardy cases. First, cases involving a second
prosecution for the same violation should not be permitted against corporate
defendants." 7  The repeated conspiracy indictments in the American
Honda cases illustrate that reprosecution for the same crime after conviction
can be an effort to harass a defendant through misuse of the government's
power to apply its resources and authority anywhere in the United States.
Second, attempts to inflict multiple punishments on the corporation, to the
extent the additional punishment is not authorized by the legislature, should
not be sanctioned by the Court. Any punishment greater than that adopted
by the legislature is an obvious misuse of judicial authority to the detriment
of the defendant. The Court has recognized these two aspects of the double
jeopardy protection as a means to prevent the government from abusing its
power.
The only type of case in which the corporation's double jeopardy right
should not be coextensive with the individual's is a second prosecution after
an acquittal. More specifically, the issue is not the second prosecution, but
the government's power to appeal the acquittal and, if it is successful, to
reprosecute the charges. The Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates the
principle of collateral estoppel, so the government cannot bring a second
weight one attaches to a defendant's feelings of joy over a favorable outcome, there is no
basis for according greater finality to an erroneous acquittal than to a reversed conviction.").
286. The Double Jeopardy Clause is not, of course, so easily bifurcated, and one can
argue cogently that both policies are implicated in every case.
287. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) ("Where the same
act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision
requires proof of a fact which the other does not.").
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prosecution based on the same facts which a jury or the court has already
determined do not constitute a criminal violation. 288 The government's
sole response to a fundamentally flawed acquittal should be an appeal to
permit the reviewing court to consider the alleged error.289
There is an intuitive sense that once a person is acquitted of the crime,
the judicial process is complete and any retrial must be purely vindictive.
But the facts in Fong Foo show that the acquittal may be a miscarriage of
justice, and the significant harm inflicted by the erroneous decision is on
society and not the defendant, who receives a windfall if guilty of the crime.
That undeserved benefit may be an acceptable cost under the Constitution
when the defendant is an individual because society does not want its
members to live with the insecurity that the government may seek to try
them again after an acquittal. The same price is not necessarily acceptable,
however, when a corporation that cannot feel anxiety and insecurity receives
the windfall and the government's enforcement effort is adversely affected.
If the court or jury acquits a corporation due to an error, there should
be a chance to correct that failure by permitting appeal. The government's
appeal is not a misuse of its power because if an appellate court finds error
significant enough to order a retrial, then the government's power has been
vindicated. If the appeal is unsuccessful, then the cost to the corporate
defendant is that of defending the lower court's decision, which in most
cases is not as significant as that of defending the case in the trial court. If
the defendant is successful and the appellate court sustains the acquittal, then
there will not be a second trial.
The proper standard of review for considering a government appeal of
the acquittal of a corporate defendant should be strict enough to deter
appeals of merely questionable rulings that are not sufficiently obvious or
egregious to warrant the threat of continuing jeopardy for the corporate
defendant. A satisfactorily high threshold that will still allow the govern-
ment to seek correction of errors that led to an acquittal can be found in the
plain error rule of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.290 In United
States v. Olano,29' the Supreme Court explained the plain error standard
by stating that the court of appeals should correct a plain forfeited error
288. See United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2863 n. 15 (1993) (Prosecutors who
bring a second prosecution for the same acts "have little to gain and much to lose .... [An]
acquittal in the first prosecution might well bar litigation of certain facts essential to the
second one."); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 446 (1970) (explaining that double jeopardy
"protects a man who has been acquitted from having to 'run the gauntlet' a second time.")
(quoting Green v. United States, 335 U.S. 184, 190 (1957)).
289. Cf Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Department of Justice, Double Jeopardy and
GovernmentAppeals ofAcquittals, 22 MIcH. J.L. REF. 837, 839 (1989) (government should
be permitted to appeal acquittals of bench trials).
290. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) ("Plain error or defects affecting substantial rights may
be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.").
291. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
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affecting substantial rights if the error "'seriously affect[s] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." 292
Requiring the government to show plain error to reverse the acquittal of
a corporate defendant would only allow retrials when the error demonstrably
affected the outcome, and not just that the verdict may have been different
absent the error.293 The real cost that a corporation would face without
the full protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause are those involved in the
government's appeal of the acquittal, not that an overzealous prosecutor can
institute a second prosecution for the same violation automatically or can
simply refile charges in another district capriciously.294
292. Id. at 732 (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. I, 15 (1985)). The
government's burden on appeal would probably insulate instances ofjury nullification, to the
extent that they occur when a corporation is the defendant. When the government charges
the corporation together with an agent, the jury is more likely to acquit the individual and
convict the corporate defendant. In United States v. Hughes Aircraft, 20 F.3d 974 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 482 (1994), the circuit court upheld a corporation's conviction
for conspiracy even though thejury found the only individual charged as a co-conspirator not
guilty. Id. at 976-77. If the jury finds the corporation not guilty on the ground of jury
nullification, it is highly unlikely that there would not be some evidence in the corporate
defendant's favor on which a jury could have decided. In effect, an appellate court
considering the government's appeal could avoid ajury nullification argument by focusing
on the evidence, however thin, that supports the jury's verdict.
293. An additional protection in the federal system is that appeals by the United States
must be approved by the Solicitor General, not just the United States Attorney's office
involved in the prosecution. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b) (1988). This provides an additional layer
of review to ensure that any appeal is meritorious and consonant with the government's
broader law enforcement program, and not just the product of the individual prosecutor's
desire to obtain a conviction.
294. The recent decision in United States v. General Electric Co., 869 F. Supp. 1285
(S.D. Ohio 1994), illustrates the type of case in which a government appeal could be allowed,
if sufficient error affects the decision to acquit. The case involved an alleged antitrust
conspiracy between General Electric and DeBeers to raise the list price of industrial
diamonds. Id. at 1288. The district court granted General Electric's motion for ajudgment
of acquittal under Rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure at the close of the
government's case, on the ground that the government's evidence, even viewed in the most
favorable light, would not permit a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty. Id. at
1288-89. If the government determines that there were grounds that meet the plain error
standard to challenge the judge's conclusion that nojury could find the defendant guilty, then
permitting the appeal will not impose any psychic costs on General Electric. The
government's burden on appeal would be almost impossibleto meet, given that the trial judge
based the decision in part on weighing the credibility of the witnesses' testimony, so it is
unlikely that pursuing the appeal would be in the government's interest. Nevertheless, the
government should not be automatically precluded from having that decision reviewed by an
appellate court solely on the ground that the defendant, a multi-billion dollar enterprise,
should not be required to suffer the anxiety of possible retrial if the government were allowed
to appeal the dismissal.
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The analytical shortcoming of not adopting the approach suggested here
and instead accepting the complete double jeopardy protection for corpora-
tions was illustrated in United States v. Hospital Monteflores, Inc.295 A
hospital and its medical director were indicted for submitting false Medicare
reimbursement forms.296 After the close of the government's case, the
district court entered a judgment of acquittal, and the government appealed
only as to the corporate defendant. 9 7 The United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that corporations receive
the same double jeopardy protection as individuals.298 The First Circuit
defended its position on the policies underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause,
taking "judicial notice of the fact that corporate well-being is heavily
dependent on that elusive quality known as 'good will' and that "[c]orpora-
tions can be made very insecure by prolonged periods of bad publicity.
299
Anthropomorphizing an entity in order to stretch the Double Jeopardy
Clause rings hollow when the result is a strained attempt to identify
insecurity in a corporation by enlarging the accounting concept of good will
as a substitute for human emotions. In much the same way that Security
National identified the burdens a small corporation would endure if it cannot
assert the double jeopardy protection, Hospital Monteflores tried to justify
a broad application of the Double Jeopardy Clause by making the corpora-
tion as much like the individual as possible. The Supreme Court, however,
has never taken that approach in determining a corporation's criminal
constitutional rights, and the anthropomorphic analysis begs the underlying
question of why the mere fact of negative publicity should justify the full
protection of the Double Jeopardy clause.3 °0
The double jeopardy analysis of Security National and Hospital
Monteflores takes the concept of corporate "emotions" too far by ignoring
the fact that a governmental appeal of the acquittal would not have
significantly exacerbated the suffering already experienced by the corpora-
tions. Unlike the individual defendant, who may be forced to remain in jail
or be subject to bail conditions, a corporation does not suffer any direct
restraint from the government's appeal. Moreover, the initial indictment
inflicted the notable harm to institutional good will, and the acquittal can be
295. 575 F.2d 332 (1st Cir. 1978).
296. Id. at 333.
297. Id. ("It has not pursued an appeal against the individual defendant, but argues
that the appeal as to the corporation can proceed because the Double Jeopardy Clause does
not protect corporations.").
298. Id. at 335.
299. Id. The appellate court conceded that "corporations do not have human emotions,
but that does not mean that they do not 'suffer' during criminal trials in the sense of
experiencing harm to a legitimate, protectible interest." Id.
300. See infra note 313 (stating that adverse publicity alone should not be the basis for
extending the protection of the Indictment Clause to corporations).
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publicized to dissipate the effect of the indictment. Hospital Monteflores
never explained why the appeal would make the harm from the initial
indictment any more profound if the acquittal were found erroneous and the
prosecution reinstituted.30'
The cost to society of permitting a groundless acquittal based on an
erroneous legal analysis by the trial court is that the corporation may
continue to operate at the edge of the law while relying on the acquittal as
a plausible argument that any further governmental enforcement proceedings
would constitute harassment or displeasure with the result of the first
prosecution. While that cost may be acceptable when an individual is the
defendant, sparing the person from another trial in order to live in peace,
permitting a corporation to continue an economic operation that arguably
violates the law does not comport with the values protected by the Double
Jeopardy Clause. The better approach would be to permit government
appeals so that the appellate courts could decide whether, taking all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there was an error of
sufficient magnitude to "have affected the outcome of the district court
proceedings."30 2
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that there is a basis for the
concerns expressed by the circuit courts in Hospital Monteflores and
Security National about the effect of a criminal prosecution on a corporate
entity. The impact could be especially acute when the corporation is a
small, closely-held company in which the individual owners suffer from the
government's actions directly. In that circumstance, the cost of defending
a judgment on appeal cannot always be absorbed by the enterprise,
particularly if the case reaches the Supreme Court.
The Double Jeopardy Clause, however, is not based on protecting a
defendant from the monetary costs of a criminal prosecution. Moreover,
extending double jeopardy to all corporations on the basis that emotionally
alluring "mom-and-pop" businesses that could be overwhelmed by the
government's power to appeal an acquittal is over-inclusive. Granting
complete protection to all corporate defendants means that every large-scale
business organization can assert the double jeopardy right regardless of the
301. The analysis advanced here does not address the problem of continuing negative
publicity resulting from a retrial if the government succeeds in its appeal. The bulk of the
negative publicity, however, will usually attend the initial filing of the criminal action and
coverage of the first trial. That a corporation may receive additional community approbation
because the government can retry the corporate defendant does not mean that every
corporation should receive the full benefit of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The standard
proposed here for reversing the acquittal and permitting a second trial is high, and the
instances of retrials after verdicts of acquittal will probably be rare. The idea of a continuing
threat to corporate goodwill from a retrial, beyond the effect of the initial charge and trial,
should not outweigh the need to protect against granting corporate defendants a windfall from
erroneous acquittals based on legal errors by the trial court.
302. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.
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pecuniary effect of a governmental appeal. If the policy concern is to
protect small businesses, then the legislature can address that issue by
permitting corporations to recover their attorney fees in cases in which the
government appeal is unsuccessful. ° 3  As a matter of constitutional
analysis, the possibility of requiring corporate defendants to pay out
additional sums in the small number of cases in which the government
might appeal should not determine the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
There is no question that the double jeopardy protection for corporations
is well-established, even though the foundation for that position does not
comport with the Supreme Court's treatment of corporate rights under the
Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. Lower courts have
taken Fong Foo and Martin Linen Supply to mean that corporations have
protection identical to the individual under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
That is a credible reading of the cases that only the Supreme Court can
correct. The problem for the government is its ability to make a plausible
argument in light of the apparently consistent line of cases rejecting appeals
of allegedly erroneous acquittals of corporate defendants.30 4 Although a
vehicle may be hard to find, an analysis of the Double Jeopardy Clause that
is consistent with the Court's Self-Incrimination Clause and Fourth
Amendment holdings on corporate constitutional rights strongly favors a rule
permitting the government to appeal erroneous acquittals and, if successful,
to reprosecute the corporate defendant.
B. Does a Corporation Have the Right to an
Indictment by a Grand Jury?
The Supreme Court has decided a corporation's right under the Double
Jeopardy Clause through inattention to the nature of the corporate defendant,
while it has never considered the question of whether a corporation has a
right to demand that it be indicted by a grand jury. The Fifth Amendment
provides: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury
303. The federal government already provides for the recovery of costs and fees in
civil and administrative actions under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412
(1988). An additional provision could provide for recovery in criminal cases in which the
government appeals after a judgment of acquittal.
304. The line of authority begins with Fong Foo and Martin Linen Supply, which do
not analyze the corporation's double jeopardy rights, and includes Security National and
Hospital Monteflores, which reject governmental appeals of acquittals without considering
the substantive merits. For example, in United States v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 427
(M.D. Tenn. 1982), the district court cited Hospital Monteflores for the proposition that
"[tihe double jeopardy prohibition applies equally to corporate as well as individual
defendants in criminal cases." Id. at 429 (citing United States v. Hospital Monteflores 575
F.2d 332, 335 (1978).
[Vol. 63:793
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
.... "305 The key issue for individual defendants is the determination of
what constitutes an "otherwise infamous crime" that triggers the protection.
In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court defined infamous
crimes as those for which the authorized punishment is a term of impris-
onment in a penitentiary 306 or at hard labor.307  In creating a bright line
for requiring a grand jury indictment, the Court explained: "What punish-
ments shall be considered as infamous may be affected by the changes of
public opinion from one age to another. In former times, being put in the
stocks was not considered as necessarily infamous.""3 8 The Court has also
held, however, that the Due Process Clause does not require the states to
proceed by grand jury indictment even though the crime would be labeled
as "infamous" in the federal system.30 9
The grand jury has a distinguished pedigree, dating to twelfth-century
England, and the Court acknowledged that "our constitutional grand jury
was intended to operate substantially like its English progenitor., 3 °10  In
Hale v. Henkel,31' the Court recounted that "the most valuable function of
the grand jury was not only to examine into the commission of crimes, but
to stand between the prosecutor and the accused, and to determine whether
the charge was founded upon credible testimony or was dictated by malice
or personal ill will.
312
305. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
306. Mackin, 117 U.S. at 352 ("We cannot doubt that at the present day imprisonment
in a State prison or penitentiary, with or without hard labor, is an infamous punishment.").
307. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. at 429 ("Our judgment is that a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term of years at hard labor is an infamous crime, within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution ....").
308. Id. at 427. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure incorporate the Court's
analysis of infamous crimes in Rule 7(a), which requires indictments for all cases that meet
the constitutional minimum:
An offense which may be punished by death shall be prosecuted by indictment. An
offense which may be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or at
hard labor shall be prosecuted by indictment or, if indictment is waived, it may be
prosecuted by information. Any other offense may be prosecuted by indictment or by
information. An information may be filed without leave of court.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a).
309. See Hurtado v. California; 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
310. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956). For a review of the history
of the grand jury, see generally Fred A. Bernstein, Note, Behind the Gray Door: Williams,
Secrecy, and the Federal Grand Jury, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 574-82 (1994); William F.
Jung, Note, Recognizing a Corporation's Rights Under the Indictment Clause, 1983 U. ILL.
L. REv. 477, 479-82 (1993).
311. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
312. Id. at 59; see Bernstein, supra note 310, at 574 ("The grand jury was regarded
as protection from prosecutorial overreaching."). A federal grand jury can investigate any
crime within itsjurisdiction by subpoenaing witnesses to testify and requiring the production
of documents for its examination to determine whether probable cause exists that a crime has
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The constitutional minimum for invoking the Indictment Clause appears
to exclude corporations because they can be sentenced to neither a
penitentiary nor a term of hard labor.313 The Supreme Court's reading of
"infamous crimes" has led lower courts which have considered the question
to hold that corporations cannot invoke the constitutional protection. In two
decisions in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United
States v. Yellow Freight System, Inc. 314 and United States v. Armored
been committed. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1992); United States v.
Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 423 (1983); see generally 24th Criminal Procedure Project,
supra note 234, at 850-56 (reviewing the powers of the grand jury). Coupled with the grand
jury's broad investigative power is the potential defendant's lack of meaningful access to the
accusatory process. A witness is not permitted to have an attorney present while appearing
before the grand jury, see In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 251
(2d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (holding that removal of counsel from grand jury does not violate
right to counsel), cert. denied sub nom. Roe v. United States, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); the
exclusionary rule does not apply to the proceedings, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
351-52 (1974); and, the government is not required to present exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury before an indictment is returned, Williams, 504 U.S. at 52. Indeed, the
prosecutor's power to exert substantial control over the proceeding has been severely
criticized for making the grand jury an inefficacious means of protecting the individual from
the unfettered power of the government. See United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 23 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("It is, indeed, common knowledge that the grand jury, having been
conceived as a bulwark between the citizen and the Government, is now a tool of the
Executive."); Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary
Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REv. 463. 469-75 (1980)
(advocating incorporation of various protections in the grand jury stage); Bernstein, supra
note 310, at 577 ("As for the indicting grand jury: if the grand jury as sword is somewhat
dulled, the grand jury as shield is riddled. That the indicting grand jury has surrendered to
the very prosecutorial power against which it was meant to protect is well-established.")
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court continues to acknowledge the crucial role the grand jury
plays in the American system of criminal justice, and it is unlikely that it will pass from the
scene. See Williams, 504 U.S. 47.
313. A broad interpretation of infamy could incorporate the concept of "stigma," that
the very act of accusing a defendant is sufficiently infamous that a grand jury should make
the indictment decision and not just the individual prosecutor acting through the filing of an
information. For example, a student author argues that "[i]nfamy is a product of ignominious
public opinion, 'a most terrible weapon.' A grand jury affords an accused as much protection
from a punishment which will bring him infamy as from a punishment which will bring him
death." Jung, supra note 310, at 499 (footnote omitted). The problem with using adverse
publicity as the basis for deciding whether a crime is infamous for constitutional purposes
is that virtually every criminal charge could theoretically be infamous. One need only
conceive of the effect of an apparently minor criminal charge on a major political figure or
religious leader to theorize that any criminal action must first be considered by a grandjury.
Corporations are no less susceptible to being stigmatized by a criminal charge than an
individual, so it is hard to conceive of a separate analysis for corporate defendants that would
not radically alter the scope of the grand jury protection for individuals. See infra note 32 1.
314. 637 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 815 (1981).
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Transport, Inc.,3 ' the circuit court rejected arguments by corporate
defendants that the prosecutions violated their right to a grand jury
indictment. In Yellow Freight, the court held that prosecution under the
Elkins Act did not constitute an infamous crime because "[t]he class of
inherently infamous crimes, if it exists at all, would encompass only the
most serious mala in se. Regulatory crimes, such as those charged in this
case, are not inherently infamous." '316
In Armored Transport, the court found the grand jury indictment invalid,
but it went on to declare that the indictment constituted a valid information
filed against the company, and therefore the case could proceed on that
basis.3 17 The Ninth Circuit held that the corporation had no right to an
indictment because the "potential punishment must be infamous, and a fine,
levied against either an individual or a corporation, simply does not fit
within the meaning of that word, as interpreted by the Supreme Court. 3 Is
Although the Indictment Clause is a means of constraining the
government's power, the protection provided for individuals is not
coextensive with the risk of misuse of the prosecutorial power. If a crime
is punishable by a term of imprisonment that does not involve incarceration
in a penitentiary or a term of hard labor, a category which includes a large
number of so-called "petty" offenses, then a fair reading of the Court's
analysis is that the defendant's interests do not outweigh the discretion
afforded the prosecutor to commence cases in a summary fashion.
Moreover, the Fifth Amendment protection is not imposed on the states; the
Supreme Court recognized as far back as 1884 in Hurtado v. California"'
that protection of the individual did not require the use of an indicting grand
jury.
32 0
315. 629 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981).
316. Yellow Freight, 637 F.2d at 1254.
317. Armored Transport, 629 F.2d at 1315. The grand jury returned the indictment
after its term expired, and therefore the indictment was invalid. Id. The defendant
corporation had entered a plea of nolo contendere, and upon learning that the indictment was
invalid, it sought to withdraw its plea. Id.
318. Id. at 1319. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York reached the same conclusion, in a case again involving an invalid grand jury indictment,
in United States v. Macklin, 389 F. Supp. 272 (E.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 523 F.2d 193 (8th Cir.
1975). The district court stated that because corporate defendants are not subject to a term
of imprisonment upon conviction, "the charges against them are not 'infamous' within the
meaning of the fifth amendment." Id. at 273.
319. I lOU.S. 516 (1884).
320. Id. at 534-35; see Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 590 (1913) (due process
does not impose on states the requirement that there be an examination of the charges prior
to the formal accusation of the district attorney). The Indictment Clause is the only criminal
provision of the Bill of Rights that the Supreme Court has not applied to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 22,
§ 15.1(a), at 686.
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While the Court has noted that the category of infamous crimes is not
limited to violations which are punished by incarceration, it has never found
any crime that rises to the level of infamy that does not at least include a
term of imprisonment. The danger addressed by the Indictment Clause is
misuse of the government's power to punish defendants, not to shield
individuals from being charged with crimes. The potential misuse of
governmental power may include the decision to prosecute, but the Supreme
Court's application of the authorized punishment as the bright-line test of
an "infamous crime" shows that the ultimate goal of requiring a grand jury
in certain federal prosecutions is to protect the individual's interest in not
being incarcerated by means of prosecutorial overreaching. In that sense,
the Indictment Clause protects individuals from misuse of the government's
power by ensuring that their punishment will only be imposed after a
scrupulously fair proceeding initiated after a determination of probable
cause.
A corporation cannot be given a sentence that reaches the constitutional
point of incarceration at hard labor or in a penitentiary that invokes the Fifth
Amendment protection. The exclusion of corporate defendants from this
protection represents a determination that the possibility of governmental
misuse of its power does not outweigh the burden of imposing greater
procedural requirements on the government. The corporation cannot
establish that it will be substantially harmed when the government proceeds
by way of an information rather than an indictment, in much the same way
that charging an individual with a petty crime not punishable by incarcera-
tion in a penitentiary or a term at hard labor does not present a threat of
government misuse of power sufficient to require the procedural protection
of convening a grand jury to determine probable cause.
The Indictment Clause involves a balancing of interests, so that the
effect of governmental misuse of its power will be most strongly felt when
a defendant is subject to imprisonment in a penitentiary or a term of hard
labor. Short of that line, the Constitution does not impose the procedural
requirement that the government present its case to a grand jury and seek
an independent review to determine whether there is probable cause that a
crime has been committed. The corporation runs the risk of having a fine
imposed, but that penalty does not rise to the level of harm that a substantial
prison sentence inflicts on an individual. An expansive definition of
infamous crimes to protect the interests of the corporation would require
attributing anthropomorphic qualities to a corporate defendant in order to
grant greater protection to a business entity than individual defendants
receive under the Fifth Amendment.3 2'
321. Recasting the Fifth Amendment's scope of protection to provide corporate
defendants with the right to indictment by a grand jury would require giving corporations
greater rights than individuals receive, or lowering the threshold to trigger the Indictment
Clause so much that virtually every federal offense will compel the government to proceed
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C. Conclusion
The invariable, and even expansive, denial of the privilege against self-
incrimination for a variety of organizations, including a single-shareholder
corporation, shows that the Court is not willing to allow the government's
enforcement program to be adversely affected by permitting any corporate
claim of the privilege. The Indictment Clause's applicability to corporations
has not reached the Supreme Court, but the two lower court decisions on the
question deny the corporate claims.3" The Court's analysis of the Self-
Incrimination and Indictment Clauses does not depend on the ontological
nature of the corporation, thus arguments seeking to equate the corporation's
constitutional status with that of the individual ring hollow. The provisions
operate in much the same fashion, omitting corporations from the definition
of those who can enjoy the right provided by the Fifth Amendment.
On the other hand, rather than asking the initial question of whether the
Double Jeopardy Clause applies to corporations, the Court assumes
uncritically the same protection for corporate defendants as that provided to
the individual. The Court has never acknowledged that it may be inconsis-
tent to apply double jeopardy protection to the corporation in exactly the
same manner as it does to the individual, when the Fifth Amendment's Self-
Incrimination and Indictment Clauses provide no protection to a corporate
defendant. That uncritical acceptance of the applicability of the Double
Jeopardy Clause to the corporation overlooks the differences between
corporate and individual defendants, distinctions that are central to the
Court's own analysis of why the double jeopardy protection prohibits a
second trial to avoid the personal harm that a second prosecution can
engender. While corporations should receive much of the protection
provided by the Double Jeopardy Clause, they, unlike the individual, should
not obtain the windfall of a plainly erroneous acquittal because the potential
harm to the corporation from an appeal of that verdict may not outweigh the
need to protect the government's power to enforce the criminal law.
by way of an indictment. But see Jung, supra note 310, at 500 (arguing that conviction of
a corporation can visit infamy through negative publicity). An expansive theory of what
constitutes an infamous crime, based on the ephemeral effects an indictment may have on a
corporation, would require substantial alterations to Supreme Court holdings that define
"infamous crimes" to accommodate corporate defendants. The effect of such an enlargement
of the Indictment Clause would be either to lower the threshold for triggering the right so
that it would cover virtually every federal crime, or to create a special rule to extend the
protection only to corporations. The latter approach would give the corporation greater
protection than individual defendants receive, a result that is not supported by the Court's
analysis of the Self-Incrimination Clause and Fourth Amendment for corporate defendants.
322. See YellowFreight, 637 F.2d at 1255 (denying motion to dismiss on Indictment
Clause claim); Armored Transport, 629 F.2d at 1320 (stating that indictment was valid).
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VI. AFTER THE CHARGE: THE CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF CORPORATIONS UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court has confronted constitutional claims by corporate
defendants under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and its analysis of the
scope of those rights is not a model of Socratic clarity. Nevertheless, the
Court has had much greater opportunity to consider those rights than the
Sixth Amendment protections that are applicable in the later stages of a
criminal prosecution. Most criminal cases involve guilty pleas rather than
trials,323 and corporations recently have been given an additional strong
incentive to cooperate with the government under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. A key component of the Guidelines permits the imposition of
a reduced fine when a corporation institutes a compliance program for
detecting criminal violations and cooperates with the investigating authorities
when a crime has occurred.
324
The incentives for corporations to cooperate with the government and
settle criminal cases short of trial makes it less likely that issues relating to
a corporate defendant's constitutional rights will arise at trial.325  Never-
323. In accepting the reality of plea bargaining in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742
(1970), the Supreme Court as far back as 1970 noted that "well over three-fourths of the
criminal convictions in this country rest on pleas of guilty." Id. at 752.
324. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2 cmt. 3(k) (1995)
(permitting a reduction in corporate fines if organization had an "effective program to prevent
and detect violations of law . . . that has been reasonably designed, implemented and
enforced so that it generally will be effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct").
325. The post-trial criminal constitutional protection that can apply to a corporation
is the Eighth Amendment guarantee that excessive fines may not be imposed. In its only
opportunity to consider the question of the applicability of the Excessive Fines Clause to a
corporation, the Court declined to consider the question. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 n.22 (1989) ("[N]or shall we decide whether the
Eighth Amendment protects corporations as well as individuals."). Justice O'Connor argued
in a separate opinion that corporations come within the protection of the Eighth Amendment:
"If a corporation is protected by the Due Process Clause from overbearing and oppressive
monetary sanctions, it is also protected from such penalties by the Excessive Fines Clause."
Id. at 284 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting). Although the majority opinion refused
to reach the issue of corporate protection, it did identify the Framers' intent in adopting the
Eighth Amendment, that "the primary focus... was the potential for governmental abuse
of its 'prosecutorial' power, not concern with the extent or purposes of civil damages." Id.
at 266.
The analysis proposed in this Article for determining the applicability of a criminal
constitutional protection to a corporate defendant focuses on weighing the effect of granting
the protection on the government's enforcement program with the need to protect against
governmental misuse of power. As identified in Browning-Ferris,the primary rationale for
the Excessive Fines Clause is to protect defendants from prosecutorial abuse, which weighs
in favor of granting the protection to corporations. The effect of the Eighth Amendment
protection on the government's enforcement power appears to be minimal, because the
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theless, there are situations in which a corporate defendant does not settle
and instead proceeds to trial. That proceeding raises the question of the
applicability of the Sixth Amendment rights to corporations. The principal
protections of the Sixth Amendment that raise special issues for corporations
are the right to a jury trial, confrontation of witnesses, and the assistance of
counsel.326
provision only prohibits fines which exceed an ill-defined limit, see Austin v. United States,
113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (remanding civil asset forfeiture matter to lower court to determine
whether amount of penalty is excessive), but does not restrict the Court's power to punish
a corporation for its misconduct. Given the minimal effect that recognition of the Excessive
Fines Clause will have on investigating and prosecuting corporate crimes, the Court should
acknowledge the right of a corporate defendant to challenge a fine that it considers excessive.
Cf United States v. Pilgrim Mkt. Corp., 944 F.2d 14, 22 (Ist Cir. 1991) ("We will assume
for the purposes of our discussion that the eighth amendment proscription against excessive
fines applies to corporations, although this is a very tenuous assumption.").
326. The other Sixth Amendment rights that apply in criminal prosecutions are: speedy
and public trial; being informed of the crime charged; and, compulsory process. Each of
these rights protects the defendant from government abuse ofprosecutorial power. Moreover,
each right is unconditional, in that it applies in every criminal proceeding and is not
dependent on some threshold being met before the right can be exercised, unlike the
Indictment Clause, which requires charging a capital or infamous crime, or thejury trial right,
which only applies if the sentence imposed exceeds six months.
The right to a speedy trial is designed "to limit the possibilities that long delay will
impair the ability of an accused to defend himself," Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378
(1969) (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966)), and it applies to all
defendants "when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who
have been 'accused' in the course of that prosecution," United States v. Marion, 404 U.S.
307, 313 (1971). Similarly, the right to a public trial applies to all criminal prosecutions,
including criminal contempt, and has been described by the Court as "a safeguard against
any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The knowledge that every
criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power." In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270
(1948).
The right to be informed of the charges and to have compulsory process are closely
related to the guarantee of due process provided by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 22, § 24.3, at 1016 (early cases on right of access to
evidence relied on due process analysis, and subsequent cases have built on that approach).
These rights also provide every defendant with a fair description of the charges and access
to evidence against the defendant, including evidence held by the government. The Court
has long recognized that due process applies to corporations. See Pembina Consol. Silver
Mining and Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888). Fundamental fairness,
the touchstone of due process, requires that every defendant be accorded the right to receive
adequate notice of the crime charged and to mount a defense. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484
U.S. 400, 408 (1988) ("Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present
witnesses in his own defense. Indeed, this right is an essential attribute of the adversary
system itself.") (citation omitted); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (the
charging document "is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and
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A. Can There Be a Jury of the Corporation's Peers?
Both Article III of the Constitution and the Sixth Amendment provide
a seemingly absolute right to a jury trial for every criminal defendant.
Article III provides: "The trial of all Crimes .. .shall be by Jury,132 7 and
the Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.""3  Yet, the
Supreme Court has rejected a categorical requirement that every criminal
defendant have the right to demand a jury trial.329 Instead, the Court has
dissected the protection by requiring that the charged offense be "serious"
rather than "petty" before the jury right attaches.33°
The traditional demarcation for the right to a jury is whether the maxi-
mum sentence that can be imposed for the crime is greater than six
months. 3 Crimes for which a court can impose a term of imprisonment
fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables
him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.").
Applying the analysis proposed in this Article for determining the applicability of a
constitutional criminal protection to a corporation, the better approach is to find that these
Sixth Amendment rights apply to the corporation because the need to protect defendants far
outweighs any potential harm to the government's enforcement program from recognizing
the corporation's power to assert them. Indeed, it would shatter the concept of due process,
which the Court has held applicable to corporations, to deny a corporation these rights at trial
because this would relieve the government of much of its burden to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, which would call into question whether a guilty verdict is reliable.
327. U.S. CONST. art. Ill. § 2, cl. 3.
328. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
329. See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 552 (1888) (stating that some petty offenses
may be proceeded against summarily without a jury).
330. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) ("The penalty authorized for a
particular crime is of major relevance in determining whether it is serious or not and may in
itself, if severe enough, subject the trial to the mandates of the Sixth Amendment."). In
determining the scope of the jury trial right, as early as 1888 the Court in Callan v. Wilson,
127 U.S. 540 (1888), asserted that the Constitution incorporates the common law distinction
between serious and petty offenses: "[T]here are certain minor or petty offences that may be
proceeded against summarily, and without a jury . I..." d. at 552. See Alan L. Adlestein,
A Corporation's Right to a Jury Trial Under the Sixth Amendment, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
375, 388-92 (1994) (reviewing the history of common law distinction between serious and
petty offenses).
331. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (plurality opinion) (maximum
penalty of one year triggers jury trial right); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 162 (maximum penalty of
two years triggers jury trial right); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 626-27
(1937) (no right to jury trial when maximum sentence is 90 days); see generally 24th
Criminal Procedure Project, supra note 234, at 1106-11 (reviewing scope of jury trial right).
The Court noted in Duncan that the dividing line between serious and petty crimes had been
"ill-defined, if not ambulatory." Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160.
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of less than six months are presumptively "petty" for resolving a constitu-
tional claim for a jury trial.332 The Court has acknowledged, however,
that the jury trial right may be invoked if a defendant "can demonstrate that
any additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum
authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly reflect a
legislative determination that the offense in question is a 'serious' one., 333
The corporation's power to claim the constitutional jury trial right would
seem to be foreclosed, similar to the Indictment Clause protection, by the
bright-line test that the term of imprisonment creates a presumption of
whether a crime is serious or petty.334 Corporations can be fined or
sentenced to a term of probation, but they cannot be incarcerated.3 35 Yet,
in United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell,336 the Supreme Court
recognized that a labor union could assert the jury trial right in a criminal
contempt prosecution.337
Despite the seemingly clear distinction between serious and petty
offenses, Bagwell's recognition of a corporate jury trial right in criminal
contempt proceedings is not as anomalous as it first appears because of the
332. United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 4 (1993) (per curiam). The designation
of an offense as "petty" depends on the maximum penalty a court could impose without
regard to the number of charges against a defendant that can be brought in a single
proceeding. Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163, 2167 (1996).
333. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989).
334. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 187 (1958) (noting that trial by jury
and indictment by grand jury "possess a unique character under the Constitution" that allows
the Court to find that they are not required in criminal contempt proceedings).
335. In an interesting attempt to sentence a corporation to what would effectively
constitute a term of imprisonment, a district court judge ordered the United States Marshall
to seize a corporation's assets and monitor its business activities for a period of time as
punishment for the corporation's involvement in a price-fixing scheme. See United States
v. Allegheny Bottling Co., 695 F. Supp 856 (E.D. Va. 1988), affdin part, rev'd in part, 870
F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1989). The circuit court reversed this novel sentence for the corporation.
United States v. Allegheny Bottling Co., 870 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1989).
336. 114 S. Ct. 2552 (1994).
337. Id. at 2562. See United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d
656, 665 (2d Cir. 1989) ("We conclude that the jury right is available for criminal contempt
whenever the fine imposed on an organization exceeds $100,000."), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1021 (1990); United States v. Troxler Hosiery Co., 681 F.2d 934, 937 (4th Cir. 1982)
(finding no constitutional violation in refusing a jury trial when fine imposed does not
constitute a serious deprivation to the corporate defendant); United States v. R.L. Polk & Co.,
438 F.2d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 1971) ("fundamental principle that corporations enjoy the same
rights as individuals to [a] trial by jury"); United States v. NYNEX Corp., 781 F. Supp. 19,
28 (D.D.C. 1991) (jury trial right of corporation attaches after weighing size of fine with
firm's ability to pay to determine whether punishment is serious), rev'don other grounds,
8 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1993); cf Musidor, B.V. v. Great Am. Screen, 658 F.2d 60, 66 (2d Cir.
1981) (holding that the corporation was not deprived of a constitutional right when it was
fined $10,000 and when it never requested a jury trial), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944 (1982).
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context of the case.338 The Court has described criminal contempt as "sui
generis,, 39 and Bagwell's holding comports with the analysis proposed in
this Article that the scope of a corporation's criminal constitutional rights
involves weighing the effect of recognizing the needs of the government's
enforcement effort against the need to protect against misuse of the
government's power. In fact, criminal contempt proceedings present a
special case that requires courts to recognize a limited corporate right to a
jury trial, but the constitutional protection should not be understood as
applicable to every prosecution of a corporation. The prospect of a jury of
the defendant's peers may seem peculiar when applied to a corporation, but
the need to guard against the potential abuse of the contempt power supports
extending the protection to the corporate defendant in this limited context.
1. The Tortured Development of the Jury Trial Right
in Criminal Contempt Proceedings
Courts have long exercised the power to punish contumacious
340
conduct to vindicate the court's dignity and authority, and the judge is often
involved in initiating the contempt proceedings.34' Contemptuous acts fall
into two categories: direct contempts, which occur in the judge's presence,
for which punishment may be imposed without any form of trial, and
indirect contempts, which are acts "committed outside the presence of the
court for which some fact-finding process is concededly necessary.
342
A second form of categorization involves the civil/criminal distinction
in contempt law. Punitive sanctions for past conduct are prosecuted as
criminal actions, while the Court designates as civil proceedings coercive
sanctions designed to compel compliance with a judicial order or to
compensate another party for losses resulting from the contemptuous
338. See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the Civil/CriminalDistinction: A New
Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempt, 79 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1025 (1993) ("The
literature on contempt of court is unanimous on one point: the law is a mess."). Professor
Dudley's article provides an excellent review of the development (such as it is) of the law
of criminal contempt prior to the Court's decision in Bagwell.
339. Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 103 (1924) (explaining that contempt
proceedings are "sui generis-neither civil actions nor prosecutions for offenses, within the
ordinary meaning of those terms").
340. "[O]bstinately disobedient or rebellious; insubordinate." THE AMERICAN
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 410 (3d ed. 1992).
341. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 795-800
(1987) (reviewing history of contempt power).
342. Dudley, supra note 338, at 1030. The Supreme Court limited the lower court's
summary contempt power to only those acts that the judge has personally witnessed. Johnson
v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 215 (1971) (per curiam). A federal court's power to punish
both forms of contempt is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1988).
[Vol. 63:793
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
behavior.343  If the Court labels the contempt "criminal," then it affords
the defendant the constitutional protections of double jeopardy,344 assis-
tance of counsel,345 and the privilege against self-incrimination.346
The fundamental problem with the application of the judicial contempt
power is that there are very few real constraints on the trial court's power
to impose punishment upon a finding of a violation because neither statutes
nor regulations prescribe the applicable sanctions. 47 The conflicting roles
of the judge as the victim of the illegal acts, the finder of facts, and the
authority who metes out the punishment exacerbates the. problem. That
predicament "often strikes at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a
judge's temperament. Even when the contempt is not a direct insult to the
court or the judge, it frequently represents a rejection of judicial authority
,5348
One means by which the Supreme Court has sought to constrain judicial
discretion was by expanding the category of contempts that should be
designated as criminal, thereby requiring courts to provide a range of
constitutionally mandated procedures to temper the pernicious impact of the
judge's "human qualities. 3 49 The other principal means that the Court has
used to temper the power of trial courts was to limit their power to use
summary contempt proceedings to impose criminal punishments, a limitation
the Court fashioned in the 1960s.
In United States v. Barnett,"' the Court upheld a criminal contempt
finding against Mississippi's governor and lieutenant governor arising out
of their defiance of an order requiring the admission of James Meredith to
the University of Mississippi.' The defendants demanded a jury tri-
al,"' which historically had been denied in criminal contempt proceed-
ings.353  Given the highly charged emotions triggered by desegregation
343. See Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1988); Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-45 (1911).
344. In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 52 (1943).
345. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925).
346. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 444.
347. Dudley, supra note 338, at 1026-27 ("Neither 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1988) nor any
other federal statute limits the severity of sanctions that a court may impose in contempt....
Civil contempt sanctions can also be breathtakingly severe.").
348. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968); see Young v. United States ex rel.
Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787, 822 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (Contempt power "summons
forth ... the prospect of 'the most tyrannical licentiousness."') (quoting Anderson v. Dunn,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 228 (1821)).
349. Dudley, supra note 338, at 1031-33.
350. 376 U.S. 681 (1964).
351. Id. at 683.
352. Id. at 682-83.
353. The denial of a jury trial right in contempt proceedings can be traced to
Blackstone. See4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *286-87 (1803). The Supreme
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orders, recognition of the right to a jury trial in this proceeding would likely
have resulted in an acquittal, thereby permitting elected state officials to
continue their obstruction of federal authority. In light of this situation, a
narrow five-justice majority opinion undertook an elaborate historical
defense of the denial of the jury trial right in criminal contempt proceedings
to support the conclusion that "[i]t has always been the law of the land, both
state and federal, that the courts-except where specifically precluded by
statute-have the power to proceed summarily in contempt matters. 354
Two years after Barnett, in Cheffv. Schnackenberg,3" the Court began
to transform its position on criminal contempt through an exercise of its
supervisory power. Cheff imposed a rule on federal courts that a criminal
contempt in which the judge imposed a sentence of over six months requires
a trial by jury, adopting the same rule for criminal contempt that had been
developed for trials of substantive offenses.356
Only two years after Cheff, the Court announced a broader change in the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in the companion cases of Duncan v.
Louisiana357 and Bloom v. Illinois.35t In Duncan, the Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment required a right to trial by jury in state prosecutions
if the defendant could have invoked the jury trial protection in a federal
court.359 The Court justified this holding by identifying the two purposes
Court stated at one point that "a long and unbroken line of decisions involving contempts...
establish beyond peradventure that criminal contempts are not subject to jury trial as a matter
of constitutional right." Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183 (1958). The court also
noted that a defendant in a contempt proceeding may not assert the right to require indictment
by a grand jury. Id. at 184.
354. Barnett, 376 U.S. at 692. Justice Black's dissent argues against even recognizing
that federal courts have the contempt power "in the absence of a clear and unequivocal
congressional grant," id. at 724 (Black, J., dissenting), while Justice Goldberg's dissent argues
that the punishment for a criminal contempt "can no longer be deemed a species of petty
offense punishable by trivial penalties," and therefore the jury trial right attaches. Id. at 752
(Goldberg, J., dissenting).
355. 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
356. Id. at 380. The Court announced that criminal contempt was not automatically
a serious offense, and therefore the actual sentence imposed, not the potential sentence,
determined whether the proceeding involved a serious or petty offense. Id. The individual
defendant's sentence was 6 months, which permitted the Court to conclude that the jury trial
right did not attach because it was a petty offense under District of Columbia v. Clawans.
Id. (citation omitted). The corporate defendant was fined $100,000, and the Court had denied
its petition for a writ of certiorari. Id. at 375.
357. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
358. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
359. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149. Duncan was an important case in establishing that the
doctrine of selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights involved determining whether a
constitutional guarantee was fundamental "in the context of the criminal processes
maintained by the American States." Id. at 150 n.14. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note
22, at § 2.6(a) (reviewing the development of selective incorporation doctrine).
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of the jury trial right: first, it prevents "oppression by the Government"; and,
second, it gives defendants "an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge. 36°  In Bloom, the Court relied on Duncan to hold that a state
criminal contempt proceeding in which the sentence imposed exceeded six
months required a jury trial. 36' The Court explained that the right to a
trial by jury was fundamental because there was "no substantial difference
between serious contempts and other serious crimes. '' 6' Bloom asserted
that the right to a jury trial in a serious criminal contempt proceeding
overcame "the unwisdom of vesting the judiciary with completely untram-
meled power... and makes clear the need for effective safeguards against
that power's abuse.,
363
The question of whether a corporate entity can claim the jury trial right
was first raised in the Supreme Court in Muniz v. Hoffman.164  The case
arose from an injunction issued in a labor strike, and the district court found
the labor union in contempt for various violations and fined it $10,000.36
Much like its approach to a corporate defendant's claim to protection under
the Double Jeopardy Clause in Fong Foo and Martin Linen Supply, the
Court's opinion did not discuss whether a corporation could even assert the
jury trial right in a criminal contempt proceeding. It simply assumed that
the right applied and went on to reach the constitutional issue of the scope
of the protection.366
The Court explained in Muniz that it "has as yet not addressed the
question whether and in what circumstances, if at all, the imposition of a
fine for criminal contempt, unaccompanied by imprisonment, may require
a jury trial., 367 The Court then refused to resolve the issue of whether a
360. Duncan, at 155-56. Duncan involved a politically chargedracial incident, similar
to that facing the Court in Barnett. In Duncan, a black defendant was sentenced to sixty days
in jail and a $150 fine for allegedly slapping on the elbow, although apparently not injuring,
a white person, during a period of racial tension related to the desegregation of a local high
school. Id. at 146-47.
361. Bloom, 391 U.S. at 211 ("Under the rule in Cheff, when the legislature has not
expressed ajudgment as to the seriousnessof an offense by fixing a maximum penalty which
may be imposed, we are to look to the penalty actually imposed as the best evidence of the
seriousness of the offense.").
362. Id. at 202.
363. Id. at 207.
364. 422 U.S. 454 (1975).
365. Id. at 457. Much of the opinion dealt with the union's statutory right to a jury
trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1988).
366. See supra text accompanying notes 250-61. The Court in Muniz merely asserted
that the defendant union was not "deprived of whatever right to jury trial it might have
under the Sixth Amendment," failing to consider if the union even had such a right. Muniz,
422 U.S. at 477 (emphasis added).
367. Id. at 476. The federal code defined a petty offense as that which imposed a
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fine alone can be "serious" for the purpose of permitting a defendant to
invoke the jury trial right.3 68  Thus, the Court in Muniz asserted that a
$10,000 fine against a union with 13,000 members was not "of such
magnitude that a jury should have been interposed to guard against bias or
mistake."3
69
2. Bagwell and The Organizational Right to a Jury Trial
in Criminal Contempt Proceedings
In United Mine Workers v. Bagwell,37° the Court did answer the
question of whether a fine can ever be so severe that it constitutes a
"serious" offense triggering the jury trial right. During a bitter coal miners
strike in Virginia, a state court judge imposed over $64 million in fines
against the union for repeated violations of an injunction.37' Once the
strike settled, the court vacated $12 million of the fine but appointed a
Special Commissioner to collect the remaining $52 million on behalf of the
state.3 72  After determining that the contempt resulted in a criminal
sanction,373 the Court held that the union was entitled to a jury trial under
the Sixth Amendment. 374
The Court's analysis of the corporation's jury trial right was as
conclusory as the rejection of the defendant union's claim in Muniz.
Bagwell merely stated in a footnote that it "need not answer today the
difficult question where the line between petty and serious contempt fines
should be drawn, since a $52,000,000 fine unquestionably is a serious
penalty of imprisonment for six months or less or a fine of not more than $500, but the court
of appeals accorded that statutory definition "no talismanic significance." Id. at 477. The
provision defining federal offenses as felonies or misdemeanors was 18 U.S.C. § 1, which
Congress repealed in 1984, effective November 1, 1987. Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 1976, 2027. Instead, the Court
stated that "imprisonment and fines are intrinsically different ... it is not tenable to argue
that the possibility of a $501 fine would be considered a serious risk to a large corporation
or labor union." Muniz, 422 U.S. at 477.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. 114 S. Ct. 2552 (1994).
371. Id. at 2556.
372. Id. The state courts held that the fines were coercive civil fines and not criminal
penalties. Id.
373. Id. at 2560-61 ("Contempts involving out-of-court disobedience to complex
injunctions often require elaborate and reliable factfinding .... Under these circumstances,
criminal procedural protections such as the rights to counsel and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt are both necessary and appropriate to protect the due process rights of parties and
prevent the arbitrary exercise of judicial power.").
374. Id. at 2563.
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contempt sanction."375  The margin between "petty" and "serious" fines
left after Bagwell and Muniz is indeed broad, totaling $5 1,990,000.376
Regardless of the line-drawing problem, however, Bagwell and Muniz
at least held clearly that an organization which could not be imprisoned may
be able to assert the constitutional jury trial right in a criminal contempt
proceeding. It does not follow, however, that those decisions grant
corporations an unconditional right under Article III and the Sixth Amend-
ment to demand a jury trial in every criminal prosecution in which a
potentially large fine can be imposed. Transferring the holdings of Bagwell
and Muniz from the sui generis context of criminal contempt proceedings to
prosecutions for substantive criminal offenses misreads the special
circumstances present in contempt proceedings.
The danger inherent in a criminal contempt proceeding is the potential
misuse of the government's power by a judge who is "solely responsible for
375. Id. at 2562 n.5.
376. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit tried to draw such a
line in United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1989), a
case decided before Bagwell involving a contempt prosecution for violation of an antitrust
consent decree. The Second Circuit rejected as too minimal anything under a $10,000 fine,
which is the congressional designation of the maximum monetary penalty for a misdemeanor,
but declined to adopt the statutory maximum fine of $500,000 for a corporate felony
conviction as the trigger for the jury trial right because applying an amount that high is
"unwarranted." Id. at 665. Instead, the circuit court adopted $100,000 as the "appropriate
threshold for determining an organization's right to a jury trial." Id. The Second Circuit
acknowledged that its line is arbitrary, but it sees the $100,000 figure as providing concrete
guidance that avoids imposing on trial courts the time-consuming task of determining the
effect a particular fine might have on an organization before the court even begins
consideration of the alleged contemptuous acts. Id. at 664. Professor Adlestein criticizes the
Second Circuit's approach as a creation "out of whole cloth." Adlestein, supra note 330, at
435.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reached a different result
in United States v. NYNEX Corp., 781 F. Supp. 19 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'don other grounds,
8 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1993), a contempt action in which the government announced it would
seek a $1 million fine upon conviction. The district court explained that the constitutional
protection was only available after weighing the potential fine against a corporation's ability
to pay to determine whether it was a serious sanction. Id. at 27. It then held that the fine,
which represented only 0. 1% of the defendant corporation's annual net income, was not a
serious risk, and therefore the jury trial right did not apply. Id. at 28. The district court
questioned the Twentieth-CenturyFox test for the Sixth Amendment right because it benefits
larger firms who will not be negatively affected by a $100,000 fine while smaller firms can
be devastated by any sanction close to that amount. Id. at 28 n.12.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit took an approach similar to
NYNEX in United States v. Troxler Hosiery Co., 681 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1982), holding that
any fine it could impose in a criminal contempt proceeding without ajury was "limited...
only to the extent that it is of such magnitude as to constitute a serious deprivation." Id. at
937.
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identifying, prosecuting, adjudicating, and sanctioning the contumacious
conduct. 377 The risk posed in this situation has led the Supreme Court
to grant the defendant a broad array of procedural protections, one of the
most important of which is to interpose a jury as the factfinder to mitigate
the negative effect of the judge's immersion in the process. In fact, the
Court has stated that "in contempt cases an even more compelling argument
can be made for providing a right to jury trial as a protection against the
arbitrary exercise of official power.
3 78
It was the structural danger posed by the nature of criminal contempt
proceedings, not just that the sanction could be labeled criminal, which led
the Court in Bagwell to find that the $52 million fine constituted a "serious"
offense. The amount of the fine alone arguably was not the determining
factor, because the setting in which the sanction arose made the potential for
misuse of the government's authority a substantial possibility. As the Court
in Bagwell declared, the fine was "unquestionably ... a serious contempt
sanction. 3 79  That language suggests that an unusually large fine should
not, by itself, trigger the jury trial right. In an emotionally charged
atmosphere, such as a bitter labor strike involving the dominant local
industry,38 ° the possibility that ruinous fines may be imposed without any
community participation in the process to serve as a buffer between the
participants, reeks of the worst form of oppression. For the Bagwell Court
to come to a different conclusion would have been surprising. The
enormous fine imposed on the union, much like a prison sentence of more
than 6 months for contumacious conduct, suggests judicial vindictiveness.
The difficulty with Bagwell as a precedent for transporting the right to
a jury trial to all cases in which a corporate defendant faces a significant
fine is that the danger of misuse of the government's power is not present
to the same degree in a regular criminal prosecution as it is in a contempt
proceeding.' The neutrality of the court is usually not called into
377. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2559.
378. Bloom, 391 U.S. at 202.
379. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2562 n.5 (emphasis added). The Court took a similarly
narrow approach to the question of whether a fine can trigger the right in Muniz, when it
stated that it was not addressing the issue of whether "a fine for criminal contempt,
unaccompanied by imprisonment, may require a jury trial if demanded by the defendant."
422 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added).
380. See Controlling Coalfield Violence, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, July 6, 1994, at A] 2
("Five years ago at this time, the coalfields of southwest Virginia seemed as dangerous as a
Beirut street corner.").
381. The line-drawing exercises in Twentieth Century Fox and NYNEX to determine
the size of the sanction that triggers a corporation's jury trial right are subject to misinterpre-
tation because the cases consider the determination of the seriousness of the fine apart from
the potential misuse of power in the contempt proceeding. Simply asserting that any
$100,000 fine enables a corporation to assert the jury trial right without recognizing that the
seriousness of the sanction is also a function of preventing a court from misusing its power
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question in prosecutions for substantive offenses, so the potential for abuse
is significantly lower.38 2 The trial court's role is to evaluate the evidence
of both parties, rather than seeking vindication of its own power and dignity
against one party.
The test of whether a corporation can assert a criminal constitutional
right should involve weighing the extent to which exercise of the right will
undermine the government's enforcement program with whether the right
will protect a corporation against a significant misuse of the government's
power. The potential for judicial abuse in criminal contempt actions argues
strongly in favor of granting the corporation a jury trial right in such a
proceeding when it is faced with a substantial fine. The negative effect on
protecting the power and dignity of the court in contempt proceedings by
permitting a corporation to assert the right to a jury trial is likely to be
minimal when the judge determines that a significant sanction will be
imposed upon conviction.
Recognizing any broader right to a jury trial outside of contempt
proceedings, however, would extend the constitutional protection in a way
that could unduly undermine law enforcement efforts. Corporations and
individuals are subject to substantial penalties in administrative and civil
proceedings.383 But the Supreme Court has clearly held that there is no
Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial for adjudication of 'public
rights,' e.g., where the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity
under an otherwise valid statute creating enforceable public rights.1
3 84
Even when the jury right attaches in a civil proceeding by the government
turns the corporate right into a mindless arithmetic procedure. Divorced from the context of
criminal contempt proceedings, the use of a dollar figure to determine the corporatejury trial
right may mean that virtually every prosecution of a corporation for a federal offense will
come under the Sixth Amendment because the maximum authorized fine for almost all
federal crimes is $500,000. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)(3) (1988).
382. The appellate courts review allegations of bias by the trial court under the abuse
of discretion standard to determine whether the judge evinced any prejudice against a
defendant that tainted the proceeding. If there is a possibility that the judge's conduct
substantially affected the outcome of the trial, then the conviction is reversed and a new trial
ordered. See, e.g., United States v. Van Dyke, 14 F.3d 415, 422, 424 (8th Cir. 1994)
(indicatingjudicial bias against the defendant through the hostile tone of trial judge's question
to defendant and court's limitation on the permissible scope of testimony by defendant's
expert, requiring reversal of the conviction).
383. Among the sanctions that the government can seek in a civil proceeding are
monetary penalties. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78U- 1 (a) (1988) (triple penalty for insider trading
profits); 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988) (civil forfeiture of property used in drug activity); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7(b)( I) (1988) (exclusion from governmental programs); see generally Project, The
Decriminalization ofAdministrative Law Penalties, 45 ADMIN. L. REv. 367, 387-92 (1993).
384. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442, 458 (1977).
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for a statutory violation, the Seventh Amendment does not mandate the
assessment of an authorized civil penalty by a jury.385
In United States v. Halper86 and Austin v. United States, 387 the
Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment and the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment apply to
civil penalties that are punitive and not just remedial in nature. 88 If a
substantial fine imposed in a civil proceeding may constitute a punishment
for constitutional purposes, then a logical argument can be made that the
fine is "serious" for the purpose of allowing a corporation to assert the jury
trial right.
Such a simplistic approach to triggering the jury trial right, based solely
on the size of the fine, arguably means that a large number of civil
enforcement actions could not be pursued except through the more elaborate,
and time-consuming, method of a full-scale criminal jury trial. The
opportunity to conclude the case through summary judgment might not be
available if the corporate defendant has the right under Article III and the
Sixth Amendment to have the case adjudicated by a jury. Granting
corporations such broad protection solely on the basis of the potential size
of a fine may impose a disproportionate cost, especially when compared to
the minimal danger that the government will misuse its power in a
substantive criminal proceeding if there is not a right to a jury trial. Unlike
contempt proceedings, the judge in a regular criminal prosecution or a civil
enforcement action is not a potentially biased or aggrieved participant.
Therefore, the possibility of governmental abuse of its authority is
absent.389
Corporations may even argue in federal prosecutions that they do not
have the right to a jury trial because the corporate defendant may be able
to have the court conduct a bench trial. In Singer v. United States,39 ° the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 23(a),39' which mandates that the government consent to a non-
385. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 425-26 (1987).
386. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
387. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
388. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448 ("Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction
constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals
of punishment."); Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2810 (Civil asset forfeiture "serves, at least in part,
to punish the owner.").
389. See Adlestein, supra note 330, at 442 (Stating that if large penalties are imposed
on corporations in civil and administrative proceedings, "then what difference, of a
constitutional dimension, arises if that same punishment is imposed in a criminal trial
conducted with expansive criminal procedural rules (including proofbeyond reasonable doubt
and presumption of innocence) but without a right to a jury under the Sixth Amendment?").
390. 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
391. Id. at 36 ("We find no constitutional impediment to conditioning a waiver of this
right on the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the trial judge ....").
[Vol. 63:793
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
jury trial for "[c]ases required to be tried by a jury." '392 Under Singer, a
prosecutor's objection to the waiver of a jury controlled unless "the
Government's insistence on trial by jury would result in the denial to a
defendant of an impartial trial. 393  If corporations do not have the jury
trial right outside of criminal contempt proceedings, then the trial court
should be able to conduct a bench trial over the government's objection
without requiring the corporate defendant to meet the high threshold of
proving that a jury could not tender an impartial verdict.394 A bench trial
can be an advantageous method of trying the case for a corporate defendant
when, as frequently occurs, the alleged violation involves a complicated
statute and the question of criminal liability hinges on subtle distinctions
about what constitutes wrongful conduct. A district judge or magistrate may
be better able than a jury to consider the nature of sophisticated financial
transactions or the limitations of corporate control of an agent's actions.
Bagwell created a limited jury trial right for corporations in criminal
contempt proceedings in those situations where the fine imposed can be
termed "serious" in order to limit the potential for mistreatment by the
judge.395 Outside that context, the Supreme Court's benchmark for every
criminal defendant's jury trial right is the maximum period of incarceration:
"Indeed, because incarceration is an 'intrinsically different' form of
punishment... it is the most powerful indication of whether an offense is
'serious.""396 The corporation's inability to suffer incarceration means
that, much like the constitutional minimum for invoking the right to
indictment by the grand jury, corporate defendants cannot claim the right to
be tried before a jury under Article III and the Sixth Amendment except in
criminal contempt proceedings.397
392. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a).
393. Singer, 380 U.S. at 37.
394. See United States v. Braunstein, 474 F. Supp. 1, 13-14 (D.N.J. 1979) (ordering
a bench trial over the government's objection in Medicaid and tax fraud prosecution due to
complexity of the issues); United States v. Panteleakis, 422 F. Supp. 247 (D.R.I. 1976)
(ordering a bench trial over the government's objection in Medicare fraud trial due to
complexity of the issues).
395. See supra text accompanying notes 370-81.
396. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989) (quoting Muniz
v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 477 (1975)). See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2166 ("In evaluating the
seriousness of the offense, we place primary emphasis on the maximum prison term
authorized).
397. See Adlestein, supra note 330, at 452 ("This entire line of jury right cases, as
developed over 100 years, does not support the constitutional principle that any defendant-
natural or corporate-subject only to a criminal fine must be tried by jury. Such a principle
should not bejudicially created now."). When the government charges officers or employees
along with the corporation in the same case, then the individual will usually be able to assert
the right to ajury trial. In that instance, it is unlikely the government will seek to sever the
trials solely in order to prevent the corporation from being tried in front of a jury. In fact,
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B. Can a Corporation Confront Itself?
The Sixth Amendment provides the defendant with the right "to be
confronted with the witnesses against him., 39' The Supreme Court has
held that the Confrontation Clause facilitates the truth-seeking function of
a trial that subjects the government's evidence to "rigorous testing" by
ensuring the defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses who testify.399
The problem faced by corporations is that the evidence against them often
is not the product of direct testimony of witnesses, but of out-of-court
statements by corporate agents. The key pieces of proof in most corporate
prosecutions are documents generated by the business organization itself and
statements of corporate agents that can show their knowledge, which the law
attributes to the corporation. Because the primary evidence against a
corporation is frequently its own documents and agents, a corporate
defendant may be unable to cross-examine in any meaningful way the
witnesses who will convict it.
Traditional criminal law requires that the government prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the requisite intent or mens
rea, such as knowledge or willfulness, for the charged offense. But under
the respondeat superior theory of liability adopted in New York Central,
400
the corporation is liable for the acts of its agents that are conducted for the
benefit of the corporation. That theory imputes the intent of the individual
agent to the corporation, so there is no need to prove that the organization
itself intended to commit the crime, only that one acting on its behalf had
the requisite intent. Courts have extended respondeat superior to permit a
conviction where no single agent of the corporation has the necessary intent
individually, but by aggregating the knowledge of all of its agents, the
corporation can have the requisite "collective knowledge" for the crime. °1
The Confrontation Clause problem facing a corporate defendant is not
that the entity cannot assert the constitutional protection. Rather, the entire
body of evidence introduced to prove its guilt may consist of out-of-court
statements, both documentary and testimonial, recounted by witnesses who
are not themselves employees of the corporation or who do not have direct
there are strong strategic reasons why the government would want to have a single trial of
all defendants, corporate and individual.
398. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
399. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-46 (1990).
400. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
401. See United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987);
United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738-39 (W.D. Va. 1974); Martin J.
Weinstein & Patricia B. Ball, Criminal Law's Greatest Mystery Thriller: Corporate Guilt
Through Collective Knowledge, 29 NEW ENG. L. REv. 65, 81 (1994) ("Collectivization of
employee conduct by imputing the aggregate of that conduct to the corporation expands the
criminal liability of the corporation. In other words, specific intent is imputed to the
corporation, even though no individual can be shown to possess the specific intent.").
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402knowledge of the underlying transaction. If the prosecutor charged acorporation for making false claims to the government for reimbursement,
402. The government generally introduces proof of the corporation's criminal liability
in two ways: first, the business records of the corporation and second, the statements of
officers and employees. Each form of evidence can show the knowledge and intent of the
agents that is attributable to the corporation, regardless of whether the government prosecutes
the individuals. The Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit the admission of hearsay, which is
defined as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801 (c).
This prohibition is not particularly helpful to corporate defendants in most cases, for three
reasons.
First, corporate documents generally constitute business records, which are admissible
under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) as an exception to the general hearsay prohibition.
Rule 803(6) states:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted
business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as
used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation,
and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
Second, an admission by a corporate agent is not considered hearsay, even though it is an
out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, because it comprises
a party admission as the "statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement
concerning the subject." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C); see 2 MCCoRICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 259, at 158 (4th ed. 1992) ("Even before the adoption of the Federal Rules, the
predominant view was to admit a statement by an agent if it concerned a matter within the
scope of the declarant' s employment and was made before that relationship was terminated.").
Third, the government may also introduce statements of officers and agents against a
corporation through the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, which permits the
admission of the statement of one conspirator against all other members of the conspiracy.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). Although it may appear incongruous that a corporate agent can
engage in a conspiracy with an employing corporation, when that entity can only act through
its agents, the Supreme Court has held that an individual and the organization can be
prosecuted for an intra-corporate conspiracy. See Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S.
613, 614-17 (1949). If the government can introduce sufficient evidence that the employee
and the corporation agreed to violate the law, then any statements made by the employee in
furtherance of the conspiracy would be admissible against the corporation as the statements
of a coconspirator. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175, 181 (1987)
(government must introduce evidence to permit trial court to find that the conspiracy exists,
and court may consider statement as proof of the existence of the conspiracy). This means
of admitting evidence can be used when it is unclear whether the corporate agent's actions
are on behalf of the corporation, so that they may not meet the admissibility requirements for
a party admission.
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the case may include the documents submitted to the government for the
claim, corporate records showing the true amount owed, and any statements
made by corporate employees in connection with the claims." 3 The
documentary evidence would be admissible as a business record of the
corporation, and a records custodian could testify that the company
maintained them in the ordinary course of business to meet the requirements
of Rule 803(6).
Statements of the employees are admissible against the corporation as
admissions of a party-opponent, and the testimony recounting the agents'
statements may come from non-employees to whom they spoke, including
government agents. If an employee made a particularly incriminating
statement, that person might refuse to testify by invoking the self-incrimina-
tion privilege. The employee cannot be compelled to testify unless the
government grants the person immunity,4" and the statements are admissi-
ble against the corporation. They are not hearsay and are admissions of an
agent acting on behalf of the corporation. Yet, the corporation cannot cross-
examine the employee. The corporation can cross-examine the witness who
heard the statement, but that questioning only probes the memory of the
witness, not the truthfulness or accuracy of the underlying statement. There
is no way for the corporation to test the veracity of the declarant of the
incriminating statement. That person need not be called as a witness by the
government, which seems to violate the basic precept of the Confrontation
Clause that the evidence against a defendant be rigorously tested through
405
cross-examination.
403. A prosecution based on these facts most likely can be brought under 18 U.S.C.
§ 287 (1988), which provides:
Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the civil, military, or naval
service of the United States, or to any department or agency thereof, any claim upon or
against the United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to
be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be imprisoned not more than five years and shall
be subject to a fine in the amount provided in this title.
Id.
404. The defendant's confrontation and compulsory process rights do not override the
right of a witness to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. See, e.g., United States
v. Follin, 979 F.2d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 1992) (compulsory process right was not violated when
the court refused to grant immunity to witness who declined to testify due to possible self-
incrimination).
405. A similar problem could arise when the government charges an employee
together with the corporation. Statements of the employee are admissible against both
parties, yet the corporation could not force the individual defendant to testify in order to
subject the statements to cross-examination. Even if there is no evidence of a conspiracy,
the usual way that one party's statements are admitted as substantive evidence against another
party, the unique position of the corporation bound by its agent's statements means that the




The Supreme Court has not taken an absolutist approach to the
constitutional protection, noting in Ohio v. Roberts"'6 that, if read literally,
the language of the Confrontation Clause "would require, on objection, the
exclusion of any statement made by a declarant not present at trial."" 7
Roberts held that admission of hearsay does not violate the Confrontation
Clause if the statement bears adequate "indicia of reliability," which in turn
"can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception.''08 .The Court explained in Roberts that
the business records exception is among the hearsay exceptions with "such
solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them
comports with the 'substance of the constitutional protection.""'' 9 Similar-
ly, the coconspirator exception is "firmly rooted" to permit introduction of
out-of-court statements by a coconspirator against another defendant without
violating that defendant's confrontation right.4'0 In short, the Court has
held that the declarant need not be unavailable to testify at trial for the court
to admit a statement without violating a defendant's Sixth Amendment right,
so long as there are sufficient indicia of reliability to overcome any
confrontation problem.""
The agency provision of the hearsay rule, which authorizes the
admission of out-of-court statements by excluding them from the definition
of hearsay, appears to be as equally well grounded as the business records
exception and the coconspirator provision. In United States v. Gooding,
412
an 1827 Supreme Court decision involving an indictment for illegally
406. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
407. Id. at 63.
408. Id. at 66.
409. Id. (citation omitted). Interestingly, the Court cited a law review article and not
a case for the proposition that the business records exception was firmly rooted. Id. A
student commentator noted that "[t]he vintage of the exception does not seem to be the most
important consideration because the Court mentions in illustration the very reliable business
records exception, which is a relative newcomer to the forest of hearsay exceptions." Georgia
J. Hinde, Note, FederalRule of Evidence801(d) (2) (E) and the Confrontation Clause: Closing
the Window of Admissibilityfor CoconspiratorHearsay, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291, 1307
(1985).
410. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987).
411. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986). The Court's holding in Inadi was
strongly criticized as making the Confrontation Clause a mere adjunct to the hearsay rules:
Thus, the Court has concluded that if a statement does not fall within the traditional
definition of hearsay, it does not present a confrontation problem. This means that the
sixth amendment contains a hearsay definition. The Court, however, has not struggled
to determine the proper definition. Instead, the Court has simply placed the notion of
hearsay found in evidence law into the Constitution.
Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoringthe Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA
L. REV. 557, 571 (1988).
412. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460 (1827).
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engaging in the slave trade, the defendant challenged the admission of the
testimony of a ship's officer as to statements made by an agent of the
defendant concerning who would pay the expenses of the voyage.4 1 3 The
Court held that the testimony was admissible on the ground that once the
agency relationship was established, then "whatever the agent says within
the scope of his authority, the principal says. 41 4 Gooding likely validates
the proposition that the agency provision is firmly rooted; therefore,
admitting testimony recounting what the corporate agent said would not
violate the Confrontation Clause even though the agent need not testify.4"5
The problem for the corporation is not that the Constitution excludes it
from asserting the confrontation right, but that the legacy of New York
Central means that it is unlikely to ever raise a Confrontation Clause claim
regarding the most important evidence introduced to convict it at trial. A
corporation cannot seek to exclude out-of-court statements on Sixth
Amendment grounds when those statements are those of a corporate agent
or the entity itself embodied by its business records. This approach reflects
the holding of Hale v. Henkel, that the corporation is separate from its
agents and that any -constitutional right only applies to the individual
supplying the information.416 The respondeat superior theory of liability
further exacerbates the corporation's predicament because the statements of
its agents may occur at any time, not just when the illegal acts took place.
They are admissible against the corporation which does not benefit from the
protection provided to individuals.417
Because of the likely negative effect on the government's enforcement
program, the Supreme Court is unlikely to alter its Confrontation Clause
analysis to address any corporate concerns about its ability to assert the
Confrontation Clause.4"' Excluding, on confrontation grounds, testimony
413. Id. at 468-69.
414. Id. at 470 (quoting 2 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE *60 (2d ed. 1825)).
415. See Hinde, supra note 409, at 1297 n.37 (Gooding's statement would be admitted
today under the agency provision of Rule 801(d)(2)(D)).
416. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. at 75.
417. An employee's statement that a corporation committed certain violations, made
long after the occurrence of the illegal activity, can be used at trial against the corporation
because it is an admission by a party-opponent, assuming the agent's statement was
authorized. Such a confession implicating another individual usually may not be used against
the co-defendant in a joint trial. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968). One
way to avoid a Bruton problem is to redact any reference to the co-defendant in the statement
and instruct the jury to consider the confession only against the confessing defendant. The
Court sanctioned this approach in Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 201 (1987). The
Bruton problem does not arise in corporate prosecutions because the Confrontation Clause
is not implicated when out-of-court statements have sufficient indicia of reliability to permit
their admission under another exception to the hearsay rules.
418. Proposals to change the means of proving corporate criminal liability that
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by third-parties about what an agent said, unless the government calls the
agent to testify, could permit a corporation to pressure its employees to
refuse to testify or to testify falsely. That possibility might prevent the
government from successfully prosecuting corporate violations if it could not
show the agent's knowledge and intent through other evidence to prove the
corporation's culpability. Similarly, if business records could be excluded
under the Confrontation Clause because the creator of the document was not
available to testify about the contents of the record, then corporations would
have an incentive to obscure the authorship of corporate records to prevent
their use against the organization.
The threat that a corporate defendant could use a constitutional provision
to frustrate criminal prosecutions was the very issue addressed by the Court
in Hale v. Henkel in the context of denying the self-incrimination privilege
to a corporation. The Court was wary of extending a constitutional right to
an organization that "would result in the failure of a large number of cases
where the illegal [activity] was determinable only upon the examination of
such papers." 4' 9 Any effort to extend confrontation rights that would limit
the admission of third-party testimony or documentary proof would have an
effect similar to recognizing an organization's right to assert the privilege
against self-incrimination.
C. The Right to Counsel and the Indigent Corporation
The Sixth Amendment provides that "the accused shall enjoy the right
... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." '20  The Supreme
Court has held that the provision includes "the right to select and be
represented by one's preferred attorney," although that right is not unlimited
when, for example, the attorney may have a disabling conflict of inter-
est."2' The right to counsel extends to defendants who do not have the
resources to retain counsel of their choice.422 The Court has limited the
constitutional mandate to provide appointed counsel to cases in which actual
incorporate an assessment of the organization's own mens rea do not confront the problem
of how the corporation's confrontation rights should be accommodated. Professor Bucy notes
that proving a "Corporate Ethos" as the basis for criminal liability may create a situation in
which "denying a corporation the right to confront its employee on the ground that the
corporation and corporate employee share a common identity will be unjust." Bucy,
Corporate Ethos, supra note 21, at 1175. It is not clear, however, how the rules of evidence
can be adjusted to limit the potential injustice that can result from having to prove a separate
corporate intent without making proof of that intent significantly more difficult.
419. 201 U.S. at 74.
420. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
421. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).
422. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right
to counsel applies to state proceedings under the Fourteenth Amendment); Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458,463 (1938) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies in federal proceedings).
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imprisonment is the punishment imposed upon the defendant after convic-
tion."'
In the vast majority of corporate prosecutions, the organization has
sufficient resources to pay for counsel, and it often provides separate
counsel for its officers and employees, even at the preliminary stages of an
investigation.424 The unusual possibility in which a corporation may be
prosecuted when it does not have the assets to retain an attorney will arise
in two situations: (1) when it is bankrupt and without enough money to pay
an attorney; or (2) when all or part of its assets have been seized by the
government, which may prevent it from disbursing its funds.425
423. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) ("We therefore hold that the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no
indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has
afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.").
424. See Henning, White Collar Crime, supra note 102, at 453 ("At the pre-indictment
stage ... targets of the investigation will often seek separate legal counsel; corporations
whose officers are also involved in investigations will frequently provide separate counsel at
the company's expense.").
425. The latter situation occurred in United States v. Unimex, Inc., 991 F.2d 546 (9th
Cir. 1993), when the government secured an exparte order seizing all of a corporation's $2
million of assetsbefore trial on drug conspiracy and currency reporting violations. Id. at 547.
The corporation sought the return of $100,000 to retain counsel, which the district court
denied without holding a hearing. Id. The corporation was not represented by counsel at
trial when it was convicted along with the company's president. Id. at 549. The corporation
appealed its conviction on the ground that it had been denied its Sixth Amendment right to
counsel at trial. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
conviction was unconstitutional because the corporation had been deprived of its Sixth
Amendment right. Id. at 551. The court's analysis in reaching this conclusion, however, was
convoluted at best, and ultimately falls short of the proper analysis of a corporation's right
to assistance of counsel.
The Ninth Circuit began by stating: "Being incorporeal, corporations cannot be
imprisoned, so they have no constitutional right to appointed counsel." Id. at 550. The court
reviewed the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (1988), which provides for the
appointment of counsel for indigent persons who are entitled under the Sixth Amendment or
who face the loss of liberty. Id. at 549. It found that corporations do not qualify under that
provision because they neither have any Sixth Amendment right to counsel nor can they be
divested of a liberty interest. Id. The circuit court then reversed the conviction on the
ground that the pre-trial seizure of the defendant corporation's assets by the district court,
without providing an opportunity to contest the freeze order, was unconstitutional:
Unimex's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and to Due Process under the
Fifth Amendment were violated by taking away all of its assets, denying it an
opportunity to show cause prior to its criminal trial that an amount it could have used
for attorneys' fees was nonforfeitable, and then forcing it to trial without counsel.
Id. at 551.
The problem facing the court in Unimex was the Supreme Court's holdings in United
States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989), and Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S.
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The Supreme Court's framework for providing counsel to indigent
defendants excludes corporations from invoking the right in a manner
similar to the denial of protection under the Indictment and Jury Trial
Clauses, at least for cases outside of criminal contempt. Under each
provision, the punishment a defendant may suffer constitutes the line for
determining the scope of protection afforded by the constitutional provision.
However, automatically denying a corporation the right to appointed counsel
because it cannot be sentenced to a term of imprisonment may not be
sufficient to protect a corporate defendant from misuse of governmental
power.
The Supreme Court has explained that the reason for requiring counsel
in criminal prosecutions is that "reason and reflection require us to recognize
that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel
is provided for him.""26  The govermnent's power to seize assets before
trial raises the troubling possibility that it may seek to use that power to
prevent a corporation from defending itself because the business does not
have the right to appointed counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
427
Disabling corporate financial resources through an asset seizure makes a
guilty plea the only plausible alternative for the corporation to free its assets,
if it cannot defend itself by hiring an attorney.
The possibility of coercive action against a corporation, aided by an
asset seizure that prevents a company from having adequate legal representa-
tion, would be a significant harm. Therefore, at least in that narrow
circumstance, a court should recognize the corporation's right to invoke the
Sixth Amendment and have counsel appointed for it.428  Moreover, the
corporation's right to counsel should not depend on showing that the
government seized the assets with the intent to deprive the corporation of
counsel because a corporate defendant does not have the ultimate protection
of the right to appointed counsel. 29
617 (1989), which held that there is no violation of the right to counsel when the government
lawfully seizes assets before trial that a defendant would use to retain counsel. Monsanto,
491 U.S. at 616; Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 632. In order to avoid finding a general
corporate right to counsel through the use of seized assets, Unimex provided only the very
narrow protection that a court must hold a pretrial hearing on the propriety of the
government's seizure at which the corporation has the right to counsel.
426. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
427. Cf United States v. Route 2, Box 472, 60 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1995)
(government sought in rem forfeiture of all the corporation's land based on the illegal acts
of a shareholder who owned 68% of the stock).
428. The contortions required to reach a similar result in Unimex show that a direct
weighing of the need to protect the corporation is the more satisfactory analysis.
429. In Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989), the Court held that
the government's potential power to abuse the asset forfeiture provisions to deprive
defendants of the counsel of their choice did not constitute a violation of the right to counsel.
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The government already assumes the cost of providing counsel for
individual defendants, and given the rare circumstance under which a
corporation can qualify for appointed counsel, extending that right to a
corporate defendant would not entail significantly higher costs. The
corporate defendant's need for counsel is vital because the organization can
only appear in court through counsel to challenge the seizure and defend
itself in the criminal action; corporations generally cannot appear pro se. 430
Even if the government charges a corporation along with one of its officers
or employees in the same proceeding, they may have conflicting interests,
such as mutually exclusive defenses. In that circumstance, the individual
officer's attorney could not adequately represent the corporation. Moreover,
the presence of counsel for the corporation is unlikely to have any
significant effect on the government's power to investigate and prosecute
violations. Counsel for the corporation would simply ensure a fair
adjudication.
The obvious problem with recognizing a corporation's Sixth Amend-
ment rights in the limited circumstance where the government's asset freeze
or seizure deprived the corporation of the ability to retain counsel is the
Supreme Court's clear limitation of the right to appointed counsel to cases
involving actual imprisonment. One solution would be to adopt the analysis
used for criminal contempt cases involving a "serious" fine for a corporate
Sixth Amendment claim. In Bagwell, the Supreme Court dispensed with the
exclusive focus on the potential punishment for determining the jury trial
right to accord corporations constitutional protection in a special circum-
stance that involved a substantial danger that the government could misuse
its prosecutorial power. Such an approach for the right to appointed counsel
for a corporation that cannot retain counsel due to the government's action
to restrain corporate assets would not damage the predominant Sixth
Amendment analysis that generally excludes corporations from having the
right to appointed counsel. Creating a narrow exception that recognizes the
limited circumstance in which a corporate defendant can invoke the
constitutional protection comports with the broader approach to corporate
Id. at 634. The underlying premise of the analysis was that the Sixth Amendment required
the government to provide counsel if the asset forfeiture caused a defendant to lose the
economic means to retain an attorney. A corporate defendant whose assets have been seized
and cannot retain counsel has no right to appointed counsel, and therefore the Court's
approach in Caplin & Drysdale should not prevent finding a potential Sixth Amendment
violation when the asset forfeiture effectively denies the right to counsel. The Court could
uphold the validity of the forfeiture by extending the constitutional requirement that counsel
be appointed to the corporation, despite the fact that the corporation cannot be incarcerated,
to supply the missing component from Caplin & Drysdale's Sixth Amendment analysis.




criminal constitutional rights that grants a right to prevent a substantial
abuse of governmental power.
VII. CONCLUSION
Hale v. Henkel established that a corporation does not have all of the
criminal constitutional rights granted to individuals. The Framers of the
Constitution did not explicitly include corporations within the protection of
its provisions.43' Because of the lack of any clear analysis for applying
the constitutional protections to corporations, the Supreme Court has
struggled with the scope of the various provisions applicable to criminal
defendants.
Hale v. Henkel provided the foundation for analyzing corporate criminal
constitutional rights. Under Hale v. Henkel, a corporation cannot claim the
same measure or degree of protection that the individual defendant may
claim, but the corporation is not bereft of all constitutional rights in a
criminal prosecution. The scope of a corporation's protection depends on
weighing the effect of recognizing the corporate right on the government's
enforcement program with the possibility that, absent the constitutional
protection, the government will misuse its power unfairly to convict and
sanction a corporate defendant. Hale v. Henkel's analysis should be
extended to determine whether a corporate defendant can invoke the
protection of other criminal constitutional rights. Indeed, that approach is
reflected in later cases involving the rights of corporations and other
business organizations under the Self-Incrimination Clause and the Fourth
Amendment.
Applying Hale v. Henkel's analysis to corporate criminal constitutional
rights demonstrates that the Court's initial approach to a corporation's rights
in a criminal matter was not an aberration or the result of a political choice
to further the populist sentiment against corporate excess. That case comes
to a seemingly odd result, denying one constitutional protection to an entity
that is subject to criminal punishment just like any individual while
recognizing another when both provisions apply to "persons." Yet, Hale v.
Henkel reflects the reality that corporations are not the same as individuals
and may not lay claim to every constitutional right and privilege accorded
to the individual.
The Constitution grants significant protection to the individual, even at
the cost of permitting some guilty defendants to avoid prosecution, because
the rights serve the important social value of protecting the individual from
the government's misuse of its power. Granting the same protection to the
431. Mayer, supra note 8, at 579 ("The Constitution does not mention corporations.").
Professor Mayer pointed out that the Framers were probably aware of the existence of




corporation, which can operate through a number of different agents and can
transmute its form virtually at will, would ultimately confer so much
protection that the criminal prosecution of the corporation could be unduly
frustrated. The philosophical status of the corporation as a legal being,
whether it be a "real" or an "artificial" entity, does not confer constitutional
rights. Instead, the question is how much protection is "appropriate" for a
corporation.432 That inquiry, first undertaken in Hale v. Henkel, points out
the importance of considering corporate claims to constitutional protection
in criminal prosecutions not on the basis that the corporation is the same as
the individual. Instead, the Court should acknowledge that corporate
criminal constitutional rights present a special case that requires careful
consideration to determine whether, and not just how much, constitutional
protection the Constitution affords.
432. In a famous essay attacking the debate over whether a corporation was a "person"
or not, John Dewey states: "In saying that 'person' might legally mean whatever the law
makes it mean, I am trying to say that 'person' might be used simply as a synonym for a
right-and-duty-bearing unit. Any such unit would be a person; such a statement would be
truistic, tautological." John Dewey, The HistoricBackgroundofCorporateLegal Personality,
35 YALE L.J. 655, 656 (1926). Dewey's attack on theorizing about the nature of the
corporation "muzzled the arguments on corporate personhood which had raged for more than
two decades." Hager, supra note 52, at 635.
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